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ABSTRACT 
Since 2006, the gang related homicide rate in Salinas, California has quadrupled.  As of 
2009 the homicide rate associated with gang activity far exceeds those of much larger 
cities such as San Francisco, San Jose, and even Los Angeles, California.  This report 
examines this negative trend through the lens of counterinsurgency, since gangs exhibit 
many similarities in structure and tactics to insurgent groups.  Accordingly, this thesis 
capitalizes on the diverse academic theories available to the study of counterinsurgencies.  
While the common narrative for an effective counterinsurgency campaign focuses on the 
importance of information dominance, there has been little research into component 
factors that might either promote, or inhibit, the flow of information that is also critical in 
combating the American street gang phenomenon.  In reality, gangs exist because of an 
information advantage bestowed upon them by the population.  Thus, we postulate that 
two factors, information volume and information processing, mutually contribute to 
information dominance with respect to a counter-gang strategy.  Through comparative 
analysis, our research suggests that improving relationships between the population and 
the government encourages more communication about gang activities.  Additionally, 
improving communication structures within the government enhances information 
processing.  Combined, these two factors reduce the gang’s information advantage. 
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Is there a place in modern law enforcement practices for the adoption of 
unconventional warfare techniques to counter the proliferation of street gangs in 
American society?  We think there is.  However, prior to understanding how 
counterinsurgency (COIN) theory can play a significant role in developing an effective 
counter-gang strategy, one must first examine and understand the similarities and 
differences between urban street gangs and insurgent forces.  Despite the differences, a 
detailed evaluation of the characteristics of both groups will make evident how an 
effective strategy grounded in counterinsurgency doctrine can be used to combat street 
gangs.  While the delineation between gangs and insurgent groups may at first seem 
clear-cut, in our ever changing world, the lines of distinction between different groups of 
armed young men are not so clear. 
A. COMPARING GANGS AND INSURGENTS 
1. The American Street Gang 
One can get lost in the myriad of descriptive terms used to describe gangs.  The 
term "gang" has no fixed legal meaning.  Definitions of gangs have varied over time, 
according to the perceptions and interests of the definer, academic fashions, and the 
changing social reality of the gang.  States have varying legal definitions of gangs.  
According to the California State Penal Code, a street gang is defined as an “ongoing 
organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, 
having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more [violent] criminal 
acts; having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members 
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang 
activity.”1  The Texas Penal Code defines street gangs as three or more persons having a 
common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership who continuously or 
                                                 
1 California State Penal Code, Title 7, Chapter 11:186.22, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/ (accessed 
11/12/2010). 
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regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities.”2  The Merriam-Webster’s 
dictionary defines a gang as, “a group of persons working to unlawful or antisocial 
ends.”3  
While Merriam-Webster may have found closure on a concise definition of 
“gang,” it is not so clear to the agencies and organizations that are tasks with combating 
illicit gang activity on a daily basis.  According to Donald Lyddane, an intelligence 
analyst for the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), no clear national consensus of 
what constitutes a gang has ever been fully reached.4  Because there is no national 
standard definition of a gang, definitions can change from one law enforcement 
jurisdiction to another. Lyddane does highlight one common denominator used in 
virtually every gang definition, one that is prevalent in most literature on the subject, and 
that is that gang members are involved in continuing criminal activity.  These activities 
can range from the sale of drugs, running prostitution rings, to human smuggling. 
Some definitions of gangs are classified strictly by the activities of their members, 
David Curry and Scott Decker, in their research on gangs note that most gangs define 
themselves along two distinct lines: (1) involvement in criminal activities, or (2) the 
affiliation of gang membership through cultural aspects such as familial ties.5  While 
definitively determining the correct and all encompassing definition of a gang is a 
worthwhile objective, this lofty goal is beyond the scope of this research.  Suffice it to 
say, these definitional questions reveal a lack of consensus on the significance of the 
gang problem, and in turn make it extremely difficult to determine what strategic policies 
might best address this growing threat.  For the purposes of this research, it is adequate to 
say that a gang is a group of individuals who constitute criminal organizations for the 
purpose of financial gain. 
                                                 
2 Texas Penal Code, Title 11, Chapter 71:71.01.d, http://law.justia.com/ (accessed 11/12/2010). 
3 Merriam Webster Online, "Gang," http://www.merriam-webster.com/ (accessed 11/12/2010). 
4 Donald Lyddane, "Understanding Gangs and Gang Mentality: Acquiring Evidence of the Gang 
Conspiracy," United States Attorneys' Bulletin: Gangs 54, no. 3 (May 2006). 
5 David G. Curry and Scott H. Decker, Confronting Gangs: Crime and Community, Second ed. (Los 
Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2003), 14. 
 3
2. The Insurgent 
Compared to the broad definition of gangs, the definition of insurgents on the 
other hand, has been honed to a much finer point of understanding.  The latest Army 
Counterinsurgency Manual, FM 3–24, defines an insurgency by its actions rather than 
any organizational doctrine.  It defines insurgency as, “an organized movement aimed at 
the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed 
conflict.”6   
3. Commonalities and Differences 
a. Strategic Objectives 
This definition of insurgencies brings to the forefront the primary 
difference between street gangs and insurgencies, and that is that both organizations 
pursue different strategic objectives.  As history has shown, most notable insurgent 
movements—the Maoist Chinese, the Hukbalahap movement in the Philippines, or the 
Iraq insurgency for example—desire to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate 
power within the country, or to break away from state control and form an autonomous 
area.  Conversely, most traditional street gangs have focused their efforts on maximizing 
financial profit.  Pursuant to this, gangs typically engage in illegal activity outside of the 
normal markets established by the state.  Gangs, like insurgencies, strive for freedom of 
movement within a particular area of interest in order to push the expansion of their 
illegal markets further into society.  Interviews with incarcerated gang members show 
that many gangs are organized strictly for the purpose of selling illegal drugs.7  The 




                                                 
6 United States Army and Marine Corps, FM 3–24, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 1–1. 
7 Curry and Decker, Confronting Gangs: Crime and Community, 95. 
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distribution is well organized and provided the primary motivation for membership, and 
that many gangs in California effectively controlled the drug markets in their 
territories.”8  
b. Operational Objectives 
Insurgent groups are not void of using criminal activity for achieving 
financial gain.  Insurgent groups in Iraq as well as those in Columbia, most notably the 
FARC, have engaged in kidnapping and other illegal activity to fund their organizations.  
The difference is financial gain is not the insurgent’s strategic objective.  By most 
accounts, insurgencies are inherently political in nature.  Financial gain is but one 
operational objective for the insurgency to continue to grow and achieve its ultimate goal 
of replacing the state apparatus.   
c. Coercive Influence 
Both gangs and insurgents tend to expand their influence in an area by co-
opting individuals and organizations through bribery, coercion and intimidation to sustain 
their activities.  In some cases the line between gangs and insurgents has become 
increasingly blurry.  According to Max Manwaring, gangs are beginning to emerge as a 
serious impediment to democratic governance and free market economies.  In his 
monograph, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit 
Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Jamaica, and Brazil, Manwaring states:   
Rather than trying to depose a government with a major stroke (golpe or 
coup) or in a prolonged revolutionary war, as some insurgents have done, 
gangs and their allies (the gang phenomenon) more subtly take control of 
territory and people one street or neighborhood at a time (coup d’ street) 
or one individual, business, or government office at a time. Thus, whether 
a gang is specifically a criminal or insurgent type organization is 
irrelevant. Its putative objective is to neutralize, control, or depose 
 
 
                                                 
8 Curry and Decker, Confronting Gangs: Crime and Community, 95.  
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governments to ensure self-determined (nondemocratic) ends. This 
objective defines insurgency, a serious political agenda, and a clash 
regarding the authoritative allocation of values in a society.9 
d. Origins 
There are many theories that attempt to explain why insurgencies exist.  
Yet, not all agree upon the factors that motivate their creation and rise.  The insurgencies 
that have plagued the twentieth century were predominately revolutionary in nature, 
following communist or socialist tenants; however, the twenty-first century has 
demonstrated something different, expanding our view, and defining the insurgency in 
different terms.  Religious ideologies of all persuasions have become predominate 
insurgent motivators, suggesting that insurgencies can also be something different from 
nationalistic fervor.  In reality, insurgencies are the result of something much more 
characteristic of human nature, and arise from persistent pressures placed upon society 
itself.  For example, it is helpful to view the insurgency as an “evolutionary” phenomena 
rather than a “revolutionary” one, suggesting that they do not occur overnight.  In his 
analysis of the current Afghan insurgency, Seth Jones states, “insurgency [is] caused by 
two…factors.  First, the structural collapse of the state [providing] a permissive 
condition.  [And] second, ideology [as] a direct motivation for insurgent leaders.”10  
Thus, an insurgency is more than a mere popular uprising, but rather a crisis that fills the 
vacuum resulting from instability and a lack of credibility of the state. 
Traditional theories on the origins of gangs identified dysfunctional 
families, failed education systems, and a lack on social institutions as antecedent 
conditions that lead many young people into the gang lifestyle.  However, in recent years 
these theories have begun to degrade in the face of new evidence that shows that the 
traditional stereotypes of gang members from impoverished neighborhoods and single 
                                                 
9 Max G. Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit 
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and 
Brazil (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College, [2008]). 
10 Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad," International 
Security 32, no. 4 (2008), 15, http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed 11/12/2010). 
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parent families with low education is too restrictive.11  Many young people in inner city 
America grow up in environments where gangs are already established, for this reason it 
is a matter of whether that individual decides to join the gang or not.  Those who choose 
to join gangs in many cases believe that it will increase their chances of securing 
monetary gains.  While financial security is a highly motivating factor, it is not the sole 
motivation for joining gangs.  In some cases it’s an individual’s search for identity, or the 
need for security and protection that drives them to join.  It is important to emphasize that 
individuals join gangs for a myriad of reasons, some no doubt are caused by 
socioeconomic conditions, for others it’s a since of belonging.  The tie that binds many of 
these reasons together is self interest.12   
e. The Population: The Source of Strength 
Of all the differences and similarities between gangs and insurgents, one 
similarity is of most importance: both organizations need the active or tacit support of the 
population to conduct their activities.  Like insurgents, urban gangs use surreptitious 
methods to gain a relative advantage over an effected city’s security apparatus, as well as 
its population, through corruption, coercion, and intimidation.  In many cases this is done 
through taking advantage of economically depressed areas that do not have the social 
cohesion or social institutions in place to repel their advances.  Because of the illicit 
nature of gangs and insurgencies, they are forced “underground” in order to survive 
because they typically do not have the size and strength to threaten or replace the state’s 
security forces.  For this reason these organizations seek out support from the population 
from which they gather recruits, weapons, and money to carry out operations.   
The Army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that in every 
insurgency, regardless of its cause, there will exists an active minority population that 
supports the insurgent, a passive majority population, and an active minority population 
                                                 
11 Finn-Aage Esbensen, "Preventing Adolescent Gang Involvement," Juvenile Justice Bulletin, no. 
September (2000), http://www.ncjrs.gov/ (accessed 11/12/2010). 
12 Martín Sánchez-Jankowski, Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991), 382. 
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that opposes the insurgency.13  The strategy for the insurgent then becomes swaying the 
passive majority to either support the insurgency, or at the least not interfere with his 
activities. Similarly, gangs require support from the population in order to survive.   
While some may find it easy to dismiss the analogy between gangs and 
insurgents based on the differing ideologies, or strategic objectives of either group, there 
is validity in making the comparisons between them.  Regardless of their differences, the 
actions of either group can have a significant destabilizing effect on society.  Truly 
understanding these organization’s ties to the population is the key to developing any real 
strategic solutions to either problem.   
B THE SMALL TOWN INSURGENCY 
1. Gang Proliferation 
Gang migration from large cities to suburban and rural areas has increased over 
the last twenty years and is a continuous concern for law enforcement agencies.  Gangs 
that were once formed in major cities are now becoming fully entrenched in many 
smaller communities across the nation.  Gang members who migrate to smaller areas 
form new neighborhood street gangs who quickly take control of areas through violence 
and intimidation.  “The percentage of law enforcement agencies in the United States 
reporting gang activity in their jurisdictions increased from 45% in 2004 to 58% in 
2008.”14  In the wake of this infiltration of gangs into rural America comes criminal 
activities such as violence and drug trafficking.   
                                                 
13 United States Army and Marine Corps, FM 3–24, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1–16. 
14 The National Gang Intelligence Center, 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment (Washington, D.C.: 
National Gang Intelligence Center, [2009]), http://www.justice.gov/ (accessed 11/12/2010). 
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2. Gang Membership 
a. National Gang Presence 
According to the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC)15, gang 
membership in the United States was estimated at 1 million members as of September 
2008.  Based on reporting from federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, this 
estimation has increased from 800,000 in 2005.  Current estimates include approximately 
900,000 active gang members in communities throughout the continental United States, 
and another 147,000 gang members incarcerated in correctional facilities.16   
b. Gang Presence in the Pacific Region  
States in the Pacific rank among the highest percentage of their 
populations as being identified as gang members.  There are approximately 6,900 gangs 
operating in the pacific region of the United States (California and Nevada) with an 
estimated aggregated membership of 237,000.  Data from the National Drug Threat 
Survey conducted in 2008 shows the percentage of law enforcement agencies reporting 
gang activity in their areas has grown from 66% in 2004 to 77% in 2008.  The NGIC 
predictions of future gang activity are rather sobering.  They predict Hispanic gangs will 
continue to fight for control of retail-level drug distribution in locations throughout the 
Pacific Region.  Additionally, gang related crime levels are predicted to remain 
significant as gangs continue to fight for control of territories.  Lastly gang-related 
extortion and fire arms violations will likely increase.17   
c. Salinas, California 
In 1999, it was estimated that there were 52 street gangs in Monterey 
County, with approximately 3,000 members.  Of these, 16 gangs were estimated to reside 
                                                 
15 NGIC is a multiagency effort that integrates the gang intelligence assets of federal, state, and local 
law enforcement entities to serve as a centralized intelligence resource for gang information and analytical 
support.  
16 The National Gang Intelligence Center, 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment,6. 
17 The National Gang Intelligence Center, 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment, 19. 
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in Salinas, CA with an estimated membership of 1,500 to 2,000.18  As of 2009, this 
estimate has risen to 5,000 active gang members operating in Monterey County with 
more than 70% of them residing in Salinas, CA.  The largest percentage of Hispanic gang 
members in the county are aligned with the Norteños (Northerners) or the Sureños 
(Southerners).  Norteños is a commonly used generic name for a variety of gangs that are 
allied with the Nuestra Familia (NF), which has traditionally been responsible for 
orchestrating many of the violent crimes in Northern California. The NF, whose 
headquarters traditionally has been in Salinas, is also responsible for the majority of the 
narcotics trafficking in much of the region.  Similarly, The Sureños is a generic name for 
gangs allied with the Mexican Mafia.  Sureños, the traditional enemies of the Norteños, 
are expanding their power base through the Mexican Mafia’s increasing influence in 
Southern California, and have begun to make their presence felt in Salinas.19  
3. Gang Violence 
In 1998, 15% of all violent crimes in Salinas were classified as gang-related; 17% 
of all homicides committed in Salinas were classified as gang-related.  While statistically 
overall crime in Salinas has seen a downward trend, the percentage of gang-related crime 
has increased.  In 2009, 27% of all violent crimes were classified as gang-related, and the 
percentage of homicides that were classified as gang-related soared to 96%.20  Since 
2006, the homicide rate in Salinas has quadrupled.  From 2006 to 2009, the homicide rate 
grew from 4.7 per 100,000 people to an all-time high of 20.4 per 100,000 in 2009, while 




                                                 
18 Estimation from Brian Contreras, Director of Second Chance, as cited in The Prevention Institute, 
Cultivating Peace in Salinas: A Framework for Violence Prevention,[1999]), 6. 
19 Marie Glavin, Monterey County's Comprehensive Violence Prevention, Intervention, Suppression 
and Reentry Framework (Salinas, CA: Renaissance Resources West, [2009]), 7. 
20 Crime statistics are from the Salinas Police Department database.  See Appendix A for more detail. 
21  Federal Bureau of Investigations, FBI Uniform Crime Reports, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/ucr (accessed 05/05/2010). 
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a per capita murder rate and a per capita crime rate that far exceeded other cities of 
similar populations in California.22  In 2009, the City of Salinas ranked 4th in the State of 
California for homicides per capita.23 
4. Perceptions of Gang Violence 
Police reports and interviews with gang task force personnel reveal that the 
intensity of gang crime and violence has escalated from 2008 to mid 2010.  The increased 
lethality of shootings and the blatant daytime occurrences of gang violence have created 
an increased sense of fear among citizens and businesses.  The high concern among local 
Salinas citizens about the seriousness of gang violence in their community is not over-
estimated, nor is it anecdotal.  In 1996, an independent study of crime in Monterey 
County found that gang violence was considered the most prevalent form of violence in 
Salinas.24  Thirteen years later, a 2009 survey of registered voters in Salinas revealed that 
98% of voters considered gangs and youth violence to be an extremely serious problem in 
the city, and 96% regarded gang related crime to be an extremely serious problem.25  The 
citizens are not alone.  The Salinas Chief of Police, Louis Fetherolf, also understands the 
seriousness of gang proliferation, as evidenced by some recent public addresses where he 
stated:   
There is no sector of our community unaffected by violent or major crime; 
gangs are at the heart of most crime in Salinas. We cannot overemphasize 
this point, we need your help.  We need your eyes, your ears, and your 
assistance in reporting crime or suspicious activity.26  Parents need to step 
up, relatives need to step up. Neighbors need to talk about what it is they 
                                                 
22 Glavin, Monterey County's Comprehensive Violence Prevention, Intervention, Suppression and 
Reentry Framework, 7. 
23 Louis Fetherolf, Report to the Community July 2010 (Salinas, CA: Salinas Police Department, 
[2010]). 
24 Applied Survey Research, The Tellus Project: Improving the Quality of Life in Monterey County, 
August 1996.  As cited by Glavin, The Prevention Institute, Cultivating Peace in Salinas: A Framework for 
Violence Prevention, 6. 
25 Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin & Associates (FMM&A), conducted a poll from May 2–4, 2009 of 400 
City of Salinas registered voters likely to cast a ballot in an upcoming election.   
26 Fetherolf, Report to the Community July 2010, 1–4. 
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see and share that with us. . . .We need people to step forward and talk 
about whom they know are involved in this criminal activity.27 
The words of Chief Fetherolf could have just as easily come from the mouths of 
frustrated military leaders who faced a mounting insurgency in Iraq in 2005.  
Unfortunately, this problem is much closer to home.  Chief Fetherolf’s pleas to the 
citizens of Salinas clearly indicate the need by local law enforcement for actionable 
intelligence on gang activity, and rightly so.  For it is becoming increasingly clear that no 
community is immune to the growing presence and associated violence of street gangs.   
5. Vulnerable Population 
According to the Salinas Police, “Monterey County can be described as the 
‘northern edge’ of the border with Mexico.  There is concern that Mexican cartels are 
exploiting local migrant populations to penetrate the region, potentially in conjunction 
with one or both of the prison-based gangs.”28  Recent immigrants and or undocumented 
foreigners come to work in Monterey County’s abundant agricultural industry.  These 
individuals usually face a myriad of cultural adjustments and language barriers that 
isolates them and makes them extremely vulnerable to gang coercion.  This is the perfect 
environment for gangs to thrive; amid a group of foreigners that will not, or cannot talk to 
the police about their activities.  This is very similar to the ways in which an insurgent 
group infiltrates and exploits sectors of an isolated population to further their influence in 
an area.  Similarly, when a gang controls a particular territory, it will have freedom to 
maneuver as it sees fit.  When describing the gangs in Salinas, Chief Fetherolf said, “[The 
gangs] operate with impunity, with no expectation of being caught” (personal 
communication, Chief Fetherolf, 2010). 
                                                 
27 Lucero Benitez, "Salinas Chief Says what are You Doing to Solve Crime," Central Coast News, 
http://www.kionrightnow.com/ (accessed 11/12/2010). 
28 Glavin, Monterey County's Comprehensive Violence Prevention, Intervention, Suppression and 
Reentry Framework, 26. 
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6. Law Enforcement Challenges 
One of the major challenges in addressing the violence caused by gangs in Salinas 
has been the lack of sufficient information on exactly who is committing the crime.  
Chief Fetherolf stated, “The number of arrests [the Salinas Police Department] makes on 
homicides is abysmal because we have a problem with the community.  The community 
does not trust us and will not communicate with us; by and large, especially the Latino 
community.  There is a language barrier and a trust barrier” (personal communication, 
Chief Fetherolf, 2010). 
A second major challenge facing the Salinas Police Department (SPD) is how to 
process crime information that comes to them in a manner that will optimize their efforts 
to reduce gang violence.  The business of tracking, storing, recalling, and sharing 
information efficiently across multiple agencies and or departments is a monumental task 
for any organization, and SPD is no exception.  Chief Fetherolf explained the problem in 
very clear in a recent interview; “[the SPD] is systems poor.  Information is not dealt with 
in a systematic way, and so officers get information and hold it close to their chests so 
they can make their arrests.  Information is not shared universally throughout the 
department.  This is a critical deficiency we have to overcome” (personal communication, 
Chief Fetherolf, 2010). 
7. Gangs: A "Wicked" Problem in Salinas 
For many given problems an exhaustive formulation can be constructed 
containing all the information a problem solver needs for understanding and solving the 
problem, these are considered “tame” problems.  Unfortunately, this is not the case when 
trying to solve the gang problem, because the locus of the difficulty is so complex it is 
not possible to definitively solve for all the possible conditions that lead to such a social 
phenomenon.29  For this reason, we see the gang problem as a “wicked problem”.  Rittel 
and Webber eloquently describe the problem of determining the effectiveness of 
solutions for wicked problems: 
                                                 
29 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," Policy 
Sciences 4 (1973), 161, http://www.springerlink.com/ (accessed 11/14/2010). 
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For tame-problems one can determine on the spot how good a solution-
attempt has been. More accurately, the test of a solution is entirely under 
the control of the few people who are involved and interested in the 
problem. With wicked problems, on the other hand, any solution, after 
being implemented, will generate waves of consequences over an 
extended—virtually an unbounded—period of time. The full consequences 
cannot be appraised until the waves of repercussions have completely run 
out, and we have no way of tracing all the waves through all the affected 
lives ahead of time or within a limited time span.30 
In Salinas, as the levels of gang violence increase, there is an increasing degree of 
media coverage of the issue.  This increased media coverage, in turn, results in a greater 
degree of general public fear.  As the level of public fear rises, the police are put under 
increasing pressure to produce a greater number of gang-related arrests.  This results in a 
short-term decrease in the levels of gang violence.  However, over the long-term, it is 
apparent that increases in public fear produce a greater divide between the city 
government and the population that they are contractually obligated to protect.  This loss 
of trust between the city and the population results in frustrated city workers who are 
struggling to meet their obligations as public servants.  In Salinas, this frustration often 
results in heavy-handed approaches toward the population that, although well intentioned, 
only serve to improve the gangs' abilities to recruit new members.  “Both the Norteños 
and the Sureños have been aggressively recruiting new members to fuel their efforts to 
control their territory.”31 In other words, gang recruitment is made easier as the gang is 
better able to capitalize on its anti-establishment essence.  Predictably, this increase in 
recruitment only serves to eventually reignite the flames of gang violence within the 
community as gangs grow and vie for precious real-estate in which to expand their drug 
markets.  In order to break the cycle of gang violence we believe a more unconventional 
approach is needed.  While the repercussions of any solution to the gang problem cannot 
be completely foreseen and evaluated, we believe an approach that has been proven 
effective in combating insurgencies has some merit in combating the proliferation of 
gang violence in our communities.   
                                                 
30 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 163.  
31 Glavin, Monterey County's Comprehensive Violence Prevention, Intervention, Suppression and 
Reentry Framework, 26. 
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C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand what aspects of COIN doctrine, when 
applied to counter-gang operations, can have the most affect on reducing the levels of 
gang violence in Salinas, CA.  The quintessential question is: how can Salinas overcome 
this “wicked problem” and reduce its level of gang violence?  It is our belief that a 
narrow focus on short term suppression efforts comes at the expense of a broader, long-
term prevention and intervention focus that is also necessary to break the recurring cycle 
of violence.  We believe COIN doctrine can provide critical insight into improving 
counter-gang efforts. 
The scope of this research will focus on the use of information to effectively 
target street gangs in Salinas.  In order to “use information” two things must exist: first 
the city government must actually have information on gang activity, and secondly the 
city must be able to process this information to use it effectively.  Potentially the 
collective population of Salinas has the information about gang activity and infrastructure 
needed by the city leadership to allow for an efficient and effective dismantling of gangs 
in their community.  We want to explore what factors contribute to the population’s 
willingness to share information with the police, and what factors within the city 
government contribute to their ability to share information across agencies and 
departments.  Using COIN doctrine as a guide, we analyze whether city government 
legitimacy, population security, the population’s trust of city government, and the 
embeddedness of the local government within the community influence the population’s 
willingness to share crime information with the police and city government.  
Furthermore, we analyze whether unity of effort within government, operational 
autonomy, and systems integration influence the city’s ability to process information.   
D. ROADMAP 
To fully understand the specific context of the gang problem in Salinas, our 
analysis will focus on three main stakeholders within the city: (1) the general population 
of Salinas, (2) the Salinas Police Department, and (3) the civilian city employees. In the 
proceeding chapters we will analyze perceptions of these three demographics of the city 
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to obtain a deeper understanding of how different aspects of the population view the gang 
problem, as well as each other.  From this analysis we hope to identify areas where major 
schisms are preventing a collaborative approach to the gang problem from occurring.   
1. Methodology and Theory 
Chapter II outlines the methodology used in this study and addresses the 
difficulties and limitations of our research.  Chapter III discusses in detail the latest 
fundamental theories in COIN and criminology literature.  We use these theories as a 
departure point from which to develop a theory of how to reduce gang violence.  Chapter 
III concludes with an outline of our basic hypotheses.   
2. Statistical Analysis 
Chapters IV through VII contain the bulk of our analysis on the different aspects 
of the population.  Using descriptive and analytical statistics we attempt to measure the 
perceptions of the different stakeholders and build regression models to better understand 
how the perceptions of the citizens interrelate with one another.  Chapter IV focuses on 
the correlations between crime tips and the levels of gang crime in the city.  Chapter V 
focuses on the perceptions of the population with respect to city government and law 
enforcement agencies using descriptive and analytical statistics.  Chapter VI analyzes the 
perceptions of the SPD with respect to the population, gang violence, and city 
government.  Chapter VII analyses the perceptions of city hall and civilian city 
employees with respect to gang crime and law enforcement agencies. 
3. Social Network Analysis 
Chapter VIII focuses specifically on the SPD’s level of information sharing using 
social network analysis.  This analysis was designed to measure, visualize, and 
understand the contact network, the advice network, the intelligence network, and the 
assistance or trust network within the SPD.  This analysis illustrates the strength of 
communication between the different units within the SPD and highlights areas where the 
SPD can improve its ability to collaborate among departments. 
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4. Results and Conclusions 
Chapter IX summarizes our research and offers insight to the areas where schisms 
exist between the population and the city government, as well as within city government 
itself.  This analysis adds understanding of those areas that might be friction points 
between the city government and the population that may retard a collaborative approach 
to fighting gang violence. This chapter concludes with some policy recommendations to 
the Salinas city government on areas where it can improve its ability to extract crime 
information from the population and improve its ability to process the information once it 
is obtained. 
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II. THEORY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Is there a causal relationship or link between information dominance32 and the 
levels of gang violence experienced by a city?  More specifically, what conditions must 
exist, either naturally or by artificial means, for civic authorities and law enforcement 
personnel to extract the required information from the population to effectively target 
gangs in their cities?  The argument put forth in this paper is that a whole-of-government 
focus on the collection and processing of information on gang activity can optimize the 
limited resources of city and law enforcement officials, and enable more effective 
targeting of gang activity.  In essence, we argue that a more proactive information-centric 
strategy focused on building a complete picture of a gang network will be more effective 
at countering gang activity than a reactive prosecution-based strategy intended to disable 
these criminal networks in a more iterative, piecemeal fashion.  To lend strength to this 
argument, this thesis offers a counter-gang theory that draws from existing military COIN 
theory.  According to COIN theory, to win in counterinsurgency, the government must 
achieve an information advantage over the insurgent.33  To achieve this advantage, 
counterinsurgent forces must proactively collect pertinent information on the insurgent, 
and then effectively analyze and process the information to convert it into actionable 
intelligence.34  
                                                 
32 Endsley and Jones define information dominance as, “the ability to collect, control, exploit, and 
defend information while denying an adversary the ability to do the same.” Mica R. Endsley and William 
M. Jones, Situational Awareness, Information Dominance, and Information Warfare.  Endsley Consulting, 
[1997]), http://www.satechnologies.com/ (accessed 3/9/2010). 
33 Counterinsurgency theory suggests that both the state and the insurgent have opening advantages at 
the onset of a conflict.  The state has a force advantage while the insurgent has an information advantage.  
However, both sides have disadvantages; the state’s opening disadvantage is its inability to “see” the 
insurgent, while the insurgent suffers an opening disadvantage in its inability to forcibly remove the state 
from power.  (Dr. Gordon McCormick, lecture delivered at the Naval Postgraduate School as part of the 
Guerrilla Warfare Seminar, July 2009.) 
34 There is no one concise definition of “actionable intelligence”; however, several sources helped to 
shape the definition that this paper uses.  They include: "Actionable Intelligence Definition from PC 
Magazine Encyclopedia," http://www.pcmag.com/ (accessed 5/21/2010); Stephen K. Iwicki, "Introducing 
the Concept of Actionable Intelligence," http://findarticles.com/ (accessed 5/21/2010); Andrew Borene, 
"Actionable Intelligence," http://www.andrewborene.com/ (accessed 5/21/2010). 
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Prior to the tragedies of September 11, 2001, criminology literature was relatively 
mute on the use of intelligence and its overall effectiveness in defeating rapidly evolving, 
and increasingly more technologically savvy, criminal networks.  Since 2001, however, a 
body of literature has begun to emerge that addresses the need for closer law 
enforcement-community relationships designed to foster the improved collection of 
information, and the streamlined processing of information to produce actionable 
intelligence.  However, because significant resources have thus far been deemed 
necessary to implement the concepts outlined in these emerging theories, their use seems 
to be relegated to the federal levels of law enforcement and a few larger cities such as 
New York and Chicago.  Accordingly, it is rather easy to deduce that the majority of law 
enforcement intelligence collection at the local and state level remains based around a 
reactive model, designed to build court cases for successful prosecution in court.35 
No longer is organized crime relegated to larger metropolises, and the last decade 
has witnessed the rise of powerful gangs in rural America.  The increasing ability of these 
organizations to carry out illegal activities, some of which are transnational and pose an 
increased risk to local government, implies a need for these less-fiscally capable 
communities to collect intelligence on individuals or groups who are likely to engage in 
illegal activity or facilitate those who do.36  For this reason, a more creative approach to 
today’s counter-gang operations is needed; one that is grounded in COIN doctrine and 
practices yet seeks to achieve information supremacy within the reality of small town 
resource constraints to effectively dismantle a highly entrenched criminal opponent. 
                                                 
35 “Very little law enforcement activity is devoted to preventing crime (except by deterrence) as 
opposed to detecting it afterward and apprehending the perpetrators.”  As cited in Abram N. Shulsky and 
Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, Third Edition ed. (Washington, 
D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2002), 155. 
36 Traditionally, this has been handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) who 
distinguishes between criminal intelligence investigations and ordinary criminal investigations.  The FBI’s 
target on criminal intelligence investigations is “an ongoing criminal organization, whose size, 
composition, past acts, intended criminal goals, and capacity to do harm must be determined.” See Shulsky 
and Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 155. Shulsky and Schmitt recognize 
that the line dividing law enforcement work and the work of intelligence organizations is not entirely clear; 
however they make the point that the distinction is usually made from the focus of the investigation.  If the 
end state is one of punishment for a singular criminal act, it seems to fall into a law enforcement realm, but 
if the focus deals with an ongoing struggle with an organization such as a gang, engaged in criminal 
activity, it would seem that this should fall under the jurisdiction of an intelligence organization. 
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B. A THEORY ON GANGS 
There are clear similarities in the origin and development of both gangs and 
insurgencies within society.  In his book Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, Max 
Manwaring observes that street gangs operate most effectively in “non-state” battle 
spaces.37  Conflicts in these areas are akin to “guerrilla warfare,” where the “insurgent” 
thrives amongst the host population of a vulnerable city.  Like insurgents, urban gangs 
use surreptitious methods to gain relative advantage over an affected city’s security 
apparatus, as well as its population, through corruption, coercion, and intimidation.  
These disruptive tactics serve a larger gang strategy of destabilization in pursuit of oft-
illegal political and economic objectives.  However, while there are clear similarities, 
there are also distinct differences in the organizational objectives of gangs and insurgent 
groups.  Most prominently, the difference lies in the insurgent’s violent quest for political 
power, while the gang member seeks power outside of the confines of the traditional 
political system.  Regardless, their actions can have significant destabilizing effects on 
society. 
C. INFORMATION DOMINANCE 
Information dominance requires a focus on three implicit tasks.  First, an 
organization must have the capacity to collect information on an adversary.  Second, the 
organization must possess the ability to control the information, process it, and exploit it 
for further gain.  Third, an organization must be able to defend against an adversary’s 
attempts to gather information on its activities. While this last task is important, it is not 
within the scope of this study.  This thesis will concentrate on the ability of an 
organization to gather information and process it for further exploitation. 38 
                                                 
37 Max G. Manwaring, Street Gangs : The New Urban Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2005), 4, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ (accessed 1/23/2010). 
38 Endsley and Jones, Situational Awareness, Information Dominance, and Information Warfare. 
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D. A THEORY ON INFORMATION DOMINANCE IN 
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 
While most gangs in the United States do not seek to overthrow the existing 
government, the asymmetric relationship between civil authorities and the gangs exhibits 
important similarities to COIN operations.  For this reason, central concepts from COIN 
theory can be useful in identifying and explaining many of the problems city officials 
encounter when conducting counter-gang operations.  In the following sections, a COIN-
based theory of information dominance will be developed to empower communities to 
effectively collect and process information to uncover the infrastructure of illegal 
organizations such as gangs. 
Just as dominating the high ground gives a force a decisive advantage over an 
opponent in a conventional war of maneuver; dominating information in an asymmetric 
conflict provides a similar advantage.  According to Mao Tse-tung, in the early stages of 
a revolutionary movement, the insurgent attacks at a time and place of his choosing and 
then disappears by merging back into the population.39  Mao Tse-tung observed that the 
insurgent moves amongst the population as fish would water, demonstrating the inherent 
connectedness that the insurgent has with a population.40  The population provides 
money, food, guns, and recruits to the insurgent; therefore, it is imperative that these 
facilitation networks remain anonymous, lest they be discovered by the 
counterinsurgent.41  This frames the counterinsurgent’s principle problem: finding the 
insurgents, and their supporters, from among the population.  This task stresses the need 
                                                 
39 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations; Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (Harrisburg, PA: 
Stackpole Books, 1971), 95.  
40 Bard E. O'Neil, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles, VA: 
Brassey's, Inc., 1990), 23.  
41 The Insurgent movements of Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen, and Che Guevara, to name a few, 
demonstrated that the population of any given area holds the key to success of the insurgent by providing 
security, supplies, and reinforcement when needed.  See David G. Epstein, "The Police Role in 
Counterinsurgency Efforts," The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 59, no. 1 
(Mar., 1968), 148–151, http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed 11/12/2010). Mao Tse-tung writes, “Especially in 
guerrilla combat, we must rely on the force of the popular masses, for it is only thus that we can have 
guarantee of success.  The support of the masses offers us great advantages as regards transport, assistance 
to wounded, intelligence, disruption of the enemy’s position, etc…If, by misfortune, we are defeated, it will 
also be possible to escape or to find concealment.” As cited in Tse-tung Mao and Stuart R. Schram, Basic 
Tactics (New York: Praeger, 1966), 57–58.  
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for good intelligence.  In much of the counterinsurgency literature, intelligence is 
regarded as the sine qua non of success by the counterinsurgent, and the argument can be 
made that the same holds true for the insurgent as well.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand the role of information as it relates to how both the insurgent and 
counterinsurgent attempt to dominate information to achieve their respective goals.   
Information dominance allows the insurgent to shape and mold his operating 
environment.  He is more likely to influence the people than the government is, since he 
can more easily move within the population.  Once he has information dominance, he can 
establish his own “shadow government,” thus increasing his legitimacy by becoming the 
authority.  Galula describes the effective use of this methodology, implying that 
“infiltration…agitation, and propaganda,” are the true subversive hallmarks of an 
insurgency.42 
Conversely, information dominance can aid the counterinsurgent in “seeing” the 
insurgent’s infrastructure and effectively targeting it.  By properly collecting and 
exploiting information, the counterinsurgent can raise the cost to the insurgent of 
acquiring resources such as new recruits, weapons, and finances.  Accurate information 
from a supporting population can also illuminate facilitation networks by which the 
insurgent processes inputs into outputs.  By changing the production coefficients, the 
counterinsurgent can force the insurgent to spend inputs on merely surviving rather than 
producing effective outputs.43  
An underlying premise in COIN theory, which will be applied throughout the 
scope of this research, is that the population, as a collective entity, knows everything 
about an insurgent organization; therefore, the population holds the key to favorably 
shifting the balance of information in favor of the counterinsurgent.44  Accordingly, this 
                                                 
42 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 1964), 32.  
43 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 32.  
44 A recent analysis of information requirements in COIN operations found that approximately 90 
percent of all information needed could be found through the population.  David C. Gompert and John 
Gordon, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, [2008]) (accessed 1/28/2010).  
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study presumes that the same holds true in regards to the activities of gangs.  In other 
words, the population amongst which a gang thrives knows everything the civil 
authorities need to effectively dismantle the gang.  This assumption naturally leads to 
questions such as: why do communities tolerate gang activity, or refrain from sharing 
information that might eliminate their presence? Or alternatively, what factors prevent the 
local civic authorities from extracting this information from the population?  Also 
puzzling: what practices implemented by the local authorities either retard, or improve 
their ability to gather information from the population?  Using COIN theory as a point of 
departure, this paper hypothesizes that factors such as government legitimacy, the 
population's sense of security, and trust of public authorities weigh heavily in the 
population’s calculated willingness to cooperate with authorities to eliminate gangs. 
1. Information Volume 
a. Legitimacy 
Often, governments fighting an insurgency face a problem of legitimacy.45  
A preponderance of literature addressing the topic of COIN places the pursuit of 
legitimacy ahead of all other objectives of the state.  Legitimacy is defined as, “the extent 
that [the] citizens regard [the state] as proper and deserving of support.”46  Experience 
has shown that in a counterinsurgency campaign, the state requires support from the 
                                                 
45 Weak actors, such as gangs, can destabilize a strong actor, making the strong actor’s power 
irrelevant.  This destabilization of legitimacy occurs through strategic interaction within an asymmetric 
conflict model.  See Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars," International Security 26, no. 1 
(2001), 93–95. For more on legitimacy in counterinsurgency see:  United States Army and Marine Corps, 
FM 3–24, The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual; Galula, Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Theory and Practice; Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical 
Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), http://www.jstor.com/ 
(accessed 2/12/2010); Timothy J. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, 
and the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Seth G. 
Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008); Tom R. Tyler, 
"Enhancing Police Legitimacy," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 593, no. 
1, "To Better Serve and Protect: Improving Police Practices" (May, 2004), 84–99, http://www.jstor.org/ 
(accessed 2/11/2010).  Also see Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, "The Role of Procedural Justice and 
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing," Law & Society Review 37, no. 3 (Sep., 2003), 513–
548, http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed 2/11/2010)..  
46 Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
185–186.  
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population to be effective.  Support and cooperation from the population is directly linked 
to the population’s judgments about the legitimacy of the state.  A key antecedent 
condition bolstering the population’s perceptions of the state is the population’s 
assessment of the manner in which the state exercises its authority.47  Although the state 
has many resources at its disposal, without the support of the population it cannot 
effectively target the insurgent’s infrastructure.48 
As with most theories, the ideas surrounding legitimacy are broad and 
varied.  Timothy Lomperis opines, “Insurgencies are won—or lost—by the relative 
amounts of legitimacy the competing sides achieve;” legitimacy is a function of political 
and economic engagement with the affected population.49  Additionally, Chalmers 
Johnson describes how a loss of authority, or the loss of confidence of the governed for 
the governing, creates a power deflation that prevents proper social interactions, making 
engagement and information diffusion difficult.50  Similarly, Leites and Wolf describe 
legitimacy as a zero-sum game.  If the population is not for the government it must be for 
the insurgent, criminal, or gang.  Thus, leadership must provide solutions and 
opportunities endogenously in order to maintain sufficient legitimacy.51  Alternatively, 
Seth Jones summarizes legitimacy as a function of capacity.  Essentially, a governing 
entity will naturally create and maintain legitimacy if it has the physical and moral means 
to govern and enforce its laws.52  Lastly, Tom Tyler approaches the issue of legitimacy as 
a function of law and order, suggesting that laws focus of procedural fairness to 
                                                 
47 David Galula concludes that, “The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power 
is embodied in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population.”  See Galula, 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 55.   
48 It is important to note that the population can support the insurgent both actively and passively.  
The counterinsurgent cannot win unless the population sees the government as legitimate and stops 
supporting the insurgent both in a passive and active capacity.  Passive support is support nonetheless to the 
insurgent because the conscious decision to withhold information from the counterinsurgent still aids the 
insurgent.   
49 Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of 
Vietnam, 6.  
50 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Second ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1982), 94.  
51 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, 174.  
52 Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 7.  
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maximize benefit to the government and minimize violence and other misconduct.53  All 
agree that legitimacy is tantamount to reducing violence associated with insurgencies, or 
in this case, gangs, but the approaches differ. 
b. Population Security   
The interconnectedness between the insurgent and the population brings to 
the forefront another obstacle to the counterinsurgent’s attempts to gain information 
about the insurgent: the security of the population.  In counterinsurgency operations, 
security is the degree to which the population is separated from the coercive influence of 
the insurgent.54  Thus, population security is perhaps one of the most fundamental 
considerations when attempting to uncover information from within a given population.  
Providing a safe environment in which the population feels free to share 
what it knows is the key task.  Kilcullen aptly describes security of the population as 
fundamental, “otherwise, the enemy re-infiltrates the area and intimidates or co-opts the 
population, and only once security is consistently established can the population 
be…induced to provide information about local…enemy.”55  Additionally, Galula argues 
that population and resource control measures provide a tremendous degree of population 
security.  These control measures are designed to physically separate the population from 
the insurgent, creating a secure environment.  Galula suggests that this can be 
accomplished through aggressive patrolling, curfews, censuses, and other related tools.56  
Eventually, the population will begin to provide any information it has, once it feels 
                                                 
53 Tom R. Tyler, "Legitimacy in Corrections: Policy Implications," Criminology & Public Policy 9, 
no. 1 (Feb, 2010), 132, ProQuest (accessed 2/11/2010).  Additionally, Tyler points out those residents who 
viewed the police as more legitimate are more willing to cooperate with them both by reporting crimes or 
identifying criminals and by engaging in community activities to combat the problems of crime. 
54 United States Army and Marine Corps, FM 3–24, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1–7. 
55 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 94.		
56 Security is a function of effective organization and is a deliberate process.  The security apparatus 
must be fairly and intentionally applied as evenly as possible, otherwise popular support will shift away 
from the government.  See O'Neil, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, 143–
144.  
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sufficiently separated from the insurgent.57  Finally, Bard O’Neil suggests that security is 
a function of effective organization and is a deliberate process.  The security apparatus 
must be fairly and intentionally applied, otherwise popular support will shift away from 
the government.58  Similarly, from a counter-gang perspective this axiom seems to hold 
true.  A population that is exposed to gang coercion will be much less likely to provide 
information to local law enforcement officials about what they know about illegal gang 
activity. 
c. Trust and Embeddedness 
In order for counterinsurgent forces to begin the process of collecting 
information on an insurgent organization they must become embedded in the population 
by integrating and engaging the population at the community level.  COIN theories add 
some depth to the understanding of conditions that contribute to a population’s 
willingness to provide information to local authorities.  As Kilcullen points out, 
engagement at the local community level is necessary in order to generate “bottom up 
buy in” from the population.59  In this endeavor, Kilcullen stresses the importance of 
removing or overcoming language and cultural barriers between the counterinsurgent and 
the population.  Only after this is achieved will trust begin to form between the 
counterinsurgent force and the population.   
While many cultural and ethnic barriers exist that preclude effective 
interaction between civic authorities and communities within the population, there are 
also social and environmental barriers as well. One of the first established environmental 
theories that shed some light on these barriers was social disorganization theory 
developed by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay in 1942.  Social disorganization theory 
states that constant residential turnover and migration cause rapid social change within a 
community.  These influences either disrupt social networks or prevent them from being 
established at all.  This ultimately contributes to the erosion of social institutions and 
                                                 
57 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 81–85.  
58 O'Neil, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, 143–144.  
59 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, 138.		
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prevents the community from generating social control agents to effectively retard the 
growth of gangs.60  Building upon this theory, researchers such as Robert Sampson, 
Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Robert Bursik have hypothesized that social cohesion and 
trust, among members of a neighborhood is linked to reduced violence levels.61  Ruth 
Horowitz, in her study of community tolerance of gangs, theorizes that familial bonds 
and family honor play a significant role in whether an outside agency, such as police, 
would be called upon to control gang violence.  
In counterinsurgency operations, the police are the first line of defense 
against an asymmetric foe.62  Unlike the military, police are particularly suited to engage 
the population at the lowest levels because they tend to remain in local areas and live in 
the community that they patrol.  This familiarity with their particular areas of 
responsibility, however defined, give police officials the unique opportunity to gain an 
intimate knowledge of who the “bad guys” actually are.  The embeddedness of local law 
enforcement into a community can provide key capabilities necessary to defeat an 
insurgency.63 
Public relations also become an extremely important role for law 
enforcement in developing and maintaining trust within the context of a 
counterinsurgency.  “The police must be trained to look upon themselves as being of the 
people and for the people.  The sometimes understandable feeling prevalent in policemen 
that ‘it’s them against us’ must be avoided at all costs.”64  Insurgent forces will 
undoubtedly attempt to point out and exploit any misconceptions about police procedures 
when carrying out their functions of maintaining law and order.  In weak states, with 
poorly functioning law enforcement agencies, insurgents may attempt to interact with the 
                                                 
60 Kimberly Tobin, Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: 
Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 30 (accessed 2/15/2010).  
61 Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush and Felton Earls, "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: 
A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy," Science 277 (1997), 918–924 (accessed 2/15/2010).  
62 Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for 
Counterinsurgency. 
63 Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for 
Counterinsurgency. 
64 Epstein, The Police Role in Counterinsurgency Efforts, 151.  
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population in ways that exaggerate any sense of injustice or inadequacy commonly 
perceived in police structure or procedures. 
2. Information Processing 
While the preceding paragraphs have noted the importance of improving the 
amount of information collected from the population, achieving information dominance 
involves more than merely collecting greater volumes of information than an opponent.  
To achieve information dominance the information that is received must be analyzed and 
processed into actionable intelligence in a timely manner for a number of varied forces 
that can be used to effectively target the enemy.65  Leites and Wolf point out: 
The ingredients of effective intelligence organization and operations are 
numerous and complex.  An effective system requires not just collection 
of information from multiple sources (some degree of redundancy is 
essential) but also processing, classifying, evaluating, storing, and 
retrieving information. Indeed, modern technological progress in 
information processing and handling is probably more important for 
counterinsurgency than are changes in weapons technology.66 
Thus, the effectiveness of information processing is a critical component, not just to the 
intelligence collection effort, but also to the entire counterinsurgency equation as a 
whole.  Effective information processing can aid in early detection of insurgent 
movements, and allow seemingly unrelated intelligence to be combined to form a 
comprehensive picture of the insurgent movement itself, and can be used to identify and 
neutralize the insurgent infrastructure.67  
Organizations differ broadly in their structure.  What are the organizational 
characteristics that are most effective in fighting an insurgency?  What characteristics 
maximize an organization’s ability to process, classify, evaluate, share, and retrieve vast 
amounts of information for the purpose of defeating an insurgency?  The following 
                                                 
65 Endsley and Jones, Situational Awareness, Information Dominance, and Information Warfare. 
66 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts. 
67 Robert E. Hildner and Charles A. Russell, "Intelligence and Information Processing in 
Counterinsurgency," Air University Review (1973) (accessed 2/11/2010).		
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sections examine existing theories that address fundamental organizational concepts that 
lead to increased levels of information sharing and processing. 
a. Systems Integration 
Lessons learned over the last ten years both in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
shown that the sharing of information across a wide spectrum of agencies is critical for 
success. A recent RAND study on the United States’ counterinsurgency capabilities 
found that, “this requirement for connectivity extends not only across services, agencies, 
and coalition nations, but also to local authorities, security services, and citizens.”  More 
pointedly, “the civil side of COIN needs information no less than the military side does, 
and the sharing of information between the two is crucial for coherence and success.”68 
Zanini and Edwards, in their analysis of networks and netwar highlight the importance of 
organizational structure in combating networked counter-government adversaries such as 
gangs, noting that “governments wishing to counter netwar terrorism will need to adopt 
organizational designs and strategies like those of their adversaries…a willingness to 
innovate organizationally and doctrinally and by building new mechanisms for 
interagency and multi-jurisdictional cooperation.”69  This type of cooperation can only be 
achieved through the integration of the systems used by all agencies involved, to include, 
civic and law enforcement agencies, first responders, military organizations, and civilian 
entities.   
A significant barrier to integration and sharing of information across 
agencies is the old axiom of “need to know” for the sake of security.  This need to know 
attitude breeds a culture of stove piping or compartmentalization of intelligence with little 
cross talk.  This type of environment lends itself to disjointed operations, impaired trust 
among departments or agencies, lack of a common operational picture, and certainly 
degrades the chances of agencies providing reciprocal information to one another. 
                                                 
68 Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for 
Counterinsurgency, 127–129.  
69 Michele Zanini and Sean J. A. Edwards, "The Networking of Terror in the Information Age," in 
Networks and Netwars, eds. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 54.		
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b. Unity of Effort 
The well-known organizational theorist Richard Daft succinctly captures 
the importance of a shared common vision in the effectiveness of an organization when 
he wrote, “without a shared vision that provides harmony and unity of mind, employee 
actions will not add to the whole.  Without a strong vision, employees may fragment and 
move in different directions.”70  From Daft’s description above we derive unity of effort 
as the degree to which an agency or agencies share a common vision or purpose.   
The United States Army Counterinsurgency Manual states, “unity of effort 
must pervade every echelon.  Otherwise, well intentioned but uncoordinated actions can 
cancel each other out or provide a competent insurgent many vulnerabilities to exploit.”71  
Pointing to the necessity of tools to enhance individual and organizational interpretation 
of incoming information toward a common purpose, Endsley and Jones note that, 
“[groups] without shared mental models will most likely require a great deal of real-time 
coordination and communication to ensure that their activities are carried out properly 
and will be far more susceptible to lapses…”72 The concept of vertical decentralization 
for managing information flows and decision making has been highlighted by Daft, who 
noted that an organization’s structure, “should fit the information requirements of the 
organization: if it does not, people will either have too little information or will spend 
time processing information not vital to their tasks, thus reducing effectiveness.”73   
In military terms, this amounts to everyone operating from common 
guidelines disseminated from a commander, to subordinates, under the term 
“commander’s guidance.”  While this should unite the efforts of everyone under a 
specific command toward a common purpose, it should not be so prescriptive as to 
                                                 
70 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory & Design, 2nd ed. (Cincinnati, Ohio: South-
Western College Pub, 2001), 565.  
71 United States Army and Marine Corps, FM 3–24, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1–18.  
72 Endsley and Jones, Situational Awareness, Information Dominance, and Information Warfare. 
73 Richard L. Daft and Ann Armstrong, "Fundamentals of Organizational Structure," in 
Organizational Theory and Design, First Canadian ed. (Nelson Education, Ltd.: Toronto, Ontario, 2009), 
125.	
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suppress individual initiative or hinder actions by subordinates.  In an interagency setting, 
for example, between law enforcement, civic authorities, and civilian organizations, this 
unity of effort will be evident through the establishment of formal relationships.  These 
relationships will be codified through the creation of missions statements, purposes, and 
goals; establishment of operating procedures; and possibly written memorandums of 
understanding detailing the responsibilities of all participants to ensure accountability. 
Regardless of how unity of effort is achieved, it is paramount that all agencies involved in 
counterinsurgency or counter-gang operations act in unison. 
c. Autonomy 
The need to act quickly and decisively in counterinsurgency campaigns 
drives organizations to decentralize operations.  Subordinate units are given the 
autonomy to conduct operations at the time and location deemed necessary for mission 
success.  
In the scope of this research, autonomy has two components.  The first is 
nested in the above concept of integration.  Without access or inclusion in all information 
systems, users will not have timely information on which to act.  Technology and 
situational awareness tools such as focal point software and web forums empower 
individual execution. 
The second component of autonomy is that freedom users have to act on 
information in a timely manner.  The degree of vertical decentralization in an 
organization facilitates individual execution at the tactical level.  Zanini and Edwards 
have noted that through emerging low cost, high capacity communication capabilities “it 
is becoming increasingly possible to further disaggregate organizations through 
decentralization and autonomy.”74  These two components combined support the concept 
that autonomy is an effective tool that can speed up an organization’s reaction to 
informational inputs by shortening the decision making cycle. 
                                                 
74 Zanini and Edwards, The Networking of Terror in the Information Age, 36.  
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E. CRIMINOLOGY THEORY 
There is a broad spectrum of criminology research that provides some theoretical 
insight to the origins of, and society’s response to, gang violence.  The following is a 
brief summary of the most convincing theories of just how and why street gangs continue 
to grow and thrive despite often well-intended efforts to stop the violence within the 
communities in which they exist. 
1. Social Disorganization Theory 
Some of the earliest scientific theory on the growth and development of gangs can 
be traced to social scientists such as Frederic Thrasher, and Shaw and McKay.  Their 
research pointed to the breakdown of social institutions, known as social disorganization 
theory, as the origins of social unrest.  This social unrest, in turn, leads to the 
development of counter-society organizations that provide some sense of structure to 
social anarchy.  As summarized by Wood and Alleyne, Thrasher found: 
One reason why social institutions failed to satisfy the needs of the 
populace was because so many people living in disorganized areas were 
immigrants.  Immigrant parents were unable to help their children adapt to 
their new culture due to a lack of familiarity with local customs.  
Furthermore, a lack of support from established social orders such as 
schools failed to compensate for this parental ignorance. 75 
Shaw and McKay also point to cultural transmission of criminal traditions in areas 
where social institutions have failed to meet resident needs.76  In other words, the youth 
who are candidates for gang membership are a product of their environment—an 
environment polluted by criminal activity serves to improve the recruiting capacity of 
gangs, and thus continue the downward spiral of social decay. 
                                                 
75 Jane Wood and Emma Alleyne, "Street Gang Theory and Research: Where Do We Go From Here?" 
Aggression and Violent Behavior 15, no. 2 (March-April, 2010), 108. 
76 Wood and Alleyne, “Street Gang Theory and Research: Where Do We Go From Here?” 
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2. Differential Association Theory 
Later work by Sutherland and Cressey led to the development of the theory of 
differential association.  Differential association points to social interaction with 
individuals who harbor counter-society norms as the root cause of phenomenon such as 
criminal gang growth.  Sutherland noted that gangs offer a social structure through which 
to interact and learn criminal tradecraft.77  Rather than the breakdown of social 
institutions leading to social unrest, differential association theory points to the 
breakdown of individual morality as the necessary and essential element leading to 
societal decay. 
3. Community-Based Policing Theory 
The body of work focused on society’s response to the presence of gang violence 
is largely dominated by the examination of the critical role required of society’s 
designated enforcers of public law: the police.  As Sung has noted, “the legitimacy of 
police work derives from the law and popular will.”78 Accordingly, the true measurement 
of effectiveness for a community’s police is not measured solely “in terms of catching 
criminals and clearing crimes,” but also by the degree to which the police repeatedly 
demonstrate themselves to be legitimate representatives of the government they protect 
and the population that they serve.79  
The role of information within law enforcement theory has evolved over the years 
in response to the changing nature of both crime itself and the constraints of the 
environment in which police operate.  In the 1990s, police departments recognized the 
need to foster a greater sense of trust with the communities they served.  Community 
policing represents a move toward that end via a focus on "police-citizen interaction and 
cooperation, and problem-solving efforts to reduce crime-related community 
                                                 
77 Wood and Alleyne, “Street Gang Theory and Research: Where Do We Go From Here?” 108.  
78 Hung-En Sung, Fragmentation of Policing in American Cities: Toward and Ecological Theory of 
Police-Citizen Relations (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 19. 
79 Sung, Fragmentation of Policing in American Cities: Towards and Ecological Theory of Police-
Citizen Relations.  
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problems."80  This effort offers great promise of improving the relationship between 
police departments and their communities, but the issue of gang-violence, like 
counterinsurgency, demands a multi-lateral approach that draws the community closer to 
their elected government-the police are simply a piece of the larger puzzle. 
4. Intelligence-Led Policing 
The more recent push by criminology theorists toward intelligence led policing 
represents a belief in the need for a more proactive approach toward law enforcement.  
This shift in focus has occurred due to the perceived failure of reactionary policing to 
cope with a more rapidly evolving criminal element.81  As noted by Ball, intelligence-
based policing is a function of two components:  (1) production of intelligence and (2) 
application of intelligence.82  Both components require an inward focus by police 
departments on how their intelligence organizations are structured to more efficiently 
cope with incoming information and produce actionable, analytical outputs.  By itself, 
however, this theory is insufficient in understanding what generates the intelligence 
inputs to the police and how the police should best respond with the information that they 
receive. 
5. Problem-Oriented Policing 
Problem-oriented policing (POP) was first introduced by Herman Goldstein in 
1979 as a revolutionary approach to law enforcement that focused attention on collections 
of related incidents, and their underlying causes, rather than the isolated incidents 
themselves.83  In essence it centers on intelligence and problem identification.  Problem-
oriented policing is preventive in nature and stresses the need to engage other public 
agencies and the private sector in reducing particular problems. 
                                                 
80 John E. Ball, Rethinking Intelligence to Integrate Counterterrorism into the Local Law Enforcement 
Mission (Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 21.  
81 Ball, Rethinking Intelligence to Integrate Counterterrorism into the Local Law Enforcement 
Mission.  
82 Ball, Rethinking Intelligence to Integrate Counterterrorism into the Local Law Enforcement 
Mission. 
83 Gary Cordner and Elizabeth Biebel, "Problem-Oriented Policing in Practice," Criminology & 
Public Policy 4, no. 2 (May, 2005), 155–180. 
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Instead of over relying on criminal law, POP utilizes the Scanning, Analysis, 
Response, and Assessment (SARA) problem solving model, which is more of an 
analytical process of solving specific policing problems.84  Scanning consists of 
identifying recurring problems in a community, identifying the consequences of the 
problem, and systematically determining a priority for each one.  Analysis of the problem 
consists of determining the underlying causes of a problem, developing hypothesis about 
why the problem is occurring, identifying and evaluate resources that are already focused 
on the problem, and identifying additional resources that could aid in the solution.  
Response consists of determining various course of action about how to handle the 
problem, objectives of the response plan, and determining responsible parties to 
implement the response.  Lastly, assessment involves determining if the correct plan was 
implemented through data collection, what additional resources should become involved 
if necessary, and continued assessment of the plan’s effectiveness.85  
POP, in many regards, includes elements of both community based policing and 
intelligence based policing, and comes closest to a model that can aid in counter-gang 
operations.  However in counter-gang operations, this type of analysis and problem 
solving may be more effective if utilized at the municipal level, where government 
officials can provide unity of effort of all agencies involved. 
F. INSURGENCY, GANGS, AND THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT 
Current military doctrine suggests that a spectrum of warfare, measured by 
intensity, exists.  This spectrum, as constructed, is largely a graduated process, 
delineating the levels of violence associated with each progression.  For instance, a stable 
peace, the first progression within this spectrum, is characterized by a low level of 
violence; followed by an unstable peace with moderate levels of violence; then an 
insurgency with intermittent levels of extreme violence and instability follows; and 
finally, to complete the spectrum, general war with unrestricted levels of violence (see 
Figure 1).  This continuum attempts to give military commanders a concise methodology 
                                                 
84 Cordner and Biebel, "Problem-Oriented Policing in Practice."  
85 Cordner and Biebel, "Problem-Oriented Policing in Practice."  
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from which to frame the type of operations that they will conduct, linking observed 
environments with operational approaches and doctrine.86   
 
Figure 1.  FM 3–0, Military Spectrum of Conflict87 
This line of thinking maintains that if an army is capable of fighting a general 
war, it will be equally as proficient in fighting an insurgency, because it is only a less 
violent form of general war.  However, reality demonstrates that this paradigm misses its 
mark.  Insurgencies, as a social and political problem, pose a different analytical set for 
military practitioners, and must be approached with a unique set of principles and 
resources.88  Likewise, when general “policing” methodologies are applied to counter-
gang operations, a similar conundrum exists.  The approach required to fight criminal 
gangs is on a different spectrum from that needed for traditional unorganized street crime, 
and demands a re-shaping of the approach communities take toward counter-gang 
operations.  
G. RETHINKING THE COUNTER-GANG APPROACH  
Intelligence led policing, community based policing, and problem oriented 
policing all have similar analytical approaches to solving crime problems.  They all share 
a theme of proactive analysis to increase the ability to identify emerging threats to a 
community.  While there has been significant evolutionary development in these types of 
policing both in theory and practice, there still remains a void as to the holistic approach 
                                                 
86 Department of the Army, FM 3–0: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the 
Army, 2008), 2–1.  
87 Department of the Army, FM 3–0: Operations. 
88 Dr. Gordon McCormick, Guerrilla Warfare Seminar, lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, July 14, 2009, referencing Martin Van Creveld.  For additional explanation, see Martin L. Van 
Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Collier Macmillan International, 1991), 254.  
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to the specific problem set of gang activity.  The answer to the unique problem of gang 
violence is not simply “policing” as these practices suggest by their singular focus.  What 
this research suggests is a COIN-based model for countering gang violence.  What makes 
counterinsurgency important to this research is that it focuses not simply on police 
capacity to gain and analyze information, but also other civic and civilian institutions, 
that interact with the population.  When integrated as a whole, these institutions can 
effectively retard the levels of gang violence in an area by increasing the volume and 
analysis of information that is extracted from the population. 
H. HYPOTHESES 
This thesis proposes that a government’s dominance of information is 
significantly responsible for decreases in the activity levels of gangs.  In the absence of 
information, the government is left only with a force advantage, but cannot decisively use 
this advantage against the gangs.  However, information dominance, as a variable, is 
difficult to conceptualize and measure.  Therefore, information dominance must be 
understood with respect to two congruent factors: the first being the volume of 
information received by the city; and second, the ability of the city to process this data 
into actionable and useable intelligence.  Figure 2 depicts the causal relationship between 
information dominance and gang violence levels.  Based on this established causal link, 
this research will focus on specific factors within Salinas that: (1) increase or decrease the 
population’s willingness to share information with the police, and (2) those factors that 
increase or decrease the ability of the city to share and process information they receive 
from the population.  Exploring these two factors of information dominance will provide 
useful insight into how Salinas city officials can obtain an information advantage in the 
fight against gang violence within their community.   
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Figure 2.  Causal Sequence for the Effects of Information Dominance on Gang 
Violence 
Hypothesis 1: Volume of information from the population increases when city 
government improves: (1) its legitimacy, (2) population security, and (3) its level of trust 
and embeddedness within the community. 
Hypothesis 2: Information processing increases when the city government 
improves: (1) its systems integration, (2) unity of effort, and (3) operational autonomy.   
I. CONCLUSION 
Observing the counter-gang problem through the lens of counterinsurgency 
provides a useful focus from which to approach the question of how to effectively combat 
the instability street gangs bring to an environment.  Civic authorities must focus their 
efforts towards decisively using information against gang activity.  The degree to which 
this is realized defines the level of information dominance the city has achieved.  
Information dominance is as essential to countering gangs as it is to countering 
insurgencies, as it allows the city, in this case, to combine their force advantage with 
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actionable intelligence to maximize effects.  From a counterinsurgency and counter-gang 
theory perspective it would seem, at least anecdotally, that controlling information in an 
asymmetric conflict can have significant impacts on violence levels. 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In seeking to understand the causal relationship between information dominance 
and its effects on gang violence in Salinas, CA we attempted to measure three things.  
The first was information volume, which we defined as the sum total of all gang related 
crime tips that the SPD receives from the population writ large.  To quantifiably measure 
volume of information, we collected and analyzed monthly crime tip data from the SPD 
database.89  We categorized the tip data into three categories:  information received 
through phone calls, internet tips, and information received through confidential 
informants (CI).90  Secondly, we sought to understand the city of Salinas's ability to 
effectively process information related to gang violence.  To get a sense of the 
topography of the SPD's informal communication networks, as well as their propensity to 
share intelligence across different divisions and units within the department, we utilized a 
social network survey.  Lastly, we sought to quantify gang related crime, which we 
defined as the sum total of all gang crime in Salinas, CA.  To measure gang crime levels, 
we collected and analyzed monthly gang crime data from the SPD database.91   
To add depth to this study, we wanted to further understand if and how the 
population’s perceptions, and resulting attitudes, impacted their willingness to divulge 
information to the city regarding gang activity.  Furthermore, we wanted to understand 
                                                 
89 Crime tips from the general population are collected by the SPD in multiple ways.  A concerned 
citizen can report crime information to the SPD using phone, text, or email. In the case of phone calls and 
texts, all personal information about the caller is blocked, making the originator of the information 
anonymous to the SPD.  Emails can be sent to the SPD either anonymously or with their personal contact 
information included.    
90 Confidential informants fall into three categories; 1) citizen informants—provide info for the 
betterment of the community; 2) mercenary informant—provide info for monetary gain; and 3)criminal 
informant—reduced sentence in exchange for information.  The preponderance of CI information collected 
by the Monterey County Joint Gang Task Force is from criminal informants (personal communication, 
Officer from the MCJGTF, 2010). 
91 Gang crime statistics were aggregate from several crime categories to include: homicide, robbery, 
aggravated assault.  All figures were filtered so that only crimes associated with gang activity were 
included.  
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the perceptions of city hall employees and law enforcement personnel toward the gang 
problem to help identify schisms or similarities in the different groups when compared to 
the general population. A preponderance of the data collected for this part of the research 
was collected through interviews and surveys.  The interviews were conducted over a 
three week period in September and October of 2010 with senior Salinas government and 
non-government officials with backgrounds in education, youth programs and social 
work, city governance, and law enforcement.  Similarly, the surveys were conducted over 
a thirty day period in September and October of 2010, and included city hall employees 
and sworn law enforcement officers.   
The qualitative research on the causal relationship between information 
dominance and the level of gang violence experienced by a city is summarized in Table 
1.  The sources of information for each variable within the research framework are 
divided among the major condition variables identified at the end of Chapter II.  The 
research methodology includes a review of non-scholarly literature, such as information 
from the Monterey County voting office, city and state websites, views from prominent 
city government officials, census data, and city and national survey data. 
 
Table 1.  Sources of Information 
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B. INTERVIEWS 
For interviews, we sought out the most prominent city officials and community 
leaders that were most visibly involved in the fight against gang crime in Salinas.  
Interviewees fell into two broad categories: city government employees and non-
governmental community leaders.  Selection criteria for government employee subjects 
were limited to the executive leadership of Salinas, such as the Mayor, City Manager, 
Chief of Police, Gang Task Force Commanders, and the Monterey County School 
Superintendent.  We felt these individuals would provide depth to our research, as it was 
assumed that they would be attuned to the creation and execution of strategic gang-
related policies in Salinas.   
The selection criteria used to determine the second group of interviewees was 
based on specific associations with gang prevention programs in Salinas such as the 
Community Alliance for Safety and Peace (CASP), Boys & Girls Clubs of Salinas and 
Second Chance.92  These individuals were deemed highly relevant to our research 
because of their direct day to day contact with high risk youth, and their experience in 
implementing the intervention and prevention policies of the city.  Collectively, both 
groups of interviewees aided this research by providing unique perspectives on the 
ongoing suppression, intervention, and prevention initiatives currently in use to combat 
gang violence in Salinas.   
The interviews were conducted with questions based on our condition variables.  
The questions ranged from baseline assessments of the gang situation, to perceptions of 
city government.  Topics identified for discussion included: legitimacy, city security, 
population’s trust in government, levels of intelligence sharing, and media engagement.  
Not all questions developed for this research were applicable to every person 
interviewed.  Thus, we developed tailored interview questions for each interviewee based 
on their role in countering the gang problem, whether they were involved in suppression, 
intervention, or prevention; or some combination of all of these. All interview questions 
                                                 
92 The 2nd Chance staff is a highly trained bilingual and bicultural group of professionals, specially 
trained in adolescent development and the latest anti-gang intervention techniques.  For more on Second 
Chance see their website at http://www.scyp.org/.  
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were developed in advance, and were approved by the Naval Postgraduate School 
Institutional Review Board.  See Appendix F for a complete list of the interview 
questions used in our research.   
To elicit thoughtful and candid responses from the interviewees, we attempted to 
be as transparent as possible by providing the questions identified for discussion prior to 
the interview.  All interviews were conducted in person with at least two researchers 
present during the interview.  At all times, interviewees were made aware that we were 
taking notes of the interview, and all respondents agreed to be quoted; however, some of 
the respondents did not want to be referred to by name in the final publication of this 
paper.  Interviews ranged between 45 to 90 minutes in length.  The feedback during the 
interviews reflected an array of substantive responses, from additional discussion topics 
beyond the scope of this research, to responses that directly addressed our key variables.  
Follow up emails and phone calls helped clarify responses as needed.  
C. SURVEYS 
For our survey research, we considered three distinct sample groups: the general 
population of Salinas, law enforcement personnel, and city employees.  These specific 
target populations were selected in order to capture the perceptions of the three main 
parties confronted with the presence of gangs in Salinas.  We ultimately hoped to 
quantify the perceptions of those individuals tasked with suppressing gang violence, of 
those involved with intervention and prevention, as well as the perceptions and attitudes 
of the general population of Salinas.  The surveys, we hoped, would add insight about 
how perceptions and attitudes might create a barrier to the effective flow of information.  
1. Salinas Population Survey 
Given time and resource constraints, it was deemed infeasible to develop an 
independent survey to measure the perceptions of the local population of Salinas.  
Instead, we used survey research conducted by CASP to measure the population’s 
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perceptions about local government.93  CASP leaders agreed to provide us with the raw 
data of their survey.  From this we were able to conduct our own independent analysis of 
the survey results.  The survey, which was conducted in September 2010, consisted of 37 
questions; 32 using a five-point Likert scale response format, two open ended comment 
questions, and three background/demographic questions.94  CASP was able to collect 309 
completed surveys distributed across the three main zip codes in Salinas (93901, 93905, 
and 93906).  While the overall sample size of the survey constitutes only .2% of the 
overall population, the sample size did represent the populations in the main zip code 
areas by 94%.   
For our analysis we grouped the survey questions into the following categories: 
legitimacy, security, trust, and embeddedness, unity of effort, and recommendations from 
the population.  The responses from this survey provided the raw data for analysis in 
Chapter V.  In order to compare responses from the general population with those of the 
city employees and law enforcement personnel, we used the CASP survey as a template 
from which to develop our surveys for the city employees and the SPD. 
2. Law Enforcement Perceptions and Attitudes Survey Design and 
Distribution 
In order to get an adequate cross section of the perceptions of sworn officers 
within the SPD, we surveyed a random sampling of officers from all units within the 
department.  To obtain our sample, we attended all shift change briefings held by the 
police department over a 48 hour period for a total of eight shift change briefs.  A cross 
section of sworn officers from all units within the police department attended each 
briefing.  At the beginning of each brief we explained our research and asked for 
volunteers to complete the survey.  All surveys were completed within ten minutes and 
all participants signed a consent form.   
                                                 
93 Salinas Community Alliance for Safety and Peace, "Salinas Population Survey 2010," Community 
Alliance for Safety and Peace, Salinas, CA, 2010). 
94 Likert Scale used was 0–5; 1 though 5 ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree; 0 was used 
to equal a do not know answer.  See Appendix B for the complete survey used in this analysis. 
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The survey was comprised of 34 questions; 33 using a five-point Likert scale 
response format, and one demographic question.95  We obtained 88 completed surveys 
from the entire population of 153 sworn officers at the rank of Commander and below, 
achieving 56% overall participation from the SPD.  Questions were grouped together to 
reflect our variables that impact processing of information: legitimacy, trust, unity of 
effort, and security.  The responses to these questions provided the raw data for analysis 
in Chapter VI. 
3. City Employee Survey Design and Distribution 
The wide variety of city employees presented a challenge in how best to obtain an 
adequate unbiased sampling of all city workers.  With 17 departments spread across the 
city we determined that visiting a majority of them was not feasible.  Instead we worked 
with the City Manager, who permitted us to attend two of his mandatory monthly city 
employee briefings.  During each briefing we were allowed to explain our research and 
recruit volunteers to complete the survey.  All surveys were completed within ten 
minutes, and all participants signed a consent form.    
The survey administered to city employees was very similar in design to the law 
enforcement survey.  The survey consisted of 33 questions; 32 using a five-point Likert 
scale response format, and one demographic question.96  We obtained 66 completed 
surveys, which correlates to 10% of all full-time and part-time employees on the city 
payroll as of October 2010.97  Questions were grouped according to their relevance to our 
variables: legitimacy, trust, unity of effort, and security.  The responses to these questions 
provided the raw data for the analysis in Chapter VII. 
                                                 
95 Likert Scale used was 0–5; 1 though 5 ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree; 0 was used 
to equal a do not know answer. See Appendix C for the complete survey used in this analysis.  
96 Likert Scale used was 0–5; 1 though 5 ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree; 0 was used 
to equal a do not know answer.  See Appendix D for the complete survey used in this analysis. 
97 As of October 2010, there were 535 fulltime city employees and 108 part time employees on the 
city payroll. Gutierrez, Miguel (Accounting Officer, City of Salinas Finance Department), Email 
correspondents with authors, 10/26/2010. 
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4. Police Social Network Survey Design and Distribution 
There is no standard doctrine, or universally accepted operating procedures, that 
describe how civilian law-enforcement agencies should process intelligence.  This 
presented our team a unique measurement problem for this particular variable.   For this 
reason we decided to conduct a social network analysis of the SPD to quantifiably 
measure relationships within the organization and determine what effect those 
relationships had on individual propensity to share information intra-departmentally.  To 
accomplish this we developed a social network survey template using the David 
Krackhardt informal network model, which was adapted by Dr. Bruce Hoppe of Boston 
University.98  To analyze the topography of the SPD’s informal network, four questions 
were posed to the entire population of sworn officers within the SPD, using a modified 
five point Likert Scale.99  These survey questions were designed to measure, visualize, 
and understand the contact network, the advice network, the intelligence network, and the 
assistance or trust network within the SPD.  Each officer was asked to rate their 
relationships with the other officers in the SPD when it came to general contact, seeking 
advice, sharing intelligence, and seeking assistance in work related matters.  The precise 
questions of the survey can be found in Chapter VIII.  
The entire population of sworn SPD officers was recruited to conduct the 
voluntary survey.  The survey was sent to the Deputy Chief of Police via email, who 
electronically distributed the surveys to all potential participants through official SPD 
email distribution lists.  The SPD leadership encouraged participation in the survey, but 
did not make participation mandatory. The survey was returned to us electronically, and 
individual responses were coded to ensure anonymity.  Of the total population of 157 
sworn officers, 59 completed the survey.  This equates to 38% of all sworn officers in the 
                                                 
98 Bruce Hoppe, "Network Characteristics," http://people.bu.edu/ (accessed 10/20/2010). 
99 Each officer rated his or her survey responses using a scale of 0 (Rarely or never), 1 (Every few 
months), 2 (Every few weeks), 3 (Every week), and 4 (Everyday) in relation to other officers and outside 
organizations and agencies that work with the SPD on gang-related issues. Additionally, see Appendix E.  
The survey used for this research was developed using the David Krackhardt informal network model, and 
was adapted by Bruce Hoppe, Ph.D. from Boston University.  Used with permission, from Bruce Hoppe, 
"Organizational Network Survey Spreadsheet Utility," Connective Associates (2006–2009), 
http://connectiveassociates.com (accessed 10/20/2010).. 
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SPD. Survey results were compiled and analyzed using UCINET and NETDRAW social 
networking analysis programs.100  In accordance with IRB guidelines, all names were 
removed from survey responses during the analysis of the results.  The responses to these 
questions provided the raw data for analysis in Chapter VIII. 
D. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
Collecting accurate crime tip data was a particularly challenging problem for our 
research.  While the SPD was able to provide crime statistics, which they submit 
regularly to the state and federal level, tip data proved very difficult to obtain.  There is 
no single repository where all crime tip data is stored at the SPD.  Anonymous phone and 
email tips are simply distributed to the unit(s) deemed most responsible for handling the 
type of information provided, and are not required to be tracked or logged at any point in 
the chain.  As a result we had to correspond with numerous points of contact within the 
SPD to piece together the quantity of tips each individual unit had obtained.  In many 
cases there was simply no documented data available for our analysis.  This made our 
data set for gang crime tips very sporadic, and ultimately prevented us from being able to 
compare the number of gang-related crimes with the volume of tips received by the SPD, 
across an optimal period of time. 
One of the limiting aspects of collecting data for this research was the lack of any 
significant historical survey data, specifically focused on Salinas, which could be 
analyzed longitudinally with respect to gang violence.  While the surveys allow for 
specific analysis of one point in time, no comparisons with past surveys could be 
conducted.  This limited our analysis to current perceptions, and prevented us from 
understanding how those perceptions have changed over time as the gang violence in 
Salinas has continued to increase. While limited in their ability to show variance 
temporally, the surveys provided a robust set of data with which to analyze the 
population’s perceptions regarding their willingness to share information with the SPD.  
                                                 
100 See Stephen P. Brogatti, Martin G. Everett and Linton C. Freeman, UCINET for Windows: 
Software for Social Network Analysis (Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies: 2002) and Stephen P. 
Brogatti, Netdraw Network Visualization (Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies: 2002) 
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One of the challenges we faced in survey design was comparability. Since our 
survey research sought to understand the perceptions of three distinct aspects of the 
population, it was necessary for them to vary slightly in order to best address our 
condition variables.  While the majority of the questions were the same, some questions 
had to be modified for the particular audience.  While all the same condition variables 
were covered in each survey, the number and type of question within each category had 
to include varied questions that could best illicit relevant data from each specific target 
audience. 
Another challenge we faced was obtaining an adequate representative sample size 
for the surveys, specifically the SPD social network survey and the CASP population 
survey.  Not every member of the SPD participated in the social network survey.  Of all 
sworn officers, only 38% completed the survey.  Ideally, this type of analysis becomes 
more effective and focused when the entire focal population participates.  Despite the 
limitations of our resultant overall sample size, the data collected is deemed sufficient to 
draw meaningful conclusions since a representative population from each relevant SPD 
unit provided input.  For example, important gang related special units of the SPD, such 
as the Violence Suppression Unit (VSU) (38% participation) and the Salinas police 
officers involved with the Monterey County Joint Gang Task Force (MCJGTF) (40% 
participation), participated on a level equal or near that of the survey’s total participation.  
Other units, such as the Patrol unit (33% participation) and the Investigations unit (35% 
participation), which consistently deal with gang related issues, participated slightly less 
than the VSU and the MCJGTF.  Their results are still consistent enough with the 
combined participation levels to merit consideration.  Ultimately we are confident our 
sample size was sufficient and provided outcomes that illustrate important characteristics 
of the SPD’s informal network.   
Lastly, the majority of the completed CASP surveys came from zip code 93905, 
approximately 58.3%, followed by zip codes 93901 and 93906 both constituting 17.8% 
of the surveys completed.  An analysis of the individual zip code percentages revealed 
that zip code 93901 was underrepresented by 8%, 93905 was over represented by 17%, 
and 93906 was underrepresented by 20%.  These misrepresentations within the zip codes 
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cautioned us to examine the data closely for any sample bias that may have resulted from 
the disproportioned zip code representation.  However, analyzing the racial demographics 
of the surveys reveals the survey distribution matched the city’s demographics by 96%.  
This combined with the fact that 94% of the primary three zip codes were covered in the 
survey gives us confidence that the responses received contain sufficient data to support a 
robust analysis of the perceptions of the population in regards to gang violence.   
In Chapters V through VII, we examine the survey data using descriptive statistics 
and regression analysis to determine what the survey results mean.  Throughout this 
analysis, examination of the interviews conducted adds amplifying data and anecdotal 
evidence to the survey results.   Through this analysis we begin to see a more complete 
picture of the perceptions of Salinas’ citizens through multiple viewpoints.  From these 
differing viewpoints comes a better understanding of those conditions that increase the 
population’s willingness to share information with law enforcement, and what contributes 
to and hinders SPD’s ability to process that information across its departments. 
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IV. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF GANG-RELATED CRIME 
STATISTICS AND TIP INFORMATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The complexity of the American urban gang problem is too far reaching and 
difficult to ascribe to any one single cause.  Countering these problems is an equally 
difficult and complex task, with no obvious “silver bullet” solutions available to stem the 
violence.  This lack of easy answers is what allows gangs to continue to breed and, in a 
perverse way, protects them from eradication.  Outlining this dilemma, SPD Police Chief 
Louis Fetherolf describes the gang situation in Salinas, CA, for example, as “a 
multigenerational, decades long problem [where] the gangs are operating with impunity” 
(personal communication, Chief Louis Fetherolf, 2010).  If this problem has prevailed as 
persistently as Chief Fetherolf suggests, the question remains - are the prevention, 
suppression, and prosecution methodologies currently implemented by government and 
law enforcement entities sufficient?   
In large part, community leaders and police departments have always viewed 
campaigns to minimize criminal gang activity as a war for information.  In theory, the 
more information about narcotics, violence, and other criminal activities typically 
associated with gangs the authorities possess, the more arrests and preventative actions 
the authorities can enact, thus making their communities safer.  While this is not 
necessarily a false cognition, it is far more difficult to execute than it is to theorize.  To 
demonstrate this assertion, this chapter will examine the correlation of information 
volume and processing, in the form of tips, with gang related criminal statistics.  In the 
end, it will be shown that the complexity of this problem demands a full and detailed 
accounting of information and how it is used to be able to fully capitalize on its potential 
to stem criminal gang activity. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
For this analysis, we focused our efforts on understanding the impact of 
information, in terms of quality and quantity, on gang violence in Salinas, CA.  Salinas is 
an interesting laboratory from which to understand this problem, given its notable 
tradition of gang violence over the last few decades.  Salinas’s strong agricultural setting 
has attracted Hispanic migrant workers for decades.101  What initially took root as a form 
of worker protection has morphed into a much broader endemic problem within the 
community.102  The SPD has a long tradition of working to counter this challenge.  
However, comparatively, the decentralized nature of gang organizations has permitted 
much greater flexibility for adaptation to a changing environment, taxing the SPD’s 
ability to secure the city.  Currently, enforcement and security approaches may not be 
keeping pace with the ever changing face of gang crime.103  Brian K. Contreras, Sr., of 
Second Chance Family & Youth Services in Salinas, and a noted community leader, 
observes that compared to 10 years ago, the gang problem today is a “different kind of 
problem…[gangs are] less blatant about their violence…even less violent…[but] more 
organized” (personal communication, Brian Contreras, 2010).  Echoing this observation, 
a SPD officer assigned to the Monterey County Joint Gang Task Force (MCJGTF) 
assesses gang violence as relatively level over the past decade, but also notes that gang 
tactics, and abilities, are evolving.  He says that gangs are “hitting what they are shooting 
at [which] shocks the conscience of the community” (personal communication, Officer 
from the MCJGTF, 2010).   
Thus, it is asserted that traditional or accepted law enforcement practices and 
information gathering and processing techniques may not be keeping pace with this 
changing foe, demonstrating little noticeable impact from information received on law 
enforcement's ability to keep the peace. To objectively measure this, two analytical 
                                                 
101 Monterey County Historical Society, "City of Salinas, California—Our History," 
http://www.salinas.net/ (accessed 10/28/2010). 
102 Louis Fetherolf, 90 Day Report to the Community: An Overview of the Salinas Police Department 
(Salinas, CA: Salinas Police Department, [2009]) 6–7. 
103 Fetherolf, 90 Day Report to the Community: An Overview of the Salinas Police Department, 6–11. 
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methodologies were used to determine if the information received about crimes 
associated with gangs had any impact on the level of gang violence: descriptive 
comparison of temporal crime data and a regression analysis of these models.  
Essentially, these models compared three significant crime statistics from the period 
encompassing January 2006 to October 2010.  These statistics included monthly gang 
crime numbers for the given period, monthly gang arrests, and monthly tip information 
received by the SPD. 
Gang crime, as measured by this study, includes homicide, robbery, and 
aggravated assault, combined to provide a single number describing criminal gang 
incidents.  Gang arrests represent all arrests made by the SPD that were gang related.  
This includes assault and narcotic type arrests.  Tips, on the other hand, come from 
several sources, including information produced by confidential informants, as well as 
anonymous internet and phone tips.   
Tips are an important aspect of this research, as they provide the primary measure 
of information volume about gang activity that the SPD uses in its enforcement efforts.  
Specifically, the SPD CI program categorizes CIs into three distinct groups: citizen 
informants, who provide information for the betterment of the community; mercenary 
informants, who provide information for monetary gain; and criminal informants, who 
seek reduced sentences in exchange for information.  CIs are generally assigned to obtain 
very specific and detailed information but, depending on the person, the situation, and 
motivations, that informational quality can vary.  The SPD will generally manage 20 to 
25 CIs at any given time, using guidelines strictly regulated by the California Department 
of Justice (personal communication, Officer from the MCJGTF, 2010).  According to a 
member of the MCJGTF, the value of the CI cannot be understated, claiming that "almost 
without exception, actionable information that comes into the [police department] is from 






generated from anonymous internet and phone sources, received through local Salinas 
and Monterey County phone lines and official websites, and the nationally organized 
“We-Tip” crime reporting system.104 
C. DESCRIPTIVE MODELING 
The graph in Figure 3 depicts gang crime levels (represented as a red line) in 
relation to tips received about gang activities (represented as a green line).  Gang arrests 
are also represented (in blue), showing how each of these statistics compare to the other.  
This figure shows these relationships over time, based on all available, and contiguous, 
historical data for these variables, which includes January 2006 to October 2010.105 
 
Figure 3.  Impacts of Gang Related Tips on Gang Related Arrests and Crime 
Levels—January 2006 to October 2010 
                                                 
104 Fetherolf, Report to the Community July 2010, 1–2. 
105 Correlating data can be found in Appendix A of this study. 
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Figure 4 shows the impact of gang related tips on gang related arrests and crime 
levels in Salinas for 2006.106  Some interesting correlations can be drawn from this first 
refined graph.   
First, there is a nearly perfect inverse relationship between the number of tips 
received and the amount of violence recorded.  In other words, as crime tips increased, 
violence decreased, and vice versa, suggesting that as the public shared information with 
the SPD, the police were better able to counter gang activities.  The inverse is also true—
crime levels increased when the public failed to share what it knew about the gangs.   
 
 
Figure 4.  Impacts of Gang Related Tips on Gang Related Arrests and Crime 
Levels—2006 
Subsequently, this unexpected relationship continues in Figure 5, which outlines the 
related 2007 data.  This graph shows a nearly identical correlation, where arrests and 
crimes follow the same general trends. 
                                                 
106 Correlating data can be found in Appendix A of this study. 
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Figure 5.  Impacts of Gang Related Tips on Gang Related Arrests and Crime 
Levels–2007 
Figures 6, 7, and 8 outline the 2008, 2009, and 2010 data sets. 
 




Figure 7.  Impacts of Gang Related Tips on Gang Related Arrests and Crime 
Levels—2009 
 
Figure 8.  Impacts of Gang Related Tips on Gang Related Arrests and Crime 
Levels—2010 
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In the end, this analysis alone is not sufficient enough to make significant 
conclusions concerning the effects of information volume on the SPD’s ability to affect 
gang crime.  A further, more refined analysis is essential to draw clearer conclusion.   
D. CONCLUSION 
There are two important conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of this 
data.  The first conclusion outlines the need for better data collection, warehousing, and 
compiling.  This was a significant limitation on this portion of the analysis.  Data was 
often incomplete, making it difficult to conduct a comprehensive analysis.  Thus, there 
may be a connection or impact, as our theory suggests, between the quantities of 
information gathered and the levels of gang related crime and arrests.  However, the 
current available data makes this difficult to assess.  Regardless, the SPD recognizes 
holes in their data collecting system.  Chief Fetherolf opines that there are no 
collaborative information tools or systematized operating procedures that allow 
information to be collected and eventually processed to any noticeable effect (personal 
communication, Chief Fetherolf, 2010).  However, individual units within the SPD and 
other supporting entities have begun gathering and using information that may, in the 
short term, allow for localized volume management.  For example, the MCJGTF has 
implemented a comprehensive gang activity and arrests log that, if implemented across 
the rest of the SPD, could potentially benefit future efforts to discern trends associated 
with information received from the population (personal communication, Officer from 
the MCJGTF, 2010). 
The second critical conclusion concerns the quality of the information received.  
Future research must develop criteria and a methodology to determine if the tip 
information that is being analyzed has produced any noticeable effects.  Again, this relies 
on the improvement of data collection and management, as previously noted.  A careful 
analysis of information quality will improve future research endeavors to determine any 
potential correlations that were previously obscure. 
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V. RESEARCH RESULTS FOR SALINAS POPULATION 
SURVEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The most important variables bearing on Salinas citizens' willingness to share 
information with the SPD are personal responsibility and unity of effort.  This finding is 
the result of our analysis of survey responses from 309 Salinas citizens.  Our analysis 
sought to determine the nature of the relationship between a person’s willingness to share 
information (i.e., information volume) and our independent variables: legitimacy, unity of 
effort, trust and embeddedness, and security.  Unity of effort was not originally included 
in our hypothesis regarding information volume, but as our research progressed we chose 
to add unity of effort to our analysis in order to expand our model and add depth to our 
hypothesis.   
As discussed in Chapter III, we utilized survey research conducted by the 
Community Alliance for Safety and Peace (CASP) to analyze typical perceptions about 
city government, law enforcement, and gang violence.  The observations and findings 
resulting from this survey are presented in three sections: statistical analysis, regression 
analysis, and results summary. 
We examined how each of our variables influences the propensity a person has 
for sharing information with the police via descriptive statistics and regression analysis.  
Both methods of analysis revealed interesting findings on how the city can improve its 
ability to elicit a greater volume of crime information from the population of Salinas.  For 
the descriptive statistical analysis below, we analyzed the results according to each 
independent variable, incorporating an analysis of the frequency of response for each 
question. 107 
 
                                                 
107 Frequency of responses for all survey questions can be found in Appendix B, Table 61. 
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For regression analysis we combined multiple questions from the survey that were 
determined to best measure each independent variable.  Not all questions were deemed to 
have the requisite expository power for a particular variable, therefore not all survey 
questions were included in the variables used in the final regression model.  Regression 
analysis offers a glimpse of both the statistical and substantive significance of our results.  
In our analysis we focus on the interpretations of statistically significant factors (p<0.10) 
and try to understand why some variables were less robust (p>0.10).  In those cases 
where our independent variables did not conform to our overall hypothesis, we offer 
possible explanations. 
B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The questions used in the CASP survey used a closed ended, five level Likert 
scale that ranged from 1—Strongly Disagree to 5—Strongly Agree.  With this particular 
scale there was a midpoint rating of neutral.  Accordingly, a response value greater than 
three indicates agreement, while less than three indicates disagreement.  From the survey 
questions, we developed the following categories of analysis based on our variables:  (1) 
Legitimacy, (2) Unity of Effort, (3) Trust and Embeddedness, and (4) Security.  We first 
discuss some demographic background characteristics of the survey responses, and then 
discuss each variable with its associated questions. Table 5 describes the means and 
standard deviations for the independent variables.   
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Legitimacy 3.0 1.2 
Unity of Effort 3.7 1.0 
Trust and Embeddedness 
          Personal Responsibility 4.4 .91 
             Embeddedness 2.4 .95 
            Cultural Alignment 3.5 1.0 
            Cultural Needs 2.9 1.4 
Security 3.3 .99 
Table 2.  Variable Means and Standard Deviation 
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1. Demographic Background 
Survey respondents proportionally reflected the racial demographics of the city of 
Salinas, CA to a large degree, see Table 6.  When asked what ethnic group they most 
identified themselves with, 76.8% of respondents stated Hispanic and 15.2% stated 
Caucasian.  These two racial demographics together comprise approximately 90% of the 
ethnic makeup in Salinas, CA and comprised approximately 92% of survey respondents.  
Asians and African American were slightly under represented in the survey by 
approximately 7%, and Native Americans were slightly over represented in the survey by 
approximately 2%.     
Race 





Caucasian 15.2 17.7 
Hispanic 76.8 72.4 
African American .7 1.6 
Asian 1.3 7.6 
Native American 2.7 1 
Other 3.4 --- 
No Race Provided 4 --- 
Table 3.  Racial Demographics 
Demographic responses indicated that 60% of those surveyed reside in East 
Salinas (Zip Code 93905), 18.3% reside in North Salinas (Zip Code 93906), and 18.3% 
reside in South Salinas (Zip Code 93901).  While these three zip codes comprise the 
Salinas Metropolitan area in its entirety, there were approximately 3.3% of respondents 
that reside in the surrounding areas (93902, 93903, 93907, and 93908).  See Table 7. 
                                                 








93901 18.3 24 
93902 0.7 --- 
93903 0.3 --- 
93905 60 39 
93906 18.3 37 
93907 1.3 --- 
93908 1.0 --- 
 
Table 4.  Respondents by Zip Code 
The highest proportions of respondents were Hispanics residing in East Salinas 
(54.3%).  The second highest response rate was from Hispanics residing in North Salinas 
(12.5%), while Caucasians residing in South Salinas (9.3%), ranked third. 
2. Perceptions of Gang Violence 
As discussed in Chapter I, the population of Salinas has historically viewed gang 
violence as a serious problem in their community.  Unsurprisingly, then, in 2010 the 
CASP population survey indicated similar feelings still dominated popular perceptions 
(see Table 8).  When asked if the gang violence problem in Salinas was serious (Q1), 
85.5% of respondents strongly agreed.  When asked if gang violence had increased 
compared to the year before, 58.3% of respondents strongly agreed.110  While other 
forms of violence can be just as damaging to a society, street gang crime tends to be more 
                                                 
109 Percentages based on estimated population of 144,276 in July 2009. See City-Data.com, “Salinas-
California.” 
110 All statements regarding frequency responses are from Appendix B, Table 61: Frequency of 
Response, Mean, and Standard Deviation by Question. 
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visible than other forms of violence and therefore galvanizes the attention of the populous 
as a whole.  It is clear gang violence is at the forefront of the minds of Salinas’s citizens.  
The interesting question remains, why has it not stirred the population to mobilize against 
this admittedly serious threat to the community?   
 
GANG VIOLENCE Frequency of Responses %  
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std Dev 
Q1: The gang violence problem in 
Salinas is very serious. 
3.6 1.0 3.0 6.9 85.5 4.7 0.9 
Q2: Compared to last year, gang 
violence in Salinas has increased. 
7.0 5.9 12.2 16.6 58.3 4.1 1.2 
Table 5.  Gang Violence Frequency of Response 
3. Legitimacy 
Our first variable, Legitimacy, can be summed up as the extent to which the 
citizens regard the city government as proper and deserving of support.111  If legitimacy 
is an important factor in the city’s ability to solicit information from the population, then 
questions describing the relationships between the population and the city government 
are important.  Survey questions 3,4,5,6 and 9 were used to measure the population’s 
attitude toward Salinas’ city government and the SPD on issues such as: city council and 
SPD responsiveness to complaints, city government services, and support for tax 
increases to fight gang violence. See Table 9 for frequency of responses related to 
legitimacy. 
Survey results indicate that 44.8% of respondents believe the Salinas Police care 
what happens to them (Q3).  Demographic analysis of this question reveals a 
misalignment between racial groups on this topic, as 67% of Caucasians agreed 
compared to 42% of Hispanics.  Questions oriented specifically at the responsiveness of 
                                                 
111 Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, 185–186.  
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the police toward a complaint, showed less agreement (37%, Q5).  Similarly, when asked 
whether the city council was responsive to complaints (Q6) only 38% agreed.  Based on 
the assumption that improving popular perceptions of city and law enforcement 
responsiveness is beneficial to improving city-community relations, the results for Q5 
and Q6 suggest areas where specific improvement could be made to increase the 
legitimacy of the city government and thereby increase the volume of information from 
the population.  
Of the responses to Q9, 43.7% of respondents agreed that the Salinas city 
government could provide services that meet their needs.  Further analysis reveals 
somewhat of a racial divide on this question, with 48% of Hispanics in agreement 
compared to 33% of Caucasians. 
In an effort to get a sense of respondent’s willingness to contribute monetarily to 
the city’s efforts to counter gang proliferation, subjects were asked an opened ended 
question regarding what changes they would support to fight gang violence in their city.  
Of the recommendations given, increasing community programs was the highest (69.3%) 
followed by increasing employment programs (57.6%).  Additionally, 46.6% of 
respondents recommended increasing the number of police officers, and 44.3% 
recommended increasing school budgets.   
In 2009, Salinas’s government officials attempted to pass measure K to provide 
the city with additional funding for anti-gang initiatives.112  All of the recommendations 
above were part of the measure K initiative.  A poll of registered voters in 2009 indicated 
that 63% of registered voters would support the measure.113  However, the measure 
ultimately did not pass, with a final vote of 60.7% against the measure.  In the CASP 
survey, when asked if respondents would support a local tax increase to support their 
recommendations most agreed (52.2%). 
                                                 
112 Measure K sought to add a 1% sales tax on taxable purchases in the City of Salinas to protect 
residents by increasing youth gang/violence prevention; after-school recreation/mentoring; expanding job 
training; hiring more police to patrol neighborhoods/schools; retaining firefighters/paramedics; establishing 
community policing; prostitution prevention; crime fighting technology; and protecting essential services 
(except vehicle purchases which are taxed based on the residency of the buyer) 
113 Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin & Associates (FMM&A) conducted a poll from May 2–4, 2009 of 400 
City of Salinas registered voters likely to cast a ballot in an upcoming election. 
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The overall results for Legitimacy show relative neutrality about the legitimacy of 
the Salinas city government and law enforcement agencies.  Often times, whether it is a 
counterinsurgency effort or counter-gang effort, there will be a small minority who 
support the government, a small minority who support the insurgent or gang, and a larger 
majority who are neutral.  This neutral population is the objective over which the city and 
the gang will fight for influence.  Understanding the population’s perceptions about the 
legitimacy of the government is critical to understanding how susceptible the population 
is to the city’s or the gang’s influence.  Results show that there is a large section of the 
population that can still be influenced by policy changes toward the favor of the Salinas 
city government in its fight against gang violence.  
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Legitimacy Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q3:  The Salinas Police care what 
happens to you. 18.4% 6.8% 30.0% 15.2% 29.6% 3.3 1.4 
Q4:  Your Salinas City Council 
Representative cares what happens to 
you. 16.9% 12.0% 28.0% 12.0% 31.1% 3.3 1.4 
Q5:  If I had some complaint about a 
police officer and took that complaint 
to a member of the police department, 
I can expect him or her to pay a lot of 
attention to what I say. 21.3% 15.6% 26.2% 12.7% 24.2% 3.0 1.5 
Q6:  If I had some complaint about a 
local government activity and took that 
complaint to a member of the Salinas 
City Council, I can expect him or her 
to pay a lot of attention to what I say. 17.1% 16.7% 28.2% 12.2% 25.7% 3.1 1.4 
Q9: I am confident that Salinas’s city 
government can provide services that 
meet my needs. (Education system, 
police, city council, mayor). 13.3% 16.7% 26.2% 19.0% 24.7% 3.3 1.3 
Table 6.  Legitimacy Frequency of Responses 
4. Unity of Effort 
To capture the attitudes of the population regarding the need for a unified 
approach to gang violence we included questions 26, 27, 29, 30, and 31.  Respondents 
agreed that combating the gang problem requires a unified approach between the 
population and the city government (87.1%, Q29).  However the majority of respondents 
indicated that the city does not communicate effectively with only 38.6% agreeing with 
Q31, “city agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang 
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violence.”  Interview results from city and law enforcement personnel confirmed this 
deficiency, and further highlighted the importance of increasing intra-agency 
communications. 
Additionally, 52% of respondents acknowledged that the police do work with 
community leaders to fight gang violence, and 47% of respondents feel that the city has 
been effective at soliciting local citizen’s help in the fight against gang violence.  In 
general it seems that a large portion of respondents perceive the city is taking a unified 
approach to confronting gang violence; however, if increasing communications among 
city agencies does affect unity of effort, results from Q31 suggest that an improvement in 
intra-agency communication could improve the popular sense of unity of effort and 
ultimately increase the volume of information from the population.  See Table 10 for 
frequency of responses related to unity of effort. 
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Unity of Effort Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q26:  The City of Salinas is taking a 
unified approach to confronting gang 
violence. 18.3% 10.4% 25.0% 17.5% 28.8% 3.3 1.4 
Q27:  The police work with local 
community leaders to fight gang 
violence. 14.2% 11.6% 22.2% 19.6% 32.4% 3.4 1.4 
Q29:  The gang violence problem is 
something that requires the combined 
efforts of the population of Salinas and 
the city government (police, city 
council, mayor, educational system) to 
resolve. 5.0% 1.4% 6.4% 11.8% 75.4% 4.5 1.0 
Q30:  The City of Salinas has been 
effective in soliciting local citizens' 
help in fighting the gang violence 
problem. 17.1% 12.7% 22.9% 14.7% 32.7% 3.3 1.5 
Q31:  City agencies communicate 
effectively among each other on issues 
related to gang violence. 19.0% 14.7% 27.7% 15.8% 22.8% 3.1 1.4 
Table 7.  Unity of Effort Frequency of Responses 
5. Trust and Embeddedness 
To measure the level of trust the community has toward the Salinas city 
government, and to measure the degree the government is embedded within the 
community, we analyzed the following areas: respondent’s willingness to share 
information with the police; willingness to help other people; willingness to work in 
community groups to solve problems; whether the government was meeting the specific 
cultural needs of the population; whether there are differing opinions among the 
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population concerning the importance of cultural heritage; and how familiar the 
population is with city and laws enforcement personnel within their community.   To 
understand the significance of each of these areas, the following section examines the 
frequency of responses for those questions that relate to trust and embeddedness, see 
Table 11. 
A large majority of respondents (82.9%) agreed that it was important to pass 
crime information to the police (Q28).  When participants were asked whether they felt it 
was important to help others that are less fortunate (Q19), 84.3% agreed.  Additionally, 
when asked whether people should form community organizations to solve community 
problems in Salinas (Q25), 82.4% agreed.  These results indicate that respondents 
understand the value of reaching out to their fellow citizens, and that community 
organizations are a good way of doing that.  This analysis also suggests the potential for 
mobilization of the masses against gang violence, particularly among the Hispanic 
population (mean of 4.8).  Additionally, if personal responsibility is shown to be a 
significant factor in the overall model (shown later in regression) these results suggest 
that increasing the citizen’s ability to form community organizations may improve their 
sense of empowerment and increase their willingness to share information with law 
enforcement agencies on gang related activities.   
To measure embeddedness we examined those areas of the city where the highest 
percentage of the population was acquainted with law enforcement personnel and city 
officials (Q34 and 35).  Survey results indicate that the population in zip code 93901 had 
the highest familiarity with both law enforcement personnel and city officials (47.7% and 
36.6% respectively).114  Conversely the population in zip code 93906 had the lowest 
familiarity with law enforcement and city officials (11.9% and 11%).  If the 
embeddedness of law enforcement and city officials is important to increasing 
information volume from the population, frequency analysis of this variable suggests that 
city officials need to establish closer ties with the community in northeast Salinas.   
                                                 
114 See Appendix B, Tables 59 and 60 for Frequency of Responses for Questions 34 and 35. 
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Because of Salinas’ high Hispanic population, the perceptions of the population 
towards cultural alignment within the city were deemed significant factors to measure.  
Shared values, attitudes, beliefs, and overall patterns of thinking socially constructed 
among members of a society have a tremendous influence on its long term health and 
growth.  A misalignment of these attitudes and beliefs between city leadership and the 
population, and even among the different ethnic groups of the population itself, can 
negatively affect how successful a city confronts a problem such as gang violence. 
To measure the impact of cultural alignment on the population’s willingness to 
provide information to law enforcement, we analyzed questions 17, 18 and 20 through 
22.  When asked if speaking English as a common language would unite Salinas’ citizens 
(Q17), 73% of Hispanics disagreed compared to 47.5% of Caucasians.  This indicates a 
polarization among the population about the importance of speaking one common 
language, and highlights the importance of language as a sense of identity.  74.3% of 
respondents stated that cultural heritage was important to their sense of identity, with a 
slightly higher rate of agreement from Hispanics than Caucasians.  
Only a small minority (33.6%) of respondents agreed that their specific ethnic 
needs were being met by city institutions such as police, city hall, and the education 
system.  While respondents indicated that cultural heritage was important, they also 
indicated that they would not necessarily be represented better by leaders of their own 
ethnic group.  This suggests that ethnicity does not weigh heavily on the respondent’s 
opinion of the city leadership, but rather action by those leaders matter more.  When 
asked if Hispanics faced discrimination in getting a decent job (Q20), 54% of Hispanics 
agreed compared to 36.8% of Caucasians.  This indicates another schism among the 
population in regards to discrimination in the job market and closely mirrors the opinions 
about city institutions failing to meet ethnic needs.  If increasing cultural alignment does 
have a positive impact on the population’s willingness to share information, then Q22 
suggests that the city should focus on meeting the specific needs of the various ethnic 
groups in Salinas, particularly Hispanics.   
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Trust and Embeddedness Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q17:  Speaking English, as a common 
language, will unite all of Salinas’s 
citizens.  58.3% 8.3% 12.2% 7.5% 13.8% 2.1 1.5 
Q18:  Salinas’s citizens are best 
represented by leaders from their own 
racial or ethnic background. 30.4% 7.9% 29.6% 9.2% 22.9% 2.9 1.5 
Q19:   People should help others who 
are less fortunate. 3.8% 2.8% 9.1% 11.2% 73.1% 4.5 1.0 
Q20:   Hispanic Americans face 
discrimination in getting a decent job. 19.6% 6.3% 23.1% 16.1% 34.9% 3.4 1.5 
Q21:  My cultural heritage is very 
important to my sense of who I am. 6.7% 3.2% 15.8% 14.8% 59.5% 4.1 1.2 
Q22:  The needs of my ethnic group 
are met in the City of Salinas by 
institutions such as: (police, elected 
officials, educational system). 22.7% 9.5% 34.1% 13.3% 20.4% 2.9 1.4 
Q25:  People should form or 
participate in community organizations 
to solve community problems in 
Salinas.   5.0% 1.8% 10.8% 14.0% 68.5% 4.4 1.1 
Q28:  It is important and effective to 
pass crime information to the Salinas 
police department. 8.2% 3.9% 5.0% 11.4% 71.5% 4.3 1.2 




The data for security was captured by the responses to questions 13 through 16, 
see Table 12.  These questions were included to measure how individual perceptions 
about personal security in Salinas affected their willingness to share information with law 
enforcement agencies.  There was largely a unanimous feeling (78.5%) among both 
Hispanics and Caucasians that Salinas was an unsafe place at night.  While the majority 
of respondents felt unsafe at night, just over a quarter of respondents (27.2%) indicated 
they have actually been threatened by gangs.  This alone is an alarming figure; however, 
the difference between those respondents that feel unsafe and those that have actually 
experienced negative effects from gangs illustrates how gangs can use a relatively small 
amount of violence as leverage to negatively affect the perceptions of the majority of the 
population.  Lastly, there was low agreement that the Salinas police had made the city 
safer over the last year (Q16).  While disagreement on this seems widespread overall, 
Hispanics seemed to disagree more (53.6%) than Caucasians (38.2%).  This suggests that 
the violence is felt by a disproportionate segment of the population.  If the perception of 
security contributes to how much information the population shares with the city, 
concerning gang activities, then this analysis suggests that law enforcement officials 
should make Hispanic neighborhood security a priority.   
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Security Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q13:  The city of Salinas is a 
dangerous place to walk alone at night. 8.7% 4.5% 8.3% 10.1% 68.4% 4.3 1.3 
Q14:  I feel safe and secure in my 
home. 15.4% 8.8% 17.5% 19.6% 38.6% 3.6 1.5 
Q15:  I, or a member of my family 
have been threatened by a gang 
member in Salinas. 55.3% 7.0% 10.5% 7.0% 20.2% 2.3 1.6 
Q16:  As compared to a year ago, the 
Salinas police department has made 
the city a more secure and safe place to 
live. 35.4% 15.0% 27.2% 8.7% 13.8% 2.5 1.4 
Table 9.  Security Frequency of Responses 
C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
We conducted regression analysis on the survey data to test our hypothesis that 
the willingness of the population to share information with law enforcement agencies is 
affected by (1) government legitimacy (legit), (2) unity of effort (unity), (3) trust and 
embeddedness, and (4) security (security).  For regression analysis the variable for trust 
and embeddedness was further broken down into several independent variables: personal 
responsibility (perresp), embeddedness of local government within the population 
(embed), city government meeting ethnic needs (culneed), and cultural alignment 
(culture).  As discussed earlier, we selected several questions from each category of the 
survey with the best expository potential for each variable.  To get each variable’s value, 
we took the average rating of all responses associated with that variable.  We then ran 




information with the Salinas Police Department.  For this model we used Q28 as the 
dependent variable, “it is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas 
police department”.115   
We included a dummy variable, “race,” in the model to determine if ethnicity had 
any impact on the population’s willingness to share information.  In order to incorporate 
race as a dummy variable answers to Q37 were re-coded for Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
answers.  Answers that were positive for Hispanic race were coded with a “1”, and non-
Hispanic answers were coded with a “0.”116  
We conducted a Ramsey retest to test for omitted variables.  Tests indicated valid 
results and that the model did not have any missing variables.117 
1. The Dependent Variable 
To measure the willingness of the respondents to share information with the SPD, 
we used question 28, “it is important and effective to pass crime information to the 
Salinas police department” as our dependent variable, see Table 13.  Regarding this 
statement, 82.9% of respondents agreed, 5% were neutral, and 12.1% disagreed.  More 
Caucasians disagreed with this statement (13.6%) than did Hispanics (10.6%).  Overall 
these results seem positive and show that respondents do perceive that it is important to 
share information with the police.  However, what people feel and whether people act on 
those feelings are two separate things.  Further analysis will attempt to explain what 
impacts people’s perceptions toward the importance of sharing information with the 
police, and understand what may prevent them from following through on their 
convictions.   
 
                                                 
115 Regression results are as follows:  Adjusted R2 =0.4279, f stat=8.67, p stat=0.0000, root MSE 
=0.9585. See Appendix B for more details.   
116 See Appendix B, Figure 36 for more detail.  
117For our model with, “willingness to share information” as the DV, the mean inflation factor (VIF) 
was 1.43.  Using Ramsey retest resulted in a p-value of 0.0116 confirming the model does not appear to 
have omitted variables.  See Appendix B for more detail.   
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DV Frequency of Responses %  
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std Dev 
Q28:  It is important and effective to 
pass crime information to the Salinas 
police department. 
3.6 1.0 3.0 6.9 85.5 4.7 0.9 
Table 10.  DV Frequency of Response 
2. Regression Results 
Overall our regression model explained 43% of the variance in the population’s 
willingness to share information with the police (adjusted R2 = .4279).  The most 
significant variables with the highest relationship with the dependent variable are 
personal responsibility (perresp, p=0.001) and unity of effort (unity 2, p=0.004).  Further 
analysis of the data shows that race, security, and cultural needs also had interesting 
impacts upon the dependent variable.  Some of our variable results are statistically 
insignificant (p>0.10) and may suggest areas of study for future research (See Table 14).  
Our analysis leads to several important conclusions regarding the population’s 























Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P 
.02 .86 .39 .00 .45 .00 .03 .12 .07 .54 .11 .25 .13 .19 .12 NA 
Table 11.  Regression Analysis by coefficient and p-values from Appendix B.  Shaded 
areas indicate p>0.10 
a. Model Analysis 
The independent variables, in rank order of regression coefficients, 
are: personal responsibility (0.45), unity of effort (0.39), security (0.13), race (0.12), 
cultural needs (0.11), cultural alignment (0.07), and embeddedness (0.03). 
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(1)  Personal Responsibility.  Examining the questions that make 
up the most important variable, personal responsibility (see Table 15), suggests the 
population is willing to help with the gang problem.  However, more importantly, if the 
population was empowered through the formation of, and participation in community 
organizations, they would be more inclined to share crime information with the police.  
This makes sense, as many interviews with city and law enforcement officials noted, 
many people do not come forward with information because they do not want to single 
themselves out and become a target of retribution.  Community organizations are a good 
way for a person to contribute information while maintaining anonymity among the 
group as a whole.   
While there are established communication channels set up by the 
city for citizens to report anonymous crime information, these channels are being 
underutilized for reporting information on violent crime.  This under utilization may be 
affected by the population’s lack of confidence that anything will result from their 
information when left on a recording machine or email account.  Furthermore, analysis of 
respondents who had negative comments about the responsiveness of the police (Q5) 
reinforces this finding.  These results may also indicate that people are simply confused 
about which channel of communication to use to report crime information. 
Engagement at the neighborhood level will allow dialogue to occur 
among members of the community and city officials on a routine basis.  For this to occur, 
it will take the city to pro-actively engage the population through the establishment of 
community organizations at the neighborhood level to increase their level of information 
on gang activities.   
Questions on Personal Responsibility Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Q19:   People should help others who are less fortunate. 4.5 1.0 
Q25:  People should form or participate in community organizations to solve 
community problems in Salinas.   
4.4 1.1 
Personal Responsibility Scale Statistics 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
4.4 .91 270 .454 
Table 12.  IV 3 Personal Responsibility Component  Questions 
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(2)  Unity of effort.  Examining the individual questions that make 
up another important variable, unity of effort (see Table 16), suggests that respondents 
view a close relationship between the community and city government as an important 
factor contributing to a citizen’s willingness to share crime information with the police.  
These results not only quantifiably confirm the attitudes of the population, they also 
reinforce the most significant variable in the model, personal responsibility; unity of 
effort may be realized through the formation of community organizations.  Through 
community organizations, citizens will feel empowered and be more willing to share 
information with the police on gang activity.  The regression coefficient values then 
decrease significantly for the rest of the variables.  Therefore, while statistically not as 
important as the first two, they do deserve some attention. 
Questions on Unity of Effort Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Q26:  The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang 
violence. 
3.3 1.4 
Q27:  The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence. 3.4 1.4 
Q29:  The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts 
of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, 
educational system) to resolve. 
4.4 1.0 
Q31:  City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related 
to gang violence. 
3.1 1.4 
Unity of Effort Scale Statistics 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
3.7 1.0 154 .396 
Table 13.  IV2 Unity of Effort Component Questions 
(3)  Security.  While security had some affect on the dependent 
variable, it did not play as a significant role in predicting willingness to share information 
as we hypothesized (coefficient of 0.139, p value of 0.19).  Table 17 illustrates those 
questions we felt best represented the variable security.  An explanation for this may be 
that citizen’s who do feel secure, either see no reason to share information with the police 
because they see no reason to go out of their way to provide information; or they live in 
an area where they have no access to the information police require.  Conversely, those 
citizens who do not feel secure may feel that divulging information to the police may 
make their situation worse and therefore do not feel it is even possible to share 
information.  Additionally, many respondents to Q5 answered negatively or neutral about 
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the responsiveness of the police.  It is possible that this impacts the population’s opinion 
on whether to share information, especially if the citizen already feels unsafe.  This may 
have lowered the overall value of security in the model.  More research in this area may 
be needed. 
Questions on Security Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Q13:   The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night. 4.3 1.3 
Q15:  I, or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in 
Salinas. 
2.3 1.6 
Security Scale Statistics 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
3.3 .99 243 .139 
Table 14.  IV5 Security Component Questions 
(4)  Cultural Needs.  Cultural needs as represented by Q22 (see 
Table 18) had a slight impact on the willingness to share information.  While the survey 
itself showed that cultural heritage was important to the respondents, regression analysis 
showed that it was not how much an individual valued their cultural heritage, but rather 
the ability of the city government to meet the ethnic needs of the population that affected 
their willingness to share information with the police.  Each ethnic group has unique 
values, attitudes, beliefs, and overall patterns of thinking.  For example, interviews during 
our research with city and law enforcement officials revealed that many Hispanic 
immigrants view the police as a corrupt institution.  These beliefs stem from their 
negative experiences with law enforcement personnel in Mexico.  Thus, an ethnic group’s 
sense of worth is tied to how much they perceive that the city government cares about 
their particular values and beliefs.  The ability of the city government to recognize these 
attitudes and align policy accordingly can instill a sense of worth and belonging to 
estranged ethnic groups and increase the level of trust they have in government 
institutions.  This increase in trust will facilitate more frequent and honest 
communication between the population and city government agencies.  This can 
positively affect how successful the city is at collectively confronting problems such as 
gang violence. 
 77
Questions on Cultural Needs Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Q22:  The needs of my ethnic group are met in the City of Salinas by institutions 
such as: (police, elected officials, educational system). 
2.9 1.4 
Cultural Needs Scale Statistics 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
2.9 1.4 211 .119 
Table 15.  IV 7 Cultural Needs Component Questions 
(5)  Legitimacy.  The relatively insignificant relationship between 
legitimacy and the willingness to share information could be due to an analysis problem.  
Accurately defining and measuring political legitimacy is a very difficult.  It is possible 
that the questions used for this variable did not capture, to a sufficient degree, those 
ingredients that accurately reflect measurements for legitimacy.  Furthermore, the 
concept of legitimacy is a complex concept that may need to be analyzed in multiple 
component parts rather than as an amalgamated variable as we have done in this model 
(See Table 19). While legitimacy may be an important factor in a counterinsurgency 
campaign, where the political legitimacy of the state is being directly challenged by the 
insurgent, it may not have any affect in a counter-gang scenario.  It is quite possible that 
the legitimacy of the city is intact by the sheer fact of its existence, and plays no part in 
the perceptions of residents as it relates to their willingness to share information.   
Questions for Legitimacy Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Q3.  The Salinas Police care what happens to you. 3.3 1.4 
Q4.  Your Salinas City Council Representative cares what happens to you. 3.2 1.4 
Q5.  If I had some complaint about a police officer and took that complaint to a 
member of the police department, I can expect him or her to pay a lot of attention to 
what I say. 
3.0 1.5 
Q6.  If I had some complaint about a local government activity and took that 
complaint to a member of the Salinas City Council, I can expect him or her to pay a 
lot of attention to what I say. 
3.1 1.4 
Q9.  I am confident that Salinas’s city government can provide services that meet 
my needs. (Education system, police, city council, mayor). 
3.3 1.3 
Legitimacy Scale Statistics 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
3.0 1.2 167 .022 
Table 16.  IV 1 Legitimacy Component Questions 
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(6)  Embeddedness.  As with legitimacy, embeddedness did not 
seem to play an integral role in shaping respondent’s willingness to share information 
with police.  While we attempted to show a causal link between the number of police and 
city officials people know, to their willingness to share information, this analysis proved 
this link to be very weak.  An explanation for this may be that it does not matter how 
many police officers someone knows, but rather what the nature and quality of the 
relationship is. 
(7)  Race.  Race was added as a dummy variable to the model to 
determine what affect race had on a respondent’s willingness to share information with 
the police.  While not a strong predictor of the dependent variable, adding race to the 
model did show that Hispanics are slightly more inclined to share information with the 
police than other ethnic groups.  This may be because Hispanics are more affected by the 
gang problem than other ethnic groups in the city.   
D. RESULTS SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Survey respondents confirmed the importance of some of our variables we 
hypothesized affect their willingness to share crime information with the police.  Not all 
of the independent variables for our model showed to be statistically significant (p < .10).  
Of the variables we tested in our model, personal responsibility and unity of effort 
provide the most clarity on where the city can focus its efforts to increase the level of 
information they are receiving from the population concerning gang crime.  It is clear that 
a majority of respondents believe that a close relationship with the city is critical to 
fighting gang crime.  Additionally, this close relationship may best be manifested through 
the development of a network of community organizations structured at the neighborhood 
level.  Results indicate it is not the number of police officers people know, but rather the 
responsiveness of the police, and the quality of the communication, between them and the 
community, that matter most in eliciting information.  In other words, it is not quantity of 
relationships, but rather the quality of those relationships that will affect the public’s 
willingness to share information. 
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These findings are in line with what history tells us works well in 
counterinsurgency campaigns.  A counterinsurgency fight is not won at the highest levels 
of government, but rather it is won at the village or neighborhood level.  A government 
that can engage the population through meaningful dialogue at the lowest levels can 
establish credibility with the people, and can also empower the citizenry to make a 
significant contribution to the fight.  While not all counterinsurgency doctrine can be 
applied to a counter-gang problem, as this analysis has shown, it is clear that the two are 
congruent on this point.  Analysis of this survey shows the population has the potential 
for mobilization; however, it is incumbent upon the city leadership, particularly in the 
law enforcement agencies, to have a similar attitude in its approach to the gang problem.  
This point cannot be overemphasized.  If the city does not strive to build closer ties to the 
community in which the gangs thrive, they will not be able to increase their knowledge 
about the gangs, and will not be able to effectively target them. 
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VI. SALINAS POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To get a better sense of attitudes and perceptions of the enforcement arm of the 
Salinas city government, we conducted a voluntary survey of the city's 153 uniformed 
police officers at the rank of Commander or below.  As previously described, this survey 
was intended to identify attitudes and perceptions that might influence the city's ability to 
effectively process information relevant to criminal gang activity.  As this survey was 
targeted at those charged with "front-line" duty on the streets of Salinas, the three Deputy 
Chiefs and the Chief of Police were excluded from the potential sample population.  The 
final survey questions were drawn from a combination of previous General Social Survey 
(GSS) research conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of 
Chicago, the 2010 CASP survey of the Salinas population, as well as original questions 
we crafted to provide insight to the unique conditions in Salinas.118 
To conduct the survey, we attended the Salinas Police Department's four daily 
shift change briefings over the course of two days: September 7 and 10, 2010.  Based on 
feedback we received from Commander Juan Ruiz, these days were specifically 
identified so that we could canvas as much of the department as possible within a 
reasonable timeframe.  At the beginning of each of the shift change briefings, we spent 
approximately five to ten minutes describing the intent and structure of the survey, 
reading the informed consent statement with an emphasis on the voluntary and 
anonymous nature of any participation, and answering questions.  Each attendee at the 
shift change was provided with a survey and given as much time as necessary to 
complete the questionnaire.  Completed surveys were collected after the shift change 
briefing, along with signatures indicating individual consent to participate in research.  
Each respondent was provided a personal copy of the informed consent statement, with 
contact information for our research team at the Naval Post Graduate School. 
                                                 
118 James Allan Davis and Tom W. Smith, General Social Surveys, 1972–2008 (Storrs, CT: The 
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, 2009). 
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B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Of the potential 153 individuals we identified as eligible to participate in the 
survey, we received responses from 88 uniformed officers (57.5% response rate).  Of the 
88 completed surveys, 53 officers (60.2%) indicated that they lived outside the city limits 
of Salinas, while 35 responded that they were Salinas residents (39.8%), as described in 
Table20. 
Indicated Residency  # of Respondents Response Rate (%) 
Reside Inside Salinas City Limits 35 39.8% 
Reside Outside Salinas City Limits 53 60.2% 
Table 17.  Salinas Police Survey Respondent Residency (Q34) 
After conducting the surveys, each questionnaire was individually coded 1 
through 88.  The responses to each question were then input into a spreadsheet, with 
individual questions grouped according to their relevance to each of our independent 
variables.119  Thus, the questions were grouped under the overall themes of legitimacy, 
security, trust, systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy.  We also included 
some general questions that we hoped might offer some discriminatory power for the end 
results.   
The statistics for each question were individually calculated, with the respondent's 
answer to the residency question used as a discriminator in the overall analysis.  The 
survey utilized a Likert Scale format, with a potential range of responses from 1 to 5, and 
"don't know."  A response of "1" indicated that the respondent "completely disagreed" 
with the given statement.  Likewise, a response of "5" indicated that the respondent 
"completely agreed" with the statement as written.  As a mid-scale response of "3" would 
indicate a neutral opinion, any responses above a 3 were interpreted as agreement, while 
 
 
                                                 
119 See Appendix C, Table 62 for complete survey data. 
 83
those answers below a 3 were documented as disagreement with the given statement. If 
the survey respondent opted for "don't know," or did not indicate an answer, their 
response was recorded as a "0" in our tables.   
Ultimately, we hoped to uncover specific causal factors that might contribute to 
improved information processing within the SPD.  To do so, we utilized both descriptive 
and inferential statistics (multiple regression) to mathematically resolve patterns in the 
data we collected.  We theorized that levels of information processing are impacted by 
the variables of systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy.  However, because we 
wanted to be able to compare attitudes and perceptions across the different survey 
populations, we also included survey questions for the variables that we conceptualized 
as responsible for information volume (legitimacy, security, and trust and 
embeddedness).  In addition, including questions for both information volume and 
processing allowed us greater flexibility in adapting our final model of information 
processing to reflect any changes to our initial theory.  The following sections describe 
the survey results for each condition variable for our overall theory of information 
volume and processing.  Table 21 depicts a brief summary of results for the variables we 
considered in this survey. 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Legitimacy 3.1 0.6 
Security 3.5 0.6 
Trust and Embeddedness 3.0 0.5 
Systems Integration 2.2 0.7 
Unity of Effort 3.0 0.6 
Levels of Autonomy 3.2 0.7 
Table 18.  Variable Means and Standard Deviation 
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a. Legitimacy 
Our first independent variable, legitimacy, was addressed in the SPD 
survey with questions 3 through 8.  These questions sought to understand individual law 
enforcement officer perceptions of the credibility of both Salinas city government, and 
the SPD organization itself.   
The responses to Q3, "The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens," are 
interesting in a way that is, perhaps, not quite apparent from the calculated mean of 4.1.  
Of the sampled population, 73.9% agreed with this statement.  While a large majority of 
the SPD believes that their organization cares about their community, this also indicates, 
of course, that more than a quarter of the SPD feels some lack of confidence that the 
organization they serve cares about the citizens of Salinas.  Also noteworthy, is the fact 
that 65% of the "3 or less" responses to Q3 were from officers who also indicated that 
they reside outside the Salinas city limits, which is a level slightly disproportionate to 
their representation in the survey.  
The responses to Q4 and Q6 also indicate a significant pessimistic mood 
about Salinas’s elected government, with only 31.9% agreeing that the City Council cares 
about Salinas citizens, and 36.5% agreeing that the City Council is responsive to citizen 
complaints.  The overall results for the legitimacy questions are described in Table 22. 
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Legitimacy Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q3. The Salinas Police care about 
Salinas citizens 
1.1 3.4 21.6 33.0 40.9 4.1 0.9 
Q4. The Salinas City Council cares 
about Salinas citizens 
5.7 22.7 39.8 23.9 8.0 3.1 1.0 
Q5. The Salinas Police are very 
responsive to citizen complaints. 
0.0 5.7 18.2 43.2 33.0 4.0 0.9 
Q6. The Salinas City Council are very 
responsive to citizen complaints. 
5.4 20.3 37.8 24.3 12.2 3.2 1.1 
Q7. I am confident in Salinas's courts 
and legal system. 
9.1 34.1 33.0 20.5 3.4 2.8 1.0 
Q8. I am satisfied with the quality of 
education in Salinas. 
44.3 36.4 17.0 2.3 0.0 1.8 0.8 
Table 19.  Legitimacy Frequency of Response 
b. Security 
The data for our second independent variable, security, was captured by 
the responses to survey questions 12 through 15.  These questions were included to better 
understand how individual perceptions and attitudes about personal security in Salinas 
contribute to a desire to share gang-related intelligence.  It is interesting to note that there 
is strong agreement that Salinas is unsafe at night, with 83% of the respondents 
answering with a 4 or 5 to Q12.  Additionally, it was rather unexpected to have the police 
department so divided in their responses to Q14.  Overall, 44% of the respondents 
indicated that they, or a member of their family, had been threatened by a gang member 




highlight a poorly worded question that failed to distinguish between on-duty and off-
duty occurrences.  The descriptive statistics that detail the overall responses to the 
security questions are detailed in Table 23. 
Security Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous 
place to walk alone at night. 
1.1 4.5 11.4 26.1 56.8 4.3 0.9 
Q13. I feel safe and secure in my 
home. 
3.6 9.5 16.7 29.8 40.5 3.9 1.1 
Q14. I or a member of my family have 
been threatened by a gang member in 
Salinas. 
46.5 2.3 7.0 12.8 31.4 2.8 1.8 
Q15. As compared to a year ago, the 
Salinas police department has made 
the city a more secure and safe place to 
live. 
17.4 20.9 36.0 20.9 4.7 2.7 1.1 
Table 20.  Security Frequency of Response 
c. Trust and Embeddedness 
The third independent variable we addressed in our survey was trust and 
embeddedness.  Questions 16 through 22 were intended to capture the police 
department's attitudes on issues frequently associated with varying levels of social 
cohesion and trust.120  Table 24, below, provides a summary of the survey results for 
these questions.  
The analysis of the responses to Q16 reveals that a greater proportion of 
those who live outside the city limits agree that speaking English as a common language 
would unite Salinas citizens (35.3%), when compared to the same responses from Salinas 
                                                 
120 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla : Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. 
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city residents (15.3%).121  This may suggest that those who live and work in the city, 
have a greater appreciation for the different cultures within Salinas, and view this as an 
important aspect of the population's shared sense of identity.  Ultimately, this points to a 
greater degree of embeddedness, or cultural respect, from those who live within the city 
that they patrol.   
The responses to Q18 are somewhat discouraging.  Of the 86 responses to 
this question, only 58.1% agreed with the statement "people should help others who are 
less fortunate." This response indicates some degree of ambivalence toward social 
responsibility within the Salinas police department.  This response might also point to the 
presence of cognitive barriers to the sort of personal activism that might foster a greater 
familiarity and trust between the police department and the population.  On the other 
hand, it might simply indicate a shared distaste for social welfare policies.  Regardless, it 
seems clear that a significant portion of the police department believes that "less 
fortunate" people should carry their own weight in the city of Salinas. 
Similarly, the responses to Q22 seem to confirm the perception within the 
SPD that the community needs to take action to correct problems.  Of the 85 respondents, 
78.8% answered with a 4 or 5 to the statement that "people should form or participate in 
community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas."  While this response 
indicates a shared belief that community organizations serve a valuable purpose in 
solving problems, there is some potential for this attitude to obstruct efforts to develop 
government-citizen partnerships that might be even more effective versus gang violence.  
In other words, to develop the trusted government-population relationships necessary to 
overcome the information advantages enjoyed by the gangs, the SPD must not perceive 
gang violence as simply a "community problem." 
                                                 
121 See Table 62, Appendix C for the expanded frequency of response results for all questions. 
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Trust and Embeddedness Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q16. Speaking English, as a common 
language, will unite all of Salinas’s 
citizens. 
17.6 12.9 18.8 15.3 35.3 3.4 1.5 
Q17. Salinas’s citizens are best 
represented by leaders from their own 
racial or ethnic background. 
42.0 31.8 17.0 8.0 1.1 2.4 1.3 
Q18. People should help others who 
are less fortunate. 
5.8 5.8 30.2 26.7 31.4 3.7 1.1 
Q19. Hispanic Americans face 
discrimination in getting a decent job. 
48.8 28.6 13.1 3.6 6.0 1.9 1.1 
Q20. My ethnic group membership is 
very important to my sense of who I 
am. 
26.5 10.8 20.5 18.1 24.1 3.0 1.5 
Q21. The needs of my ethnic group are 
met by the City of Salinas (police, city 
council, educational system, mayor). 
22.8 20.3 31.6 16.5 8.9 2.7 1.2 
Q22. People should form or participate 
in community organizations to solve 
community problems in Salinas. 
1.2 2.4 17.6 29.4 49.4 4.2 0.9 
Table 21.  Trust and Embeddedness Frequency of Response  
d. Systems Integration 
Questions 9, 10, and 11 were included to get a sense of how the typical 
SPD officer receives his or her information about gang activity.  Question 33 was 
directed more towards understanding perceptions about the efficiency of intra-
government communication channels.  Considered together, these questions were 
intended to offer some insight into how well city agencies are networked for the sharing 
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of gang-related intelligence (see Table 25).  It is interesting to note the vast majority of 
the responses to Q9 indicated that they do not get most of their information about gang 
activity through official city communication channels; only 15.9% confirmed that they 
get most of their information through this source.  As indicated in the responses to Q10, 
the channel of communication with the greatest proportionate use was "word of mouth or 
rumor."  However, this still represented only 30.7% of those sampled.  In Q11, even 
fewer indicated that media outlets provided useful information about gang activity 
(9.1%).  The lack of any clear consensus on the use of these information channels 
illustrates a dependency on some alternative means of communication, and it is quite 
possible that the wording of our questions did not adequately canvas the possible sources 
of information used within the SPD.  Combined with the largely negative response to 
Q33, this response pattern points to deficiencies in the integration (and usefulness) of 
official city communication channels.  At the same time, these results may also highlight 
an over-reliance on limited personal information sources.  This contention will be further 
investigated in Chapter VIII as we examine the social and professional networks used by 
the SPD, in detail. 
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Systems Integration Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q9. I receive most of my information 
about gang activity through official 
city communication channels (Press 
releases, billboards, community 
meetings) 
46.6 27.3 10.2 10.2 5.7 2.0 1.2 
Q10. I receive most of my information 
about gang activity through word of 
mouth or rumors. 
15.9 22.7 30.7 20.5 10.2 2.9 1.2 
Q11. I receive most of my information 
about gang activity through media 
outlets (TV, newspaper, radio). 
42.0 31.8 17.0 8.0 1.1 1.9 1.0 
Q33. City agencies communicate 
effectively among each other on issues 
related to gang violence. 
34.2 29.1 29.1 6.3 1.3 2.1 1.0 
Table 22.  Systems Integration Frequency of Response 
e. Unity of Effort 
To get a better sense of the SPD’s attitudes regarding the need for a more 
unified response to gang violence, as well as perceptions of ongoing city government 
efforts to reach out to the community, we included questions 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, and 32 
(see Table 26).  In general, there seems to be agreement among SPD officers that city 
agencies are not executing a unified counter-gang strategy (Q23 and Q28), though there 
is nearly universal agreement that a unified approach is what is needed (Q31, 95.5%).  In 
addition, over half of the respondents indicated that information about gang activities 
should be more freely distributed (Q27, 51.2%), rather than compartmentalized on a need 
to know basis. 
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Unity of Effort Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q23. The City of Salinas is taking a 
unified approach to confronting gang 
violence. 
20.2 39.3 14.3 17.9 8.3 2.5 1.2 
Q24. The police work with local 
community leaders to fight gang 
violence. 
2.4 17.1 30.5 37.8 12.2 3.4 1.0 
Q27. Information related to gang 
activities should only be shared with 
other individuals or departments on a 
need to know basis. 
31.0 20.2 19.0 16.7 13.1 2.6 1.4 
Q28. The city of Salinas and the 
Salinas PD have a unified counter-
gang strategy. 
27.2 35.8 19.8 14.8 2.5 2.3 1.1 
Q31. The gang violence problem is 
something that requires the combined 
efforts of the population of Salinas and 
the city government (police, city 
council, mayor, educational system) to 
resolve. 
0.0 0.0 4.5 10.2 85.2 4.8 0.5 
Q32. The City of Salinas has been 
effective in soliciting local citizens' 
help in fighting the gang violence 
problem. 
21.6 39.8 28.4 6.8 3.4 2.3 1.0 
Table 23.  Unity of Effort Frequency of Response 
f. Levels of Autonomy 
Survey questions 26, 29 and 30 were included to better understand the 
individual's perceptions of their own capacity to act in a timely manner to counter gang 
activities (Table 27).  The responses to Q26 reveal that just under half (48.8%) agree that 
they "have a role in implementing the city's counter-gang strategy."  If a counter-gang 
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campaign is viewed as something that requires the combined efforts of all citizens 
(including citizen-police) to eliminate the criminal gang's inherent information 
advantage, then this survey response points to an under-utilization of available resources.  
The results for Q29 and Q30 are interesting for their even distribution 
across the different responses.  While this is clearly not the most desirable outcome to 
questions about individual initiative and freedom to act, it was more positive than we 
expected. 
Levels of Autonomy Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q26. I have a role in implementing the 
city's counter-gang strategy.  
13.1 14.3 23.8 15.5 33.3 3.4 1.4 
Q29. Existing Police Department 
policies suppress individual initiative 
and or hinder my ability to reduce 
gang activities.    
19.8 14.0 27.9 20.9 17.4 3.0 1.4 
Q30. I have freedom to act on gang 
related intelligence in a timely manner. 
10.3 21.8 31.0 25.3 11.5 3.1 1.2 
Table 24.  Autonomy Frequency of Response 
g. General 
For the purposes of enhancing our ability to extract useful information 
from the survey responses, we included a selection of general questions.  Questions 1, 2, 
and 25 served to provide a baseline sense of the attitudes of the respondents toward the 
gang violence "problem" in Salinas (Table 28).  We wanted to ensure there was some 
agreement that the level of gang violence was problematic.  The responses to these 
questions confirmed that there is, indeed, a very strong consensus within the SPD that the 
current level of gang violence is "serious" (Q2, 100%).  There is also strong agreement 
that gang violence will not simply resolve itself over time (Q25, 95.2%).  Question 34 
(Table 20) was also a "general" question, and asked the respondents to indicate whether 
they resided within the city limits of Salinas.  This question was used as a discriminator, 
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intended to help us determine if an officer’s perceptions were influenced either positively 
or negatively by where they lived in relation to the gang problem.   
General Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q1. Compared to last year, gang 
violence in Salinas has increased. 
9.4 31.8 43.5 12.9 2.4 2.7 0.9 
Q2. The gang violence problem in 
Salinas is very serious. 
0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 96.6 5.0 0.2 
Q25. The gang violence problem will 
resolve itself with time regardless of 
how the City responds to the situation. 
84.3 10.8 3.6 0.0 1.2 1.2 0.6 
Table 25.  General Question Frequency of Response 
2. Regression Analysis 
Using information processing ("infopro") as our dependent variable, we tested 
several multiple regression models with various independent variables. Initially, we 
constructed models including the variables associated with our theory of information 
processing; we tested the variables of systems integration, unity of effort, and 
autonomy.122  Ultimately, the model that included the variables of police legitimacy 
("legitpol"), city government legitimacy ("legitcity"), security ("security"), personal 
responsibility ("perresp"), community ("community"), and government agency unity of 
effort ("unity") offered the strongest statistical explanation of the factors influencing the 
SPD's capacity for information processing.   
We also included a dummy variable for officer residency to determine if the 
location of the respondent's housing had any influence on their perceptions of the city's 
information processing capacity.  Those responding to the residency question (Q34, 
Table 20), were coded as a "1" if living within city limits, and as a "0" if living outside 
city limits.   
                                                 
122 See Appendix C, Figure 39 for a detailed description of the models tested. 
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Finally, we conducted a Ramsey retest to ensure that our model addressed all 
necessary variables.  Testing indicated valid results with no missing variables.  The 
resulting best fit model, and associated analysis, is described in the following sections. 
a. The Dependent Variable 
The questions we posed, specifically about information and intelligence, 
were intended to get a sense of current attitudes about sharing gang-related intelligence 
freely.  If we could realistically gauge individual feelings about the appropriateness of 
sharing gang intelligence, we concluded that it would be possible to compare these 
attitudes with those measured by the other questions in the survey to better understand 
what factors most influence the SPD’s capacity for information processing.  In essence, 
we assume that changes in attitudes about information processing will result in 
quantitative and qualitative changes in the processing of information about criminal 
gangs.  Accordingly, we selected several questions from the survey with the best 
expository potential, and ran multiple regression models to determine the variables 
offering the best fit.  Of those tested, the use of questions 30 and 33 for the dependent 
variable offered the most statistically interesting results (Adjusted R2 = .44). 
Questions about Information Processing Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q30. I have freedom to act on gang related intelligence in a timely manner. 3.1 1.2 
Q33. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related 
to gang violence. 
2.1 1.0 
Table 26.  Information Processing Dependent Variable 
b. Regression Results 
Multiple models were run to determine the independent variables offering 
the most statistically significant model for information processing.  As described earlier, 
our initial theory pointed toward systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy as the 
variables responsible for differing qualitative levels of information processing.  
Ultimately, however, our analysis pointed toward a different causal relationship. 
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The model offering the most statistically significant results in our multiple 
regression included variables for: unity of effort, trust and embeddedness, security, and 
legitimacy.  Although this explanation diverges from our initial theory regarding 
information processing, the overlapping significance of personal responsibility and unity 
of effort variables for both volume (see Chapter V, Section B) and processing provides a 
























Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P 
-0.20 .03 .04 .66 -.02 .70 -.27 .00 .85 .00 -.05 .58 -.09 .48 
Table 27.  Regression Analysis by coefficient and p-values from Appendix C.  
(Shaded areas indicate p > 0.10) 
Of the independent variables included in the model (Table 30), the most 
statistically relevant were: community unity of effort (p = 0.00, coefficient = 0.85), 
personal responsibility (p = 0.00, coefficient = -0.27), and police legitimacy (p = 0.03, 
coefficient = -0.20).  Although the other variables did not show a strong causal 
relationship with our information processing dependent variable (i.e., p < 0.10), our 
results do not exclude the possibility that further research might reveal stronger linkages. 
(1) Unity of Effort with the Community.  As the variable with 
the strongest relationship to attitudes about information processing, unity of effort with 
the community requires the most focus within the police department (Table 31).  In other 
words, to achieve a stronger positive consensus about information sharing, the SPD must 
convince officers that the city and the community are working toward common goals in 
the fight against gang violence.  There are powerful psychological forces that come into 
play with a perceived group consensus.  As Robert Cialdini notes in Influence: The 
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Psychology of Persuasion, "one [psychological mechanism] we use to determine what is 
correct is to find out what other people think is correct."123  He further elaborates, noting 
that "we view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the degree that we see 
others performing it."124  Perhaps this notion provides some rational for why it is so 
important for individuals to perceive that the city government is reaching out to the 
population.  If individual police officers sense that there is an organizational impetus to 
develop ties and share information toward a common purpose, then those same 
individuals might be more compelled to adopt this "common" behavior themselves. 
Questions about Unity of Effort with Community (community) Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q24. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence. 3.4 1.0 
Q31. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined 
efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city 
council, mayor, educational system) to resolve. 
4.8 0.5 
Q32. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in 
fighting the gang violence problem. 
2.4 1.0 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
3.5 0.6 82 0.85 
Table 28.  IV 5 Unity of Effort with Community Component Questions  
(2) Personal Responsibility.  The negative coefficient with 
personal responsibility seems to illustrate that officers who care more about the 
community are more likely to be frustrated with the quality of information sharing within 
the SPD (Table 32).  Although a large number may value an improved professional 
relationship (i.e., unity of effort), one cannot help but get a sense that there is some lack 
of desire to get personally involved with the community.  Cara J. Wong argues that "what 
[makes] a city a vibrant "community"—and not simply a municipality of solitary TV 
addicts burrowed deep in their dens—would be the presence of relational ties among its 
residents."125  Derivatively, if a counter-gang campaign requires a vibrant, engaged 
community that is more cognizant of gang activity, then the police, as representatives of 
                                                 
123 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, 2nd ed. (New York: William 
Morrow, 1993), 116. 
124 Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. 
125 Cara J. Wong, Boundaries of Obligation in American Politics: Geographic, National, and Racial 
Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 7. 
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the government, must foster that sort of interaction through personal engagement with the 
population.  This requires the sort of personal concern for others that strengthens the 
fabric of social trust, as well as generating an intra-departmental desire to improve 
information sharing so that the SPD might better serve the community.  In other words, 
the negative coefficient does not mean that in order to improve information sharing the 
police need less personal responsibility.  Instead, the negative relationship perhaps points 
to a mechanism for improvement within the SPD: improve officer attitudes towards 
personal responsibility and they will want to make the organization better. 
Questions about Personal Responsibility (perresp) Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q18. People should help others who are less fortunate. 3.7 0.6 
Q22. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve 
community problems in Salinas. 
4.2 1.0 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
4.0 0.8 85 -0.27 
Table 29.  IV 4 Personal Responsibility Component Questions 
(3) Police Legitimacy.  The negative coefficient associated 
with the police legitimacy variable in our model indicates that the less the police perceive 
themselves as a legitimate force, the more they will be satisfied with how Salinas 
government agencies are sharing information about gangs (Table 33).  Although this 
result may seem somewhat counterintuitive, a closer examination might offer some 
explanation.  Legitimacy has been defined as the extent to which the citizens regard the 
city government as proper and deserving of support.126  Accordingly, if the police see 
themselves as "undeserving of support," then execution of daily operations require a 
more independent, isolationist adaptation to compensate for the lack of external support.  
This, too, is contrary to what we would like to see from the enforcement arm of the city 
government in order to effectively fight a networked foe with an inherent information 
advantage.  As with personal responsibility, this likely points to another leverage point 
for creating a culture of excellence within the SPD.  The more individual officers 
                                                 
126 Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
185–186. 
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perceive the SPD as a legitimate force, the more conscious they will be of internal 
deficiencies, which, in turn, should create more of a hunger for continuous improvement. 
Questions about Police Legitimacy (legitpol) Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens. 4.1 0.9 
Q5. The Salinas Police are very responsive to citizen complaints. 4.0 0.9 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
4.1 0.8 88 -0.20 
Table 30.  IV 1 Police Legitimacy Component Questions 
(4) SPD Officer Residency.  Officer residency was coded as a 
dummy variable for the regression model to determine what effect location had on 
respondent perceptions on information sharing.  While not a strong influence on officer 
perceptions about information processing, living inside the city limits tended to indicate a 
less than favorable opinion about the city's information sharing. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The survey of the SPD proved quite descriptive in our quest to better understand 
the factors contributing to improved information processing within the enforcement arm 
of the city government.  Of the variables we sampled in our questionnaire, the attitudes 
related to unity of effort, trust, and legitimacy provide perhaps the most compelling story 
of what needs to be changed to measurably improve the SPD's capacity for the 
production and distribution of actionable intelligence.  Based on our survey results, we 
found that officers who care less about helping others (personal responsibility) and see 
themselves as an illegitimate force are likely to be satisfied with lower levels of 
information sharing.  In other words, less concern for others and a poor self-image 
translate to less desire for improvement within the SPD.  To generate an increased 
appetite for improved information sharing, SPD leadership must work to reverse these 
attitudes within the ranks.  In the long-term, the individual officer's commitment to 
organizational excellence is essential to garnering the public trust and minimizing the 
gang presence.  
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Overall, however, the finding requiring the most immediate prioritized focus is 
that individual officers must perceive that government agencies are working with the 
community toward the same goals in countering gang violence before they will perceive 
that information is being (or perhaps needs to be) shared effectively.  We will examine 
this point further in Chapter IX as we offer some potential course of action to improve 
Salinas' capacity for information volume and processing to reduce gang violence. 
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VII. SALINAS CITY EMPLOYEE SURVEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter II, fighting an insurgency requires a unified, whole-of-
government approach to secure the loyalty of the masses.  Accordingly, based on our 
theoretical framework, fighting a "war" versus the entrenched gangs of Salinas requires 
more than just a dedicated police department; the entire city government must operate in 
unison toward a shared vision of victory.  Therefore it was important for us to get a sense 
of the attitudes of civilian city employees in Salinas who interface with the public as the 
"faces" of government bureaucracy.  To measure the attitudes and perceptions of the city 
employees of the Salinas city government, we conducted a voluntary survey of the city's 
643 full- and part-time workers.  As previously described in our methodology chapter, 
this survey was intended to identify attitudes and perceptions that might influence the 
city's ability to effectively process information relevant to criminal gang activity.  As this 
survey was intended to capture the attitudes of those responsible for interfacing with the 
Salinas population, as well as policy-making, all city employees were deemed eligible for 
participation in the survey.  The final survey questions were drawn from a combination of 
previous GSS research conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the 
University of Chicago, the 2010 CASP survey of the Salinas population, as well as 
original questions we crafted to provide insight to the unique conditions in Salinas.127   
To conduct the survey, we attended the scheduled city employee meetings on 
October 6 and 13, 2010.  Based on feedback we received from the city manager, these 
days were specifically chosen so that we could canvas as much of the department as 
possible within a reasonable timeframe.  At the beginning of each of the meetings, we 
spent approximately five to ten minutes describing the intent and structure of the survey, 
reading the informed consent statement with an emphasis on the voluntary and 
anonymous nature of any participation, and answering questions.  Each attendee at the 
                                                 
127 Davis and Smith, General Social Surveys, 1972–2008. 
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meeting was provided with a survey and given as much time as necessary to complete the 
questionnaire.  Completed surveys were collected after the briefing, along with signatures 
indicating individual consent to participate in research.  Each respondent was provided a 
personal copy of the informed consent statement, with contact information for our 
research team at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Of the potential 643 individuals we 
identified as eligible to participate in the survey, we received responses from 65 city 
employees (10% response rate).  Of the 65 completed surveys, 42 respondents (64.6%) 
indicated that they lived inside the city limits of Salinas, 21 responded that they resided 
outside the city limits (32.3%), and 2 (3.1%) provided no indication of their home of 
residence (Table 34). 
Indicated Residency # of Respondents Response Rate (%) 
Reside Inside Salinas City Limits 42 64.6% 
Reside Outside Salinas City Limits 21 32.3% 
No Residency Answer Provided 2 3.1% 
Table 31.  Salinas City Employee Survey Respondent Residency (Q33) 
B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
After conducting the surveys, each questionnaire was individually coded from 1 
to 65.  The responses to each question were then input into a spreadsheet, with individual 
questions grouped according to their relevance to each of our independent variables.128  
Thus, the questions were grouped under the overall themes of legitimacy, security, trust, 
systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy.  We also included some general 
questions that we hoped might offer some insight of baseline perceptions about gang 
violence. 
The statistics for each question were individually calculated, with the respondent's 
answer to the residency question used as a discriminator for the overall analysis.  The 
survey utilized a Likert Scale format, with a potential range of responses from 1 to 5, or 
                                                 
128 Reference Appendix D, Table 67 for the complete data set. 
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"don't know."  A response of "1" indicated that the respondent "strongly disagreed" with 
the given statement.  Likewise, a response of "5" indicated that the respondent "strongly 
agreed" with the statement as written.  As a mid-scale response of "3" would indicate a 
neutral opinion, any numbers above a 3 were interpreted as agreement, while those 
answers below a 3 were documented as disagreement with the given statement. If the 
survey respondent opted for "don't know," or did not indicate an answer, their response 
was recorded as a "0" in our data.   
As with the survey of the Salinas Police Department, we hoped to uncover 
specific causal factors that might contribute to improved information processing of gang-
related intelligence within city government.  To do so, we utilized both descriptive and 
inferential statistics (multiple regression) to mathematically resolve patterns in the data 
we collected.  We theorized that levels of information processing are impacted by the 
variables of systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy.  However, because we 
wanted to be able to compare attitudes and perceptions across the different survey 
populations, we also included survey questions for the variables we conceptualized as 
responsible for information volume (legitimacy, security, and trust and embeddedness).  
In addition, including questions for both information volume and processing allowed us 
greater flexibility in adapting our final model of information processing to reflect any 
changes to our initial theory.  The following sections describe the survey results for each 
independent variable for our overall theory of information volume and processing. Table 
35 depicts a brief summary of results for the variables we considered in this survey. 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Legitimacy 3.0 0.8 
Security 3.0 0.5 
Trust and Embeddedness 3.4 0.5 
Systems Integration 3.0 0.5 
Unity of Effort 3.2 0.6 
Levels of Autonomy 3.0 1.4 
Table 32.  Variable Means and Standard Deviation 
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a. Legitimacy 
Our first independent variable, legitimacy, was addressed in the Salinas 
city employee survey with questions 3 through 8 (Table 36).  These questions sought to 
understand individual city worker perceptions of the credibility of both the SPD, and the 
larger city government organization itself.  Interestingly, the results for Q3, "The Salinas 
Police care about Salinas citizens," indicated a largely negative attitude toward the police 
department, with only 45.2% agreeing with the statement.  Similarly, only 46.9% agreed 
with Q4, "The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens."  Both clearly represent 
ambivalence towards the rightful authority of government institutions, from those who 
actually work for government institutions.  If the government doesn't consider itself 
legitimate, it is hard to see why the citizens of Salinas should feel compelled to see things 
any differently.  
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Legitimacy Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev
Q3. The Salinas Police 
care about Salinas citizens 
9.7% 16.1% 29.0% 22.6% 22.6% 3.3 1.3 
Q4. The Salinas City 
Council cares about 
Salinas citizens 
4.7% 14.1% 34.4% 18.8% 28.1% 3.5 1.2 
Q5. The Salinas Police 
are very responsive to 
citizen complaints. 
15.0% 25.0% 35.0% 23.3% 1.7% 2.7 1.0 
Q6. The Salinas City 
Council are very 
responsive to citizen 
complaints. 
4.8% 12.9% 46.8% 24.2% 11.3% 3.2 1.0 
Q7. I am confident in 
Salinas's courts and legal 
system. 
11.5% 24.6% 18.0% 29.5% 16.4% 3.1 1.3 
Q8. I am satisfied with 
the quality of education in 
Salinas. 
25.4% 39.7% 17.5% 12.7% 4.8% 2.3 1.1 
Table 33.  Legitimacy Frequency of Response 
b. Security 
The data for our second independent variable, security, was captured by 
the responses to survey questions 12 through 15 (Table 37).  These questions were 
included to better understand how individual perceptions and attitudes about personal 
security in Salinas contribute to a desire to share gang-related intelligence.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, a majority of those surveyed perceived Salinas to be a dangerous place to 
walk alone at night, with 60% agreeing with Q12.  However, despite their fear of the 
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streets of Salinas, approximately the same percentage felt safe and secure in their home 
(Q13, 62.3%).  Interestingly, the fear expressed in the survey did not seem to be 
significantly based upon personal encounters with gang violence.  Only 20.6% indicated 
that they, or a member of their family, had been threatened by a gang member in Salinas 
(Q14).  This perception suggests an attitude of fear that might be changed through better 
internal marketing of the city's successes in combating gang violence.  A focus on 
shifting negative attitudes about security is one approach for government officials 
looking for ways to create a more vibrant, trusting government. 
Security Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous 
place to walk alone at night. 
6.2% 7.7% 26.2% 24.6% 35.4% 3.8 1.2 
Q13. I feel safe and secure in my 
home. 
11.5% 6.6% 19.7% 37.7% 24.6% 3.6 1.3 
Q14. I or a member of my family have 
been threatened by a gang member in 
Salinas. 
52.4% 17.5% 9.5% 14.3% 6.3% 2.0 1.3 
Q15. As compared to a year ago, the 
Salinas police department has made 
the city a more secure and safe place to 
live. 
25.4% 25.4% 30.2% 15.9% 3.2% 2.5 1.1 
Table 34.  Security Frequency of Response 
c. Trust and Embeddedness 
The third independent variable we addressed in our survey was trust and 
embeddedness.  Questions 16 through 22 were intended to capture the city employees' 
attitudes on issues frequently associated with varying levels of social cohesion and 
 107
trust.129  The respondents were evenly distributed in their views of the importance of 
English as a common unifying language within Salinas in Q16 (mean = 3.0, standard 
deviation = 1.5).  When asked if citizens would be best represented by members of their 
own ethnic group however, the results were far more skewed, with 72.3% in agreement 
(Q17).  The results for Q18 suggest a greater sense of personal responsibility among city 
government employees versus SPD officers (see also Chapter VI, Table 24).  When asked 
if people should help others who are less fortunate, 84.4% agreed.  Similarly, 84.4% 
agreed that people should form or participate in community organizations to solve 
community problems in Salinas (Q22).  Considered together, these results describe a city 
government that sympathizes with the need to reach out and get personally involved to 
solve community problems.  Table 38 provides a summary of the survey results for these 
questions. 
                                                 
129 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. 
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Trust and Embeddedness Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q16. Speaking English, as a common 
language, will unite all of Salinas’s 
citizens. 
21.9% 17.2% 21.9% 17.2% 21.9% 3.0 1.5 
Q17. Salinas’s citizens are best 
represented by leaders from their own 
racial or ethnic background. 
12.7% 22.2% 38.1% 23.8% 3.2% 2.8 1.0 
Q18. People should help others who 
are less fortunate. 
0.0% 0.0% 15.6% 32.8% 51.6% 4.4 0.7 
Q19. Hispanic Americans face 
discrimination in getting a decent job. 
20.3% 28.1% 25.0% 17.2% 9.4% 2.7 1.2 
Q20. My ethnic group membership is 
very important to my sense of who I 
am. 
15.4% 12.3% 27.7% 29.2% 15.4% 3.2 1.3 
Q21. The needs of my ethnic group are 
met by the City of Salinas (police, city 
council, educational system, mayor). 
8.5% 20.3% 37.3% 22.0% 11.9% 3.1 1.1 
Q22. People should form or participate 
in community organizations to solve 
community problems in Salinas. 
0.0% 3.1% 12.5% 29.7% 54.7% 4.4 0.8 
Table 35.  Trust and Embeddedness Frequency of Response  
d. Systems Integration 
Questions 9, 10, and 11 were included to get a sense of how the typical 
Salinas city employee receives his or her information about gang activity.  Question 32 
was directed more towards understanding perceptions about the efficiency of intra-
government communication channels.  All of these questions, however, were intended to 
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offer some insight into how well city agencies were networked for the distribution of 
gang-related information (Table 39). 
The response to Q32, "City agencies communicate effectively among each 
other on issues related to gang violence," was largely negative, with only 15.7% agreeing 
with the statement.  When asked how they get their information about gangs, most 
indicated that media outlets were the primary source (Q11, 72.3% agree).  The second 
most used information source about gangs was through official city communication 
channels (Q9, 34.9% agree), followed by "word of mouth or rumors" (Q10, 21.5% 
agree).  Clearly there is room for improvement here, as a more networked government 
would be better able to ensure a consistency of vision and purpose in a counter-gang 
campaign.  In the absence of adequate official information, however, people will seek out 
alternative, and often inaccurate, sources. 
Systems Integration Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q9. I receive most of my information 
about gang activity through official 
city communication channels (Press 
releases, billboards, community 
meetings) 
12.7% 23.8% 28.6% 23.8% 11.1% 3.0 1.2 
Q10. I receive most of my information 
about gang activity through word of 
mouth or rumors. 
12.3% 32.3% 33.8% 16.9% 4.6% 2.7 1.0 
Q11. I receive most of my information 
about gang activity through media 
outlets (TV, newspaper, radio). 
4.6% 7.7% 15.4% 38.5% 33.8% 3.9 1.1 
Q32. City agencies communicate 
effectively among each other on issues 
related to gang violence. 
17.6% 31.4% 35.3% 13.7% 2.0% 2.5 1.0 
Table 36.  Systems Integration Frequency of Response 
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e. Unity of Effort 
To get a better sense of city employee attitudes regarding the need for a 
more unified response to gang violence, as well as perceptions of ongoing city 
government efforts to reach out to the community, we included questions 23, 24, 28, 29, 
30, and 31.  The overall results for the questions composing the unity of effort variable 
are described in Table 40. 
Based on the response to Q30, Salinas city employees overwhelmingly 
believe the gang violence problem requires the combined efforts of the population of 
Salinas and the city government (93.9% agree).  However, only 43.9% agree that the city 
is taking a unified approach (Q23), and only 29.4% agree that the city of Salinas and the 
SPD have a unified counter-gang strategy (Q29).  Similarly, there is a sizeable negative 
view of the city's efforts to reach out to local citizens for help in fighting the gang 
problem.  Although 22% agreed with Q31, "The city of Salinas has been effective in 
soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem," nearly twice as 
many disagreed.  It is clear that city employees believe there should be more unity of 
effort between the population and the government, but it is also fairly clear that this is not 
perceived to be happening in the struggle versus gang violence.   
Finally, when asked how freely information related to gang activities 
should be shared within city government, 64.5% of those surveyed indicated that 
information sharing should not be executed on a need-to-know basis (Q28).  This 
indicates a desire for more inter-departmental/inter-agency communication and 
cooperation, yet from the results to Q29, we see that this is also not perceived to be 
happening.   
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Unity of Effort Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q23. The City of Salinas is taking a 
unified approach to confronting gang 
violence. 
7.0% 10.5% 38.6% 29.8% 14.0% 3.3 1.1 
Q24. The police work with local 
community leaders to fight gang 
violence. 
6.9% 13.8% 29.3% 39.7% 10.3% 3.3 1.1 
Q28. Information related to gang 
activities should only be shared with 
other individuals or departments on a 
need to know basis. 
43.5% 21.0% 16.1% 8.1% 11.3% 2.2 1.4 
Q29. The city of Salinas and the 
Salinas PD have a unified counter-
gang strategy. 
15.7% 27.5% 27.5% 23.5% 5.9% 2.8 1.2 
Q30. The gang violence problem is 
something that requires the combined 
efforts of the population of Salinas and 
the city government (police, city 
council, mayor, educational system) to 
resolve. 
0.0% 0.0% 6.2% 7.7% 86.2% 4.8 0.5 
Q31. The City of Salinas has been 
effective in soliciting local citizens' 
help in fighting the gang violence 
problem. 
8.5% 33.9% 35.6% 15.3% 6.8% 2.8 1.0 
Table 37.  Unity of Effort Frequency of Response 
f. Levels of Autonomy 
Survey question 27 was included to better understand the individual's 
perceptions of their own capacity to act in a timely manner in to counter gang activities 
(Table 41).  However, based on the even distribution of the responses (mean = 3.0, 
standard deviation = 1.4), it is hard to draw any powerful conclusions from this one 
 112
question.  However, it is interesting to note that 30.5% perceive no personal role in the 
city's counter-gang strategy.   
Levels of Autonomy Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q27. I have a role in implementing the 
city's counter-gang strategy.  25.4% 5.1% 25.4% 28.8% 15.3% 3.0 1.4 
Table 38.  Autonomy Frequency of Response 
g. General 
For the purposes of enhancing our ability to extract useful information 
from the survey responses, we included a selection of general questions.  Questions 1, 2, 
25 and 26 served to provide a baseline sense of the attitudes of the respondents toward 
the "problem" of gang violence in Salinas (Table 42).  We wanted to ensure there was 
some consensus that the level of gang violence was problematic.  The responses to these 
questions confirmed that there is, indeed, a very strong consensus within the Salinas 
government that the current level of gang violence is "serious" (Q2, 98.5%).  There is 
also strong agreement that gang violence will not simply resolve itself over time (Q26, 
89%).  Question 33 (Table 34) was also a "general" question, and asked the respondents 
to indicate whether they resided within the city limits of Salinas.   
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General Frequency of Response (%)   
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std 
Dev 
Q1. Compared to last year, gang 
violence in Salinas has increased. 3.3% 18.0% 32.8% 16.4% 29.5% 3.5 1.2 
Q2. The gang violence problem in 
Salinas is very serious. 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 15.4% 83.1% 4.8 0.4 
Q25. It is important and effective to 
pass crime information to the Salinas 
Police Department. 
0.0% 3.1% 4.7% 20.3% 71.9% 4.6 0.7 
Q26. The gang violence problem will 
resolve itself with time regardless of 
how the City responds to the situation  
78.1% 10.9% 3.1% 6.3% 1.6% 1.4 0.9 
Table 39.  General Question Frequency of Response 
2. Regression Analysis 
Using information processing ("infopro") as our dependent variable, we ran 
several multiple regression models with various independent variables.  Initially, we 
constructed models including the variables associated with our theory of information 
processing; we tested the variables of systems integration, unity of effort, and 
autonomy.130  Ultimately, however, the best model included variables for: the perception 
of a gang problem ("gangprob"), legitimacy ("legit"), security ("security"), personal 
responsibility ("perresp"), unity of effort with the community ("community"), and 
government agency unity of effort ("unity").  This model offered the strongest statistical 
explanation of the factors influencing the Salinas city employees' capacity for 
information processing.  This best fit model, and the resulting analysis, is depicted in 
Appendix D, Figure 40, and is described in Tables 43, 44, 45, and 46.  
We also included a dummy variable for city employee residency to determine if 
the location of the respondent's residence had any influence on their perceptions of the 
                                                 
130 See Appendix D, Figure 40 for a detailed description of the models tested. 
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city's information processing abilities.  Those responding to the residency question (Q33, 
Table 34), were coded as a "1" if living within city limits, and as a "0" if living outside 
city limits.   
Finally, we conducted a Ramsey retest to ensure that our model addressed all 
necessary variables.  Testing indicated valid results with no missing variables.  The 
resulting best-fit model, and associated analysis, is described in the following sections. 
a. The Dependent Variable 
The questions we posed specifically about information and intelligence 
were intended to get a sense of current attitudes about sharing gang-related intelligence 
freely.  If we could realistically gauge individual feelings about the appropriateness of 
sharing gang intelligence, we concluded that it would be possible compare these attitudes 
with those measured by the other questions in the survey to better understand what 
factors most influence the city government's capacity for information processing.  In 
essence, we assume that changes in attitudes about information processing will result in 
quantitative, and qualitative, changes in the processing of information about criminal 
gangs.  Accordingly, we selected several questions from the survey with the best 
expository potential, and ran several regression models to determine the variables 
offering the best fit.  Of those tested, the use of questions 25 and 32 for the dependent 
variable offered the most statistically interesting results (Adjusted R2 = .35, see Table 
43). 
Questions about Information Processing Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q25. It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas Police 
Department. 4.6 0.7 
Q32. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related 
to gang violence. 2.5 1.0 
Table 40.  Information Processing Dependent Variable 
b. Regression Results 
Multiple models were run to determine the independent variables offering 
the most statistically significant model for information processing.  As described earlier, 
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our initial theory pointed toward systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy as the 
variables responsible for differing qualitative levels of information processing.  
Ultimately, however, our analysis pointed toward a different causal relationship.  The 
model offering the most statistically significant results in our multiple regression 
























Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P Coeff P 
.08 .32 .12 .30 -.20 .04 .03 .82 .26 .16 .10 .45 .00 N/A 
Table 41.  Regression Analysis by Coefficient and p-values from Appendix D. 
(Shaded areas indicate p > 0.10) 
Of the independent variables included in the model (Table 44), the most 
statistically relevant was "security" (p = 0.04, coefficient = -0.20).  Although the variable 
for unity of effort with the community, "community," did not present a strong result in 
the model analysis, its borderline results warrant some discussion along with "security."  
The other variables did not show a strong causal relationship with the information 
processing dependent variable (i.e., p < 0.10); however, our results do not exclude the 
possibility that further research might reveal stronger linkages. 
(1) Security.  As the variable with the strongest relationship to 
attitudes about information processing among Salinas city employees, security requires 
the most focus within the city government (Table 45).  With a negative resultant 
coefficient in our model, greater feelings of fear correlate to less interest in sharing 
information about gang activity.  In other words, to achieve a stronger positive consensus 
about information sharing, city employees must perceive that Salinas is a secure place to 
live and work.  As presented in the descriptive analysis of the security variable, although 
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60% of the respondents harbored a fear of Salinas only 20.6% indicated that they had 
actually had personal experiences with gang violence.  This would seem to indicate that 
the sense of fear is more of a perception than it is reality for most city employees.  
Accordingly, the city should focus its efforts on altering this consensus of fear.  In the 
absence of any contradictory information from the city, however, this perception will 
continue to be reality for most employees.  Based on our modeling, fearful employees are 
more "closed-off," and less likely to see the value in communicating information that 
might be useful to counter gangs in Salinas. 
Questions about Security (security) Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night. 3.8 1.2 
Q14. I or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in 
Salinas. 2.0 1.3 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
2.9 0.9 63 -.20 
Table 42.  IV 3 Security Component Questions 
(2) Unity of Effort with the Community.  Although unity of 
effort with the community exhibited a rather high p-value (0.16), we still believed that 
this marginal result warranted some discussion (Table 46).  With a positive coefficient of 
0.26, a greater degree of perception that the city and community are working toward 
shared counter-gang objectives will lead to improved interest in sharing information 
about gang activity among city agencies.  This is an outcome similar to that of the SPD 
survey, where unity of effort was deemed a significant causal factor in increased 
information sharing.  As we noted in Chapter VI, this causal link might be explained by a 
psychological impetus to mimic the behavior of a larger group.  Stated another way, 
people have a "tendency to see an action as more appropriate when others are doing 
it."131 
                                                 
131Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, 116. 
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24. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence. 3.3 1.1 
30. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts 
of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, 
mayor, educational system) to resolve. 
4.8 0.5 
31. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in 
fighting the gang violence problem. 2.8 1.0 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
3.6 0.6 53 .26 
Table 43.  IV 5 Unity of Effort with the Community Component Questions   
(3) City Employee Residency.  City employee residency was 
coded as a dummy variable for the regression model to determine what effect location 
had on respondent perceptions on information sharing.  Residency was found to not be a 
significant influence on perceptions about information processing. 
C. CONCLUSION 
As with the SPD survey, the results of our sampling of Salinas city employee 
attitudes pointed to variables for information processing that were different than we 
expected to see.  Our original theory presupposed that changes in attitudes about 
information processing are affected by changes in attitudes about systems integration, 
unity of effort, and autonomy.  However, as a result of our regression testing, it appears 
that security and, to a lesser degree, unity of effort with the community, are the causal 
factors leading to changes in perceptions about sharing gang-related information among 
city agencies. 
Based on our descriptive analysis, city employees exhibited a relatively high 
degree of personal responsibility, indicating a strong willingness to reach out to others in 
need.  They also indicated a strong belief that efforts to reduce or eliminate gang violence 
require a unified effort from the government and the community.  Unfortunately, few 
agree that the government is doing enough to reach out to the community in the interest 
of developing a shared vision for success versus the gangs.  Perhaps this personal 
frustration with how the government is handling the counter-gang campaign explains the 
negative perceptions so many have about Salinas government and the SPD.  It is quite 
 118
possible that these negative perceptions of the City's efforts to work with the community 
contribute to negative attitudes about taking more of a personal role and sharing gang 
related information with others in city government.  This connection, however, was weak 
(at best) in our model. 
The most significant finding from our regression model was that by reducing 
perceptions of fear it is possible to improve attitudes about sharing gang-related 
information.  Descriptively, city employees indicated a relatively high degree of 
perceived danger in Salinas.  Perhaps through better marketing of the city's successes in 
improving the overall security of Salinas, it would be possible to shape the government 
into an organization of less fearful employees, that are more willing to openly 
communicate in a more beneficial way.  We will examine this point further in Chapter IX 
as we offer some potential course of action to improve Salinas' capacity for information 
volume and processing to counter gang violence. 
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VIII. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: INFORMATION 
PROCESSING AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Measuring information handling and processing within an organization can be a 
difficult proposition at best.  However, visualizing how an organization communicates, 
shares, and uses this information, through both its formal and informal networks, can help 
illuminate just how information is processed.  Dr. Jeffrey Pfeffer observes that 
“knowledge that produces power in organizations is not only technical knowledge about 
the work process itself, but also knowledge of the [organization’s] social system.”132  
Descriptively, an organization’s formal network is nothing more than its hierarchical 
chart, denoting command and supervisory relationships.  However, the informal 
organization tends to encompass the more subtle side of an organization, consisting 
largely of its personal contacts, relationships, and friendships, generally demonstrating 
how members of an organization conduct most of the important and even difficult 
organizational tasks.  These informal networks are commonly referred to as social 
networks.133  More precisely, a social network “can be defined as a finite set or sets of 
actors and the relation or relations defined on them, where individuals are reduced to 
nodes, and relationships to links.”134  Dr. Stuart Koschade of the Queensland University 
of Technology, opines that a proper analysis of the social network “focuses on 
uncovering the patterning of people’s interactions, and correctly interpreting these 
networks assists in predicting behavior and decision making within the network.”135 
 
                                                 
132 Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Chapter 6: Location in the Communication Network," in Managing with Power 
(Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1993), 111. 
133 David Krackhardt and Jeffrey R. Hanson, "Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart," 
Harvard Business Review (July-August, 1993), 105. 
134 Stuart Koschade, "A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Application to 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 1 (2006), 559. 
135 Koschade, “A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Application to Counterterrorism 
and Intelligence.”  
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Koschade’s statement alludes to the introspective benefit that a social network analysis 
might offer to an organization seeking to better understand its information processing 
capabilities. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY OF THE SALINAS POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 
The Salinas Police Department, by any organizational standard, possesses a 
common hierarchical format.  Figure 11 depicts the current SPD organizational design. 
This clearly illustrates the Chief of Police as being at the strategic apex of the SPD and its 
three organizational divisions, which manage the day-to-day operations of the Police 
Department.  These divisions are further organized into distinct units that allow the 
organization, as a whole, to cope with the highly complex and moderately uncertain 
environment common to community policing initiatives found throughout the United 
States.136  This organizational structure relies on what Dr. Henry Mintzberg calls the 
professional bureaucratic model.137  Specifically, this model seeks to maximize the 
standardization of skill sets while simultaneously creating as much horizontal 
specialization as possible.  In other words, the SPD seeks to flatten its structure, while 
maximizing the capabilities of its officers.  This organizational design results in a degree 
of vertical and horizontal decentralization that is relatively common to highly specialized 
military and paramilitary organizations.  However, this structure's reliance upon internal 
administrative focal points, such as Sergeants and Commanders, to provide both inter- 
and intra-unit liaison can limit what social network experts call consensus building and 
information flow.138  Consequently, this limits the police department’s ability to 
capitalize on the experience, knowledge, and expertise of individual officers.   
                                                 
136 Fetherolf, 90 Day Report to the Community: An Overview of the Salinas Police Department, 17. 
137 Henry Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?" Harvard Business Review (January-
February, 1981), 8. 
138 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design: Fashion of Fit?” 5–6.  
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Figure 9.  Formal Organization of the SPD139 
Like many such organizations throughout the United States, the SPD is struggling 
to maintain effectiveness while dealing with a multitude of budget and personnel cuts.  A 
recent public relations bulletin from the SPD noted that for the FY 2010/2011 budget, the 
police department lost 19 sworn officer and seven civilian positions, forcing the SPD to 
restructure in order to provide “mission critical” services.140  Additionally, the SPD will 
“no longer respond to minor non-injury traffic collisions…civil matters; or minor 
nuisance calls, etc.  Other low priority calls for service are being screened more closely to 
determine if a police officer is really needed at the scene.”141  Perhaps even more 
disconcerting is the fact that “specialized police units are being reduced and personnel 
reassigned to Patrol and Investigation Divisions to meet ‘mission critical’ functions.”142  
Regardless of the current financial or political situation, the police department must 
                                                 
139 The formal organization of the SPD comes from public records provided by the SPD to the 
research team on 19 August 2010.  Specific Officer Names and unit assignments have been redacted at the 
request of SPD to help maintain a degree of operational security for the police department.  For a more 
comprehensive organizational perspective, see Fetherolf, 90 Day Report to the Community: An Overview of 
the Salinas Police Department, 1–40. 
140 Fetherolf, Report to the Community July 2010, 1. 
141 Fetherolf, Report to the Community July 2010.  
142 Fetherolf, Report to the Community July 2010, 1. 
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continue to provide the community with services, looking for ways to start “doing more 
with less.. [and becoming] innovative.”143  Social network analysis can aid the SPD in 
this initiative. 
C. NETWORK ANALYSIS 
1. Social Network Methodology 
This section will focus on the importance of the informal social network and how 
it affects operations within the SPD.  To analyze the topography of the SPD’s informal 
network, four questions were posed to the entire population of the sworn police officer 
force at the SPD, in survey format.144  These questions were designed to measure, 
visualize, and understand the contact network, the advice network, the intelligence 
network, and the assistance or trust network that exist within  the SPD.  Specifically, each 
officer rated his or her survey responses using a scale of 0 (Rarely or never), 1 (Every 
few months), 2 (Every few weeks), 3 (Every week), and 4 (Everyday) in relation to other 
officers and outside organizations and agencies that work with the SPD on gang-related 
issues.  The precise questions of the survey included: 
Contact: On average, how often do you have contact with the following 
individuals or organizations? (Contact can be meetings, phone calls, or emails)  
Advice:  On average, how often do you go to the following individuals or 
organizations for help or advice concerning work related matters? 
Intel Sharing:  On average, how often do you share gang related intelligence 
with the following individuals or organizations? 
Assistance / Trust: On average, how often did the following individuals and or 
organizations provide assistance and or expertise to your gang prevention 
activities over the last year? 
                                                 
143 Scott Anthony, "Doing More with Less," Forbes.com, http://www.forbes.com/ (accessed 
10/20/2010). 
144 See Appendix E.  The survey used for this research was developed using the David Krackhardt 
informal network model, and was adapted by Bruce Hoppe, Ph.D. from Boston University.  Used with 
permission, from Hoppe, Organizational Network Survey Spreadsheet Utility.  
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Accordingly, these survey results were complied to produce a series of network analyses 
and maps.145  These network maps are useful in visually identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses within a particular network, demonstrating how these informal positions can 
be used to enhance information processing and utilization. 
2. Social Network Construction 
a. Social Network Analysis Indicators Defined 
In order to best understand the social network and its analysis, there are 
several important characteristics and tools that must be defined.  The characteristics of 
"betweenness," "network density," "degree centrality," "connectedness," and "clustering" 
are the analytical ways and means that describe the functional relationships between the 
actors within the network itself.  The most important of these characteristics is the 
concept of centrality.  The question of centrality, according to Dr. Jeffrey Pfeffer, is 
paramount to individual and organizational success within networks.  Centrality is the 
vehicle that creates and harnesses institutional power.  In this case, the exercise of power 
is generally a reflection of the degree of influence one holds within the confines of 
certain social networks.  Pfeffer opines, “To develop influence, we need to be plugged 
into the structure of communication and interaction, and that means seeking out 
interactions, even social interactions, strategically.”146  Thus concluding, “social 
networks are…structures that can be built deliberately, and our place in the network of 
communication is something that is under our own control.”147   
Pfeffer explains that position is everything and that ultimately, power or 
influence, is a function of being centrally located within a network.  To illustrate, Pfeffer 
conveys that individuals within a network structure that are the most central, or at a point 
                                                 
145 Two network mapping software programs were used to produce the normalized network data and 
accompanying social network map.  UCINET was used to normalize and analyze all related data, and can 
be found at Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis.  
Netdraw was used to produce all network map products, and can be found at Brogatti, Netdraw Network 
Visualization. 
146 Pfeffer, Chapter 6: Location in the Communication Network, 123–124. 
147 Pfeffer, Chapter 6: Location in the Communication Network, 125.  
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at which the flow of work or ideas move, tend to gravitate towards informal leadership 
roles, assuming higher levels of power and influence.  Thus, Pfeffer argues that 
individuals and organizational elements gain power precisely because of their centrality 
in the overall flow of communication and work.  Centrality is achieved through either 
social or physical location within a particular network.  The closer an individual or 
organization is to the action (figuratively and literally), the higher the degree of power 
and influence it or they will enjoy.   
Refining centrality into its relevant components is important in 
demonstrating its utility.  One of these components or tools is the measure of 
“betweenness.”  Betweenness is “a particularly useful indicator of information control; it 
assesses the extent to which a person falls between pairs of other individuals on the 
communication paths that link them.”148  Betweenness is an essential part of social 
network analysis, identifying, to a large degree, which node is controlling and 
distributing information effectively.  This is extremely important to networks that rely on 
timely intelligence to remain effective.    
Network density is another factor that aids in measuring centrality.  
According to Sean Everton, density “is formally defined as the total number of ties within 
a network divided by the total possible number of ties, which means that network density 
measures range for 0.0 to 1.0.”149  If a network has a lower density, closer to 0, then there 
are fewer connections between nodes.  Conversely, if the density is higher, closer to 1, 
then there is a greater degree of connections.150  Everton continues by indicating that 
“network density is positively related to the likelihood that actors within the network 
follow accepted [informal social] norms.”151 
                                                 
148 Pfeffer, Chapter 6: Location in the Communication Network, 111–112.  
149 Sean Everton, "Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network 
Analysis" (Dark Networks Course Manual, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 94. 
150 Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 
94–95.  
151 Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 
95. 
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However, network density has its limitation, thus other measures must be 
used.152  Degree centrality, or the degree to which information flows in or out of a 
particular node, comprises an important measure used by this analysis.  Specifically, this 
measures the number of ties that a particular node exhibits, suggesting that the more ties 
that a node has, the greater its influence and power it is within the network.153 Degree 
centrality is used to calculate an average degree centrality, which measures the “average 
of every individual actor’s degree centrality score.”154  Additionally, it “attempts to 
capture the overall makeup of a network.  It helps determine how centralized (e.g., 
hierarchical) or decentralized (e.g., “flat” organizations) a network is.”155  “In-degree” 
centralization describes the specific ratio of connections in-bound to a particular node or 
set of nodes; whereas, “out-degree” centralization measures all out-bound connections.  
This is a particularly useful measure in determining if information is received, processed, 
and disseminated effectively within an organization, and then moved to the most 
effective consumers. 
Connectedness is another measure of centrality, though much weaker and 
less useful than betweenness or degree centrality.  Connectedness describes those actual 
connections between persons or nodes within the social networks.  It describes whom is 
in contact with whom, and provides an idea of the strength of those connections.  This is 
an important tool, as it illuminates the actual communication that is occurring in the 
network, suggesting trends associated with trust, influence, and expertise.156 
 
                                                 
152 Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 
98.  
153 Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 
98, 109–110.  
154 Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 
98. 
155 Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 
100. 
156 Pfeffer, Chapter 6: Location in the Communication Network, 112.  Also see Krackhardt and 
Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, 106–111 for implications on how 
connectedness impacts trust, influence, and expertise. 
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Finally, the visual analytic tool of clustering provides the analyst with the 
ability to determine network relationships through visual and statistical examination.  The 
appearance of clustering in a social network suggests that some sort of physical 
relationship exist between nodes.  Clustered nodes tend to indicate mutual trust, 
influence, or expertise.  While closely related to connectedness, clustering depicts the 
“nearness” of individuals in the way they interact, and not necessarily how many 
individual connections a particular node may have.157  Statistically, clustering is 
described by the clustering coefficient, average path length, and cohesion.  The higher the 
clustering coefficient and path length, the more likely a network exhibits “small world” 
characteristics.  In other words, the “smaller” the world (higher clustering coefficients 
and path lengths), the more tightly knit the network is.158  Cohesion measures the 
strength of this “small world” characteristic on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0, providing an 
indication of reliability for the clustering data.  
b. Limitations of Social Network Analysis 
Network analysis also has some important limitations.  This type of 
survey, taken exclusively on an individual basis, may provide some inconsistencies that 
will potentially skew the results.  For example, patrol officer A may consider patrol 
officer B more central to his individual network than he really is.  In other words, officer 
A may state that he communicates with officer B on a daily basis.  However, officer B 
may describe their communication as a weekly event.  This lack of perceptual consensus 
produces some inconsistencies that will clearly weaken the overall results.159  This 
particular survey analysis endeavored to reduce this inconsistency by placing priority on 
responses that reflected consensus between respondents.  However, it is important to bear 
in mind that individual perceptions can skew survey results, which would, in turn, 
negatively impact the overall value of the analysis. 
                                                 
157 Hoppe, Network Characteristics. 
158 Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 
102.  
159 Krackhardt and Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, 106. 
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This analysis is also limited, to some degree, by the fact that not every 
member of the SPD participated in this voluntary survey.  Table  47 outlines the number 
of participants, by unit and rank, in the SPD that completed the social network survey.160  
Of all sworn officers, only 38% completed the survey.  Ideally, this type of analysis 
becomes more effective and focused when the entire study population participates.  
Regardless of the sample size, the results are still sufficient since a representative 
population from each relevant SPD unit provided input.  For example, important gang 
related special units of the SPD, such as the Violence Suppression Unit (38% 
participation) and the Salinas police officers involved with the Monterey County Joint 
Gang Task Force (40% participation), participated on a level equal to or near that of the 
survey’s total participation.  Other units, such as the Patrol unit (33% participation) and 
the Investigations unit (35% participation), which consistently deal with gang related 
issues, participated slightly less than the VSU and the MCJGTF.  Their results are still 
consistent enough with the combined participation levels to merit consideration.  
Ultimately, while this analysis would have certainly benefited from a more complete 
representation from all divisions, we consider the current data to be sufficient to provide 
useful observations about the SPD's informal network. 
                                                 
160 See Appendix E for further explanation. 
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Table 44.  Salinas Police Department Network Analysis Survey Participation Results  
Another important limitation to consider is the timeliness of the survey 
results.  Social networks are constantly evolving, developing, and reshaping.  For 
example, new members of the organization join the network, old members leave, and new 
relationships are formed as a result of joint problem solving opportunities.  Thus, 
organizational leaders and managers need to constantly reevaluate existing networks.  Dr. 
Koschade points out that “although the use of social network analysis looking at 
historical groups is capable of providing some levels of predictability and foresight, the 
method is at its most powerful when employed in real time, allowing the clear 
visualization of the interactional, communicational, and structural cohesion of an 
[organization].”161  Accordingly, while the near-real time results of this survey provide 
the most powerful insight into how present-day social relationships contribute to SPD 
functionality, the long-term implications of this analysis (i.e., predictability and foresight) 
must be tempered by the physical changes that will inevitably occur within the 
organization over time.  
                                                 
161 Koschade, A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Application to Counterterrorism 
and Intelligence, 572–573. 
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c. Other Factors Affecting the Scope of the Network Analysis 
Although the survey used in this study captured monthly relationship data, 
for the sake of relevancy and brevity, our analysis only focused on those results related to 
daily and weekly communications and interactions.  While interesting conclusions might 
be drawn from less frequent interactions, they were not deemed to be as effective in 
analyzing trends and producing conclusions when compared with more frequent 
communication patterns. 
In the following sections, SPD social networks will be depicted 
graphically using the legend found in Figure 12.  Often times these network maps can 
become crowded, presenting a significant amount of information in a small space.  This 
legend is designed to aid in the analysis and reading of the network maps.  Additionally, 
SPD units are represented by a numerical value, simplifying the map data.  When 
referenced in the body of this study, the unit will be listed, followed by a number in 
parentheses indicating their numerical descriptor on the map; for example, Patrol (2).  
The information on this legend will be referenced throughout the remainder of this 
chapter. 
 
Figure 10.  Social Network Color Legend 
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3. The Contact Network 
This first network analysis of the SPD examines the contact or friend network.  
Essentially, the contact network shows how an individual maintains contact, whether 
through personal interface, meetings, phone calls, or emails, with another member of the 
police department.  Individual nodes represent a single police officer, who are labeled, 
colored, and represented according to the network legend found in Figure 12.  Figure 13, 
visually depicts the contact relationships experienced weekly by members of the SPD that 
participated in the survey.  
 
Figure 11.  Contact Network—Participants maintain contact weekly (through 
meetings, phone calls, or emails) at least once per week 
This particular network map demonstrates some interesting clustering 
characteristics.  While many nodes seemingly have connections to other nodes of 
differing units, like units tend to cluster together on the map’s peripheries, indicating a 
preference with whom they interact.  This is likely the result of normal working 
relationships, but physical proximity within the network suggests that informal 
relationships are shaped by the SPD’s formal structure.  Descriptively, this network has a 
clustering coefficient of 0.444, indicating moderately close knit clusters of individually 
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identified police units, with average path lengths between nodes being 1.943 connections.  
Additionally, a cohesion ratio of 0.523 shows a moderate level of compactness within 
each cluster.162  In reality this is a bit disconcerting.  Any time formal structure 
diminishes an organization’s ability to cross bureaucratic boundaries and form informal 
relationships across units (or cluster) lines, there is a weakening of potential innovations, 
reducing the organization’s ability to process and share important information in a timely 
manner.  This phenomenon is more clearly observed in Figure 14, which depicts the 
contact network according to its daily connections.  Network centralization is also very 
telling in this particular map, describing how information flows.  Out-degree 
centralization is nearly 73%, suggesting a highly hierarchical structure managing the flow 
of information out of individual nodes.163  This is consistent with observations made 
about the SPD’s formal organization, suggesting that the informal structure has minimal 
impact.    
 
Figure 12.  Contact Network—Participants maintain contact daily (through 
meetings, phone calls, or emails) at least daily 
                                                 
162 See Appendix E for statistically supporting data. 
163 See Appendix E for statistically supporting data. 
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The SPD Patrol (2) unit was the most prominent participant in the survey.  It 
exhibits strong physical clustering characteristics, indicating that there are adequate 
internal links within the unit itself.  However, connections outside of this cluster are 
limited, generally filtered through unit leaders, and then on to the police department 
leadership.  In other words, communications moving outside of the Patrol (2) unit must 
flow through certain “gate keepers” or “bottlenecks.”  This type of clustering is observed 
in the BNE Task Force (3), VSU (4), and Investigations (6) units as well.  The SPD 
Leadership (5), being located centrally in the map, act as “connectors” between units, 
suggesting a level of hierarchal centrality.  However, statistical analysis describes a 
different story. Out-degree and In-degree centralization are relatively low for this 
network, roughly 25% and 7% respectively, suggesting a flatter organizational dynamic.  
The clustering coefficient (0.379) is relatively unchanged from the weekly contact 
network map, indicating that the two networks exhibit similar clustering dynamics.  
While the average path length (4.382) and cohesion ratio (0.176) suggest weaknesses in 
how this network interacts internally, the SPD’s daily contact and friendship interaction 
are far more effective than its weekly networks.164 
Simplifying the daily network map to depict only the MCJGTF (1), VSU (4), and 
Investigation (6) units provides for a more thorough analysis—see Figure 15. 
                                                 
164 See Appendix E for statistically supporting data. 
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Figure 13.  Daily Contact Relationships (through meetings, phone calls, or emails) 
between the MCJGTF, VSU, and Investigations 
These units work most closely with gang related issues, so it is important to observe their 
behavior in relation to one another.  Incidentally, when a betweenness analysis is 
conducted on this map, we see that information flow is largely controlled by members of 
the unit in positions of authority, aiding to the argument that the contact network is highly 
affected by the SPD’s formal organization. 
Another interesting simplification of the daily contact network map relates the 
previous map showing the MCJGTF (1), VSU (4), and Investigation (6) with the Patrol 
(2) unit added—see Figure 16.  A betweenness analysis demonstrates the same dynamic 
as the previous map; however, this map illustrates that there is no informal connections 
with the Patrol (2) unit and the other units.  Intuitively, the Patrol (2) unit should have the 
majority of casual information concerning Salinas since they canvass the city on a daily 
basis.  Accordingly, if gang activity is observed by members of Patrol (2), then it is 
seemingly unlikely that gang related information will make it to those units responsible 
for specific counter-gang initiatives.   
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Figure 14.  Daily Contact Relationships (through meetings, phone calls, or emails) 
between the MCJGTF, VSU, Investigations, and Patrol Unit 
The SPD also maintains a contact network with supporting California, Federal, 
and community agencies.  Figures 17 and 18 describe these relationships, demonstrating 
nominal interaction.  The interaction between the SPD and these agencies is not 
hierarchical in nature; however, weekly network densities (0.0405) and daily network 
densities (0.0122) suggest a low level of normalization of activities.165  These informal 
relationships suggest a low level of coordination and unity, possibly negatively affecting 
counter-gang initiatives.  A higher “norming” or an expansion of the informal network, of 
network behaviors will likely strengthen ties, converging organizational goals. 
                                                 
165 See Appendix E for statistically supporting data. 
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Figure 15.  Weekly Contact Relationships (through meetings, phone calls, or 
emails) between the SPD and Supporting Agencies 
 
Figure 16.  Daily Contact Relationships (through meetings, phone calls, or emails) 
between the SPD and Supporting Agencies 
 136
4. The Advice Network 
Analysis of the advice network tends to show those individuals that are the most 
influential figures within an organization.  The nodes that are most prominent in this 
network tend to exhibit the greatest degree of technical and subject matter expertise.166  
For the purposes of this study, the advice network will “help identify gaps in information 
flow, the inefficient use of resources, and the [potential] failure to generate new ideas.”167  
The first network map, presented as Figure 19, depicts weekly interactions between 
members of the SPD.  Participants were asked how often they sought advice from other 
individuals or agencies concerning work related matters.  Here, high unit clustering is 
also observed, similar to the contact network.  Descriptively, there are some important 
distinctions between this network and the contact network.   Overall, network density 
(0.0710) is extremely low, suggesting that despite the potential ties available, individual 
nodes have fewer average degree (4.119) connections as compared to the contact 
network, which had an average degree of (12.763).  This means that an officer is likely to 
only seek out one or two others for advice, though they may be in contact with many 
more.  This “bottlenecks” expertise and information flow, keeping it isolated in small 
pockets within the network itself.  Additionally, unlike the contact network, the degree of 
both the out and in centrality is much smaller, suggesting that this network is much flatter 
and informal, resulting in a structure less tied to the formal hierarchy of the police 
department.168 
                                                 
166 Krackhardt and Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, 106–107. 
167 Krackhardt and Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, 106.  
168 See Appendix E for statistically supporting data. 
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Figure 17.  Weekly Advice Network 
Continued examination of the advice network’s daily interactions echoes the 
analysis of the weekly network.  The daily advice network is depicted in Figure 20, 
showing strong clustering by unit.  The clustering coefficient associated with this 
network map is 0.425, a moderately strong ratio, suggesting that the advice network 
suffers from “small world” characteristics - a dangerous trait in this type of network.  
Realistically, this suggests that a particular individual will likely centralize his efforts to 
share or receive information and expertise, limiting innovation and reducing the potential 
for new ideas to be generated.  This negatively impacts organizational value creation.  
Connections reaching outside of individual units are also limited.  On average, there are 
2.931 connections between any two units within the network, suggesting a reduced 
betweenness and connectedness within the network in general.169  This attests to the 
network’s incapacity to flow advice, expertise, and information in a timely and effective 
manner. 
                                                 
169 See Appendix E for statistically supporting data. 
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Figure 18.  Daily Advice Network 
Reducing the daily advice network to examine the specific connections that exist 
between the MCJGTF (1), Patrol (2), VSU (4), and Investigations (6) continues to show a 
startling trend—see Figure 21.  There are no “advice” connections between the “gang-
specific” units and the Patrol (2) unit.  Whether this is a function and effect of the formal 
organization of the police department, or a result of access and conflicting schedules, 
these units tend to become “one way” repositories of expertise and information.  This 
characteristic reduces the possibility for a better and well-rounded enforcement approach.  
SPD Police Chief, Louis Fetherolf, supports this observation, claiming “we are systems 
poor—[internal] information is often held close to the chest” (personal communication, 
Chief Fetherolf, 2010).  This disconnect has the potential to negatively impact the SPD’s 
ability to foster an organizational learning environment, with a greater capacity for 




Figure 19.  Daily Advice Network Measuring Betweenness from MCJGTF, VSU, 
Investigations, and Patrol 
Community, State, and Federal level expertise appear to not play a critical role in 
the SPD’s advice network either.  Figures 22 and 23 summarize limited connections and 
interactions at this level.  Community programs, such as Second Chance and the Boys & 
Girls Clubs, who have daily interactions with gang members and other community youth, 
do not figure into these maps, suggesting that the SPD is not maximizing its resources 
and using all available sources of information.  While successful joint law enforcement 
efforts, such as “Operation Knockout,” conducted in April 2010, show the SPD’s 
capacity to work with State and Federal law enforcement agencies to great effect, in 
reality, these relationships can be fleeting.170  However, the SPD recognizes this 
shortcoming and has taken significant steps to improve its connections outside of its own 
                                                 
170 Operation Knockout was a highly successful joint law enforcement operation, demonstrating a near 
perfect blend of local, state, and federal law enforcement efforts, arresting “over 100 gangsters and 
associates” in a short period of time.  See Fetherolf, Report to the Community July 2010, 4.   
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organization.171  In conclusion, the advice network conceptualizes “holes” in the SPD’s 
informal network, demonstrating the need for stronger advice and expertise relationships.  
 
 
Figure 20.  Weekly Advice Network between SPD and Supporting Organizations 
and Agencies 
 
                                                 
171  As a result of Operation Knockout and other similar operations, a “violent crime and narcotic task 
force is being established in Salinas and extending county-wide to combat gang violence and narcotics 
trafficking.”  This undoubtedly will improve the advice connections between the SPD and other supporting 
agencies.  However, the SPD must make every effort to ensure these connections are used on a regular 
basis.  See Fetherolf, Report to the Community July 2010, 4. 
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Figure 21.  Daily Advice Network between SPD and Supporting Organizations and 
Agencies 
5. The Intelligence Network 
One of the central themes advanced by our study is the premise that better 
intelligence processing leads to a stronger capacity to act.  This, in turn, necessitates a 
better understanding of the SPD intelligence network in order to fully assess how this 
concept relates to Salinas and the SPD’s efforts to reduce gang related violence.  Figure 
24 shows the intelligence interactions within the SPD that occur on a weekly basis.  
Arguably, there is a continuing pattern within this network similar to that observed in the 
previous two networks. 
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Figure 22.  Weekly Intelligence Network 
For example, there is a significant level of clustering along unit lines, suggesting 
that intelligence sharing is an individual unit priority, with information remaining isolated 
within a unit.  Again, this may be an impact of the professional bureaucracy common to 
the SPD and other military and law enforcement agencies.  However, analysis suggests 
that this network is moderately affected by centralization, roughly 31% for intelligence 
flowing out of nodes, and 10% for intelligence flowing in, demonstrating that the impact 
of the formal organizational structure may not be completely to blame.172  To prove this 
point, a look at the daily intelligence network, Figure 25, and a reduced model found in 
Figure 26, depict interactions between units most likely to encounter gang related 
intelligence.   These network maps demonstrate a weakness in the SPD’s ability to 
manage this type of information, both formally and informally.   At best, connections are 
loose and isolated along unit lines.  Statistically, both the weekly and daily intelligence 
networks are not dense enough (0.0731 and 0.0234 respectively) to suggest that 
 
 
                                                 
172 See Appendix E for supporting data. 
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intelligence is being shared freely.  However, if densities were represented as a 
percentage of the SPD’s maximum capacity to share intelligence, they would be doing so 
at a rate of roughly 7% weekly, and 2% daily.173 
 
Figure 23.  Daily Intelligence Network 
Additionally, average path lengths between nodes are high, with 3.09 path lengths 
between individuals observed in the weekly map and 2.753 in the daily map.174  This 
shows that there is little difference in how information is shared over time (weekly versus 
daily intelligence networks), and that intelligence may have to move across several 
boundaries in order to reach the nodes capable of reacting to it.   
There is a difference between the idea of “proactive” intelligence and traditional 
law enforcement intelligence.  Proactive intelligence seeks to predict what a criminal is 
likely to do, while traditional law enforcement intelligence is largely gathered to aid in 
prosecution.  However, recognition by law enforcement that proactive intelligence is 
essential has helped to change the shape of intelligence use for aid in prevention and 
                                                 
173 See Appendix E for related data and trends. 
174 See Appendix E for related data and trends. 
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suppression of violence and other related crimes.175  In the end, the SPD intelligence 
network maps demonstrate clear relationship barriers (both individual and organizational) 
to developing a more robust capacity to share the sort of information necessary to build 
an effective proactive intelligence apparatus.   
 
Figure 24.  Daily Intelligence Network Measuring Betweenness from MCJGTF, 
VSU, Investigations, and Patrol 
Lastly, the bi-modal intelligence network, Figure 27, demonstrates that inter-
organizational and inter-agency intelligence relationships also suffer from intelligence 
network weaknesses.  Regular contacts are limited with supporting agencies; however, 
significant operations, like Knockout, strengthen these ties and the SPD’s overall 
capacity to share and use information when the situation presents itself.    Regardless, 
network densities continue to be low (0.0160), suggesting the need for improved 
connections.176  In the end, intelligence sharing is isolated and limited, with a strong 
possibility for improvement based on the informal system already in place.    
                                                 
175 Ball, Rethinking Intelligence to Integrate Counterterrorism into the Local Law Enforcement 
Mission, 91. 
176 See Appendix E for supporting data. 
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Figure 25.  Weekly Intelligence Network between SPD and Supporting 
Organizations and Agencies 
6. The Assistance Network 
The assistance network is essentially the SPD’s trust network.  Of note, the 
assistance network is distinct from the advice network in that it measures relationships 
impacted by individual alliances and not expert direction.  Thus, this network analysis 
helps to identify who individual nodes gravitate towards when faced with uncertainty 
about organizational issues.  Like the other networks already examined, the assistance 
network displays strong clustering ties along unit lines—see Figures 28 and 29.  This 
characteristic suggests that the boundaries drawn by the formal SPD organizational 
structure significantly impact an individual officer’s ability to seek out assistance from 
others in the organization at-large.  Additionally, centrality measures for both the weekly 
and daily (40% and 20% respectively) network maps are moderate, giving some validity 
to this observation.  
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Closer examination of those units most directly involved in gang related 
enforcement activities reinforces previous observations—see Figure 30.  Trust within an 
organization is critical, especially when information flow, expertise, and commonality of 
purpose are important to mission success. 
 




Figure 27.  Daily Assistance or Trust Network 
 
Figure 28.  Daily Assistance or Trust Network Measuring Betweenness from 
MCJGTF, VSU, Investigations, and Patrol 
But, who is trusted most in the SPD?  Within the Patrol (2) unit, for example, 
those nodes that are most prominent (larger in size) tend not to be the formal 
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organizational leaders.  Here the betweenness measure helps to show that individuals 
with the rank of “officer” (down triangles) tend to be those sought after most for 
assistance.  Why is this, and what does it mean?  Essentially, those that are perceived to 
have the most practical experience are sought after most often when questions arise.  
These individuals become unwanted “trust managers,” stagnating the trust process and 
providing no value added to the organization as a whole.  To counter this, managers and 
other leaders must be vigilant, using principles of centrality to locate, or relocate, these 
“trust managers” effectively, so that more individual nodes can access and use their 
assistance.177    
D. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
A thorough analysis of the SPD contact, advice, intelligence, and assistance 
networks provides keen insight into how information is organized, shared, and used.  Our 
study hypothesizes, in part, that the ability to process information effectively is critical in 
achieving information dominance and allowing authorities to reduce gang violence.  
Essentially, this social network analysis demonstrated that while there are holes and 
challenges in the way that both the formal and informal networks at the SPD accomplish 
this, there is a sufficient base from which to strengthen the process.   
Essentially, the SPD suffers from several organizational “configuration” 
problems.  Dr. David Krackhardt and Dr. Jeffrey Hanson outline some of these 
configurations, explaining their implications.  The first such configuration is the 
“imploded relationships” phenomenon.  In this situation, clusters have few links to other 
clusters.  This happens when individual nodes fail to reach out and develop these 
relationships, preferring to communicate internally.  The impacts are obvious; 
information does not get shared across unit boundaries, thereby “bottlenecking” the 
processing procedures.  Consequently, information relating to gang enforcement issues 
becomes stymied and ineffective.  Each of the four networks exhibited this configuration, 
                                                 
177 See Krackhardt and Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, 106–111. for 
specific solutions to this problem, which are beyond the scope of this study.  While this is not necessarily a 
negative trait, it can produce friction within an organization, degrading effectiveness and value creation 
efforts. 
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but the contact and intelligence networks are perhaps the most affected.  However, the 
assistance network may reap some benefits from this configuration, allowing for higher 
levels of internal unit camaraderie and cohesion.  In the end, the risks far outweigh the 
potential benefits; if there is no mechanism to encourage the free flow of information, it 
is likely that localized intelligence efforts may fail.178 
Another configuration prominent in the analysis of the four social networks is that 
of “fragile structures.”  This occurs when units only communicate internally and with one 
or two other units.  This is clearly seen in those networks depicting the relationships 
between the MCJGTF, VSU, Investigations, and Patrol units.   According to Krackhardt 
and Hanson, this “can be problematic when contributions [in] several areas [becomes] 
necessary to accomplish work quickly and spawn creativity.”179  In a low-intensity 
situation, such as counter-gang operations, effective and creative strategies are essential 
to success.  It is hard to quantify this type of success if the most important enforcement 
elements are having a difficult time synchronizing their efforts and goals.180 
Lastly, the “bow tie” configuration also impacts the SPD and its assistance 
network in particular.  When one node becomes too central in a trust network, that 
individual may garner too much power and control, undermining organizational structural 
integrity and creating the conditions for this bow tie type configuration.  While this is not 
a specifically observable problem at the SPD, there is potential for it to become so.  
While this chapter has endeavored to underscore the value of informal networks, there is 
purpose in having an effective formal network, as it tries to streamline organizational 
processes.  Bow tie configuration tends to undermine the formal organizational structure, 
isolating small clusters of individuals in the network, possibly exacerbating some 
imploded relationships already in existence.  The result is that “organizational processes 
                                                 
178 Krackhardt and Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, 110.  
179 Krackhardt and Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, 111.  
180 Krackhardt and Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, 106–111. 
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tend to become rigid and slow.”181  The ultimate danger is that information stops 
flowing, making inter-unit communication impossible.182 
Overcoming these organizational configuration challenges is easier said than 
done.  A holistic approach must be developed.  Using the informal network as an 
organizational advantage should become a focus of the SPD leadership.  While the formal 
structure is important in developing and maintaining the overall direction of the SPD, it is 
the informal network that provides the catalyst for true value creation, innovation, and 
problem solving.  Table 48, summarizing the analytical data associated with this section 
of the study, should be examined closely, along with the other significant findings, in 












Weekly Contact  0.2200  12.763  72.325%  19.709%  0.444  1.943  0.532 
Daily Contact  0.0500  2.898  24.732%  7.194%  0.379  4.382  0.176 
Weekly Contact‐Agency  0.0405  Bi‐Modal ‐ Analysis Matrix is not Available 
Daily Contact‐Agency  0.0122  Bi‐Modal ‐ Analysis Matrix is not Available 
Weekly Advice  0.0710  4.119  31.361%  15.577%  0.244  3.383  0.281 
Daily Advice  0.0231  1.339  23.960%  6.421%  0.425  2.931  0.048 
Weekly Advice‐Agency  0.0160  Bi‐Modal ‐ Analysis Matrix is not Available 
Daily Advice‐Agency  0.0070  Bi‐Modal ‐ Analysis Matrix is not Available 
Weekly Intelligence  0.0731  4.237  31.153%  10.107%  0.324  3.09  0.235 
Daily Intelligence  0.0234  1.356  13.407%  6.391%  0.475  2.753  0.049 
Weekly Intelligence‐Agency  0.0160  Bi‐Modal ‐ Analysis Matrix is not Available 
Daily Intelligence‐Agency  0.0060  Bi‐Modal ‐ Analysis Matrix is not Available 
Weekly Assistance  0.0751  4.3560  39.715%  11.653%  0.3760  2.9590  0.2500 
Daily Assistance  0.0248  1.4410  20.273%  6.243%  0.4710  3.0810  0.0550 
Weekly Assistance‐Agency  0.0199  Bi‐Modal ‐ Analysis Matrix is not Available 
Daily Assistance‐Agency  0.0080  Bi‐Modal ‐ Analysis Matrix is not Available 
Table 45.  Consolidated Multi-Network Statistical Analysis183  
The end result of this analysis was to demonstrate the varying network 
weaknesses, showing that there is potential for improvement.  Information processing is 
not easy, but a critical component to success against an asymmetric problem such as the 
 
                                                 
181 Krackhardt and Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, 111. 
182 Krackhardt and Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart.  
183 See Appendix E for supporting calculations and original data. 
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gang phenomenon in Salinas.  Informal networks, in conjunction with established formal 
norms, are critical to understanding relationships in the struggle for information 
dominance.184  
 
                                                 
184 Krackhardt and Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, 111.  
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This research project began with the intent of exploring what aspects of 
counterinsurgency doctrine, when applied to counter-gang operations, can have the most 
affect on reducing the levels of gang violence in Salinas, CA.  More specifically we 
sought to understand how Salinas city officials and law enforcement agencies can 
increase the level of information they receive from the population about gang activities, 
and how the city can increase its ability to process that information in order to effectively 
target street gangs in their community.  To accomplish this, our team studied the 
perceptions of the general population, the SPD, and city hall employees in great detail 
through the survey and interview process described in previous chapters.  Through 
regression analysis we found conditions, that when met, can increase the population’s 
willingness to share information with the SPD.  Our analysis showed that when the 
population perceives they are part of a unified effort with the city toward the removal of 
gangs, and they have been empowered to make a difference toward this goal the 
population is more likely to share information that they have about gang related activity. 
Similarly we found conditions, that when met, can improve the SPD's attitudes 
toward sharing information internally.  Our analysis of the SPD showed that when police 
officers perceive that the government and the community are working towards common 
goals they have more favorable attitudes about information processing.  We also found 
that officers with less of an inclination to personal responsibility and a poor perception of 
police legitimacy are more likely to be satisfied with the current quality of information 
processing within the city government.   
Finally, our survey of the Salinas city employees revealed two primary factors 
contributing to attitudes about the quality of information processing within the city 
government.  Of all the variables considered, the reduction of fear and a perception that 
the government and the community were working together to solve the gang problem 
were most important in predicting attitudes about gang-related information sharing. 
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B. SURVEY CROSS EXAMINATION AND OBSERVATIONS 
While regression analysis and analytical statistics are good tools for predicting 
behavior, they do not always tell the complete story.  In the previous chapters we 
examined the descriptive statistics for each of our three surveys independently of one 
another (population, police, and civilian city employees).  We felt it was valuable to this 
research to include a comparison of the survey results across all three demographics.  The 
following section contains the results of this cross examination, and highlights those 
areas where opinions diverge as well as converge on different topics.  This we felt would 
provide Salinas’s city leaders a concise list on where focus should be applied to repair the 
schisms within their community. 
1. Legitimacy 
a. Strains on Legitimacy 
Differences in perceptions between the Salinas population and city 
organizations (city government and the SPD) were clear when examining the effects of 
legitimacy across all three surveys.  There is significant disagreement over how 
legitimate the SPD or City Hall portray themselves.  When asked if the police department 
cares about the average citizen, the SPD overwhelmingly believes that it does (73.9%).  It 
is clear that the SPD works hard to ensure that Salinas is a safe community, within the 
bounds of its limited resources.  However, only 44.8% of the general population and 
45.2% of the city employees agree that the Salinas police care about them.  This schism 
demonstrates the SPD’s difficulty in reassuring a weary population that it is doing all that 
it can to protect them.  Additionally, there is a similar schism with regards to police 
responsiveness to citizen complaints and concerns.  While 76.2% of the police indicate 
that they are doing the best that they can to respond to citizen needs, only 36.9% of the 
general population and 25% of the city employees felt the same way.  In the end, these 
perceptions may be damaging to the SPD’s legitimacy, suggesting a possible 
misalignment of expectations between the city’s residents and the SPD. 
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Lastly, when queried concerning the effectiveness of the courts and legal 
system affecting Salinas, 76.2% of the SPD indicated a lack of confidence in the legal 
system, suggesting that it may not be an effective tool in dealing with criminals or 
deterring future crime.  Interestingly, the population places more legitimacy in the courts 
and legal system than the SPD does, indicating that they believe the legal system is 
largely effective. 
b. Agreeing to Disagree 
Despite ardent disagreements concerning perceived levels of legitimacy, 
there are some areas of agreement.  Regardless, these agreements are presented as 
negative results, meaning that the three surveys agree that there is a lack of legitimacy 
with regards to some aspect of governance.  For example, it is clear that the general 
population, the SPD, and city employees have little faith in city council’s ability to care 
about citizen needs or to respond to those needs in an effective manner.  The 
consequential impact on legitimacy is potentially enormous.  A possible consequence 
may include difficulties in establishing effective policy designed to unify efforts against 
gang violence, and subsequent community support for those policies. 
2. Security 
a. Areas of Agreement 
Across all three surveys, the consensus was that the gang problem is 
serious and that Salinas was not a safe place at night.  With this type of unanimous 
response one would believe that many Salinas citizens have been directly affected by 
gang activity; however, this does not seem to be the case.  The majority of responses 
indicated that most people have not been directly threatened by gangs in their 
community.  This observation tells us two things: (1) the ability of the gangs in Salinas to 
use violence as leverage to incite fear in the community is strong, and (2) perceptions are 
stronger than reality.  Compounding the problem is the perception that the Salinas Police 
have not made the city any safer over the last year.   
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b. Areas of Disagreement 
The security topic that was most disagreed upon was the perception that 
gang violence had gotten worse over the last year.  Analysis showed that 74.9% of the 
general population and 45.9% of the city hall employees believed the gang problem had 
gotten worse, but only 15.3% of police believe it had.  Either the police are in denial that 
the gang problem is getting worse, or the population is not informed enough about the 
facts concerning gang activity.  Since the police are intimately involved in the day to day 
fight against gangs, giving them a better understanding of the problem, and the majority 
of the public is not, it is likely that the locus of disagreement lies with the population’s 
lack of accurate information concerning gang activity.  Previous research in Salinas 
indicated that overall levels of violence have either decreased or stabilized over the past 
30 years, demonstrating a modicum of consistency.185  Furthermore, our research shows 
that over the last year, the proportion of gang violence has declined, confirming the 
SPD’s assertion that violence has not worsened.186  This confirms our hypothesis that the 
public’s inaccurate perception of the gang problem stems from their lack of accurate 
information about the current level of gang violence.  In order for the population to 
effectively participate in counter-gang initiatives it needs to know what is going on; 
therefore, an aggressive information campaign must be undertaken within the city to 
inform the public on current gang issues.   
3. Trust and Embeddedness 
a. Areas of Agreement 
On issues of trust and embeddedness, all three survey populations shared 
the belief that people should form community groups to solve social problems.  They also 
                                                 
185 This assertion is consistent with research conducted by Majors Jason Clarke and Tracy Onufer, 
who aptly demonstrate the effects of varying economic, educational, social, and enforcement factors on 
violence levels in Salinas.  Of particular note, Chapter 2 “Data Analysis,” clearly shows the violence trends 
in Salinas since 1981.  See Jason Clarke and Tracy Onufer, "Understanding Environmental Factors that 
Affect Violence in Salinas, California" (Master of Science in Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate 
School), 21–58 (accessed 11/23/2010).  
186 Reference Appendix A, Section C. 
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agreed that it is important to share crime information with the police.  There was partial 
agreement that ethnic needs were met by the city of Salinas.  Agreement in these areas 
suggest that there is a willingness among the population to get involved; however, this 
will require a concerted effort from the city government to tap into this capability.   
b. Areas of Disagreement 
Participants disagreed on issues of cultural identity.  There was sharp 
disagreement between the police, the population, and city employees about whether 
speaking English as a common language would unite Salinas’s citizens.  These results 
indicate that the population values cultural heritage and language as critical to their 
identity.  This feeling was less prominent among the police and city employees.  Cross 
examination of these responses reveals that the “front line troops,” those which interact 
with the citizenry on a daily basis, do not regard culture as an important aspect of 
understanding the community that they protect.  Additionally, when asked whether 
people should help others who are less fortunate, 58.1% of police agreed compared to 
84.3% of the population and 84.4% of city employees.   
4. Unity of Effort 
a. Agreement 
Cross examination of survey data indicates an agreement that in order to 
reduce gang violence, a unified approach between the city government and the population 
is required.  There is significant agreement that there is currently no unified approach 
being taken to counter gang violence, particularly among the SPD where 59.5% of 
respondents felt that the city lacked a unified approach to gang violence.  We hypothesize 
that the disconnect between what should be happening and what is happening is due to a 
lack of a unified counter-gang strategy.  Further survey results confirm this hypothesis. 
There is a consensus among city employees and the SPD that no unified gang strategy 
currently exists.  These findings indicate that the city government understands what needs 
to be done, but is having a difficult time executing this type of unified policy.   
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b. Disagreement 
The only large disagreement among the surveys concerning unity of effort 
was whether the city government was effective at soliciting help from the citizens.  
Regarding this subject, 22.1% of city employees and 10.2% of the SPD felt that city 
government had been effective at soliciting help from the citizens, while 47.3% of the 
population had a higher regard for the city in this area.   
C. POLICY DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
These recommendations are intended to be practical and implementable in order 
for the Salinas City Government to see a decrease in gang violence.  For precise data on 
why and which variables are seen as more important, refer to Chapters IV through VIII 
and the corresponding appendices.   
1. Increasing Information 
These suggestions are targeted at those areas that will help Salinas city 
government increase its ability to gather crime information from the population. 
a. Empower Local Citizens 
(1) Discussion.  As shown in Chapter V, personal 
responsibility and unity of effort proved to be the most strongly correlated IVs for the 
population’s willingness to share information.  Personal responsibility was a subset of 
trust from our overall hypothesis.  Salinas citizens showed that they retain a tremendous 
desire to help other people.  Additionally, our research showed that if the population was 
empowered through the formation of, and participation in community organizations, they 
would be more inclined to share crime information with the police.  Our research has 
found that the police are pleading with the local community to provide information about 
criminal activity, and no one is talking.  We hypothesize this is due to the current passive 
nature of the relationship between the city government and the population.  The city has 
failed to empower the population through active engagement at the neighborhood level.   
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(2) Recommendation.  As leaders of the community, city 
officials and law enforcement personnel must make community engagement at the 
neighborhood level a priority.  It is not enough to establish a tip line and then wait for 
reports to trickle in.  There exists in Salinas a perception among the population that 
neither the city council nor the police are responsive to complaints.  A passive tip line 
approach to acquiring information is not working.  There must be engagement between 
the city and the population through an active two way dialogue.  The establishment of 
community groups at the neighborhood level accomplishes several things: (1) increase 
the unity of effort between the community and the city, (2) allow dialogue to occur 
among members of the community and city officials on a routine basis, (3) establish a 
sense of trust between group members, (4) allow police to provide the community with 
specific information requirements they are seeking, and (5) reassure the community that 
their input counts.  Building strong community group networks allows the city to build a 
more personal relationship with the community, and ultimately receive more information 
about criminal activity through those relationships. 
Based on our research we recommend these community groups include 
law enforcement personnel who patrol that particular part of the city in which the group 
members live, as well as civil servant and social service representatives.  We realize that 
the formation of community groups across the city will take time and resources, so we 
recommend the groups should be started in neighborhoods in East Salinas particularly 
among Hispanic neighborhoods.  Some group members may not feel safe meeting in their 
neighborhoods, depending on their proximity to the gangs. In these instances off site 
meetings could be set up. 
The community groups described here, in their simplest form, are hubs in 
the city’s information network.  When properly manned, resourced, and utilized they 
have the potential to be a great force multiplier against gang violence.  The gangs that 
thrive in Salinas are also a network.  What we are recommending is the city of Salinas 
fight the gang network with a network of their own.   
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b. Incorporating City Employees Into the Process 
(1) Discussion.  Oftentimes the myriad of jobs conducted by 
city workers gives them access and placement to the neighborhoods rife with gang 
activity, such as sanitation workers and public works employees.  In contrast to police 
officers, city workers are accepted entities in neighborhoods that would be non-
permissive to a police presence.  The “invisible” nature of these workers gives them the 
capacity to observe community conditions that would be beneficial to law enforcement’s 
situational awareness. 
(2) Recommendation.  We recommend the city leadership 
establish a forum between city workers and law enforcement officers to facilitate 
information sharing.  This approach would accomplish several things: (1) increase police 
resources, (2) give people a chance to share their observations, and (3) give city 
employees a sense of participation in fighting the gang problem.  Additionally, this 
empowerment may reduce the sense of fear and uncertainty among city employees, as 
they feel they are contributing to a unified effort. 
c. Additional Considerations 
(1) Feedback.  Our research found that many times when 
arrests are made based on a tip provided by someone in the community, there is little to 
no feedback to the public that an anonymous tip provided the valuable information.  
When this occurs, it fosters the idea that “no one is really listening”, and leads to an 
apathetic population.  Our recommendation is the city should provide feedback to the 
population when their input leads to action against gang activity.  For obvious safety 
concerns, no attributable information should be shared about the source of the 
information; however, the method by which the police received the tip could be made 
public to bolster more support from the population.  Face to face feedback at a 
community group meeting, as described above, would be the most productive mechanism 
for providing this type of feedback.   
(2) Virtual Community Groups: Harnessing Existing Social 
Networks.  Existing social network websites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Yahoo 
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Groups provides an existing network for the city to tap into for the collection of 
information.  There are over 500 million people with Facebook accounts.  In instances 
where groups cannot be easily formed in the physical sense, community groups can be 
formed using existing social networking sites.  Community groups can establish their 
own accounts on one of these websites that would facilitate daily interaction among the 
group members in between physical meetings.  It would also provide a channel for 
passing information to the police that the group is familiar with.  The group members 
know who is receiving the information and they know they will get feedback.  Growth of 
networks on sites such as Facebook can expand quickly, more so than in a physical sense.  
As these networks grow, the momentum of this exponential growth may likely bring in 
people that otherwise may not have gotten involved.   
2. Increasing Processing Power 
These suggestions are targeted at those areas that will help the Salinas city 
government increase its ability to process, understand, and use the information that it 
gathers from the population. 
a. Effective Formal and Informal Organization 
(1) Discussion.  As indicated in Chapter VIII, the potential for 
improving the way information is used, formally and informally, within the SPD exists.  
Currently, it is the assessment of this research that this potential is not being fully 
maximized, thus limiting the SPD’s ability to successfully confront the gang phenomenon 
in Salinas.  In the end, this challenge is a function of organization, and how individuals 
within the organization interact.  As previously noted, overcoming these organizational 
challenges is easier said than done.  Two specific organizational challenges face the SPD, 
degrading its informal, and even its formal capacity to process information: imploding 
relationships and fragile structures.  Each of these challenges work against the SPD’s 
ability to effectively process and use potential information and intelligence.  Thus, a 
holistic approach must be developed that uses the informal network as an organizational 
advantage.  While an organization’s formal structure is important in developing and 
maintaining the overall direction, it is the informal network that provides the catalyst for 
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true innovation and problem solving.   The following recommendations will provide 
ideas that may help the SPD maximize this network and improve its information 
processing. 
(2) Recommendations. 
Overcome imploded relationships with more informal intra-
departmental coordination.   In this situation, as stated before, units have few links to 
other units within the police department.  This happens when individuals fail to reach out 
and develop these relationships, preferring to communicate internally.  The impacts are 
obvious; information does not get shared across unit boundaries, thereby “bottlenecking” 
the processing procedures.  Consequently, information relating to gang enforcement 
issues becomes stymied and ineffective.  Purposeful integration of units through 
collaborative sessions offers equal input from every participant.  Such meetings offer a 
forum for people to share information that might not typically have the opportunity to do 
so.  This can also be accomplished through intra-departmental training sessions, 
providing social opportunities in a mix unit environment.  Leaders must consciously 
break reliance on internal ties and force units to interact in a more holistic manner.  This 
is a leadership responsibility, and time and opportunity must be made for individuals to 
create relationships across unit boundaries. 
Strengthen fragile structures through the establishment of 
formal intelligence reporting and analysis mechanisms.  The use of a formal reporting 
system, detailing gang related information or intelligence can be used to generate 
dialogue within the department.  These reports are freely shared and distributed; thus, 
units that traditionally share across limited boundaries now will potentially reach every 
unit within the SPD.  This type of reporting must be done daily, and managed through a 
single point.  Essentially, reports are collected by one person, analyzed and organized, 
and then shared with every other unit in the form of a daily intelligence summary.  This 
will allow the department to formulate an overall “common intelligence picture” and 
ensure that everyone is using the same information to plan and conduct operations. 
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b. Establish Commanders Critical Information Requirements 
(1) Discussion.  If information is to be synchronized across the 
Salinas Police Department, the officers need to know what information is relevant and 
important to the command.  On a typical day, officers may come in contact with a variety 
of information and may find it hard to sort what is important and what is not.   
(2) Recommendation.  In order to clearly establish what 
information is critical to the operations of the police department we recommend the 
police department leadership issue critical information requirements to officers outlining 
the latest “gaps” in intelligence.  While these information requirements should be issued 
from the command level, they needn’t be devised by the command.  Input from all units 
should be collated to provide a comprehensive list of information gaps in their particular 
area.  The commands job then becomes prioritizing this list and putting emphasis behind 
its use.  As information about a particular requirement comes in, it gets reported back 
down to the unit that originally needed the information. The command can continue to 
issue revised information requirements as the intelligence picture develops. 
c. Database Management 
(1) Discussion.  In the course of our research, we observed a 
general inconsistency in crime tip data collection and archiving within the SPD.  Current 
distribution channels send crime tips to various locations within the SPD, with no central 
repository for collection.  Because efficient crime analysis demands accurate and 
complete records of incoming information, the SPD would benefit from improvements in 
this area.  If analysis was possible, the SPD would be better able to evaluate the 
effectiveness of various methods of intelligence collection. 
(2) Recommendation.  We recommend the establishment of a 
central collection database for all crime tip information within the SPD.  This will 
facilitate easier access to a complete record of incoming intelligence from the various 
available sources (telephone, internet, CI, etc.).  This enables a greater understanding of 
what the public is communicating to the police, in addition to presenting a clear picture of 
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which line of communication is most useful, as well as areas where these processes could 
be improved. 
3. Additional Recommendations 
a. Coordinated Media Plan 
(1) Discussion.  Interviews with city government officials 
revealed that currently the city does not have a coordinated plan to provide routine 
feedback to media outlets and the population of Salinas specifically regarding progress in 
countering gang activity.  While the police department does have a public information 
officer tasked to coordinate this effort, a coordinated plan across city agencies has yet to 
be realized.  It is critical for the city to maintain transparency in how it is combating gang 
proliferation in their community. 
(2) Recommendation.  (1) Establish a formal anti-gang theme 
that is understood and used by both city hall and the police department.  (2) Develop 
media talking points prior to large operations to facilitate the dissemination of 
information to the public quickly and accurately after the operation occurs.  (3) Establish 
standard procedures for routine interactions with the media to provide feedback to the 
community about how resources are being used to counter gang activity.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of our thesis was to understand what aspects of counterinsurgency 
doctrine, when applied to counter-gang operations, can have the most affect on reducing 
the levels of gang violence in Salinas, CA.  While this study has shown there to be clear 
applications of this theory toward fighting gang violence, the concept of using these 
techniques is still in its early stages.  The models and theories put into practice by law 
enforcement agencies in the past have served an invaluable purpose, and still have many 
important capabilities that can be brought to bear against criminal organizations.  
However, current information about gangs has consistently shown that they are growing 
in sophistication and are becoming increasingly networked in their operations.  As a 
result, the nature of the conflict between gangs and city government is becoming more 
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asymmetric.  The problem then becomes how can current suppression, intervention, and 
prevention techniques be modified to overcome the asymmetric nature of this conflict 
between city government and street gangs?  We believe counterinsurgency practices shed 
light on how this can be achieved  
To overcome this asymmetry will require a new paradigm, one that incorporates 
the focused use of information to achieve an advantage in suppression, intervention, and 
prevention efforts against gang activity.  A strategy focused heavily on the use of 
information can aid the Salinas city government in “seeing” the gang’s infrastructure and 
effectively targeting it.  Current counter-gang strategies seem to understate the 
importance of engagement at the local community level as necessary to generate “bottom 
up buy in” from the population.  A focused effort in extracting information from the 
population will disrupt the gang’s link to the population, which is their center of gravity.  
The axiom, “information is power” seems to befit this situation.  If this is true, to exert 
this power successfully, information must be processed and shared across all agencies 
involved in the conflict.  Processing and sharing of information will allow the city to 
wield intelligence effectively to root out an entrenched and networked enemy such as 
gangs.   
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APPENDIX A. SALINAS CRIME STATISTICS, TIP 
INFORMATION, AND SUPPORTING EMPIRICS  
A. DESCRIPTION 
Gang related statistics and tip information lie at the heart of this paper’s research 
efforts.  These statistics helped to understand the corollary relationships that have 
impacted community and police efforts to combat gang crime in Salinas, California over 
the past several years.  The following appendix outlines the data collection and analysis 
efforts as they relate to gang crime in Salinas, providing an overview of our analytical 
results. 
B. METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
All crime statistics and tip information were collected using public police records 
given for use by the SPD.  This data was sorted and compiled into relevant categories 
pertinent to this study.  
The analysis procedures used two techniques: descriptive comparison and 
analytical statistical analysis.  The descriptive comparison analysis compiled and 
analyzed the results using graphical representations.  This method allowed the drawing of 
conclusions about the data based on temporal trends.  The analytical statistical analysis 
used standard regression and the Prais-Winsten autocorrelation regression techniques to 
correlate relationships between varying independent variables.  
C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL RESULTS 
The following tables, 49 and 50, describe those crime statistics observed by the 
SPD from January 2006 thru October 2010.187  Definitive analysis of this data is 
presented in the body of this study in Chapter IV. 
                                                 
187 Salinas Police Department, Salinas Police Department in-House Crime Statistics (Public Record) 
(Salinas, CA: Salinas Police Department, 2006–2010). 
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Table 46.  Comprehensive Crime Statistics Observed in Salinas, California from 
January 2006 to October 2010 
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Table 47.  Gang Related Crime Statistics Observed in Salinas, California from January 





APPENDIX B. SALINAS POPULATION SURVEY SUPPORTING 
EMPIRICS 
A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
As mentioned in Chapter V, we analyzed the survey data to designate a question 
to represent our dependent variable for our regression model. Q28, “It is important and 
effective to pass crime information to the Salinas police department”, was chosen to 
represent our dependent variable as it most represented the population’s willingness to 
share information with the city.  Figure 33 illustrates the results of our regression model 
for volume of information.  The source for all of the regression analysis is StataCorp. 
2007, Stata Statistical Software: Release 10. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP. 
. reg q28 legit unity2 perresp embed security race culture culneed 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      83 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  8,    74) =    8.67 
       Model |  63.7008961     8  7.96261201           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  67.9858509    74  .918727715           R-squared     =  0.4837 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4279 
       Total |  131.686747    82  1.60593594           Root MSE      =   .9585 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         q28 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       legit |    .022367   .1264719     0.18   0.860    -.2296337    .2743677 
      unity2 |   .3963825   .1314425     3.02   0.004     .1344775    .6582874 
     perresp |   .4539542   .1342344     3.38   0.001     .1864864    .7214221 
       embed |   .0363863   .0299851     1.21   0.229    -.0233603     .096133 
    security |    .139657   .1078349     1.30   0.199    -.0752088    .3545228 
        race |   .1206112   .2441054     0.49   0.623    -.3657794    .6070018 
     culture |   .0784748   .1300472     0.60   0.548    -.1806499    .3375996 
     culneed |   .1194218   .1030006     1.16   0.250    -.0858113    .3246549 
       _cons |  -.3445702   .6145796    -0.56   0.577    -1.569147    .8800064 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 29.  Regression Results 
B. REGRESSION TESTS 
We used a variety of tests in order to determine the validity of our dependent 
variable regression. In order to test collinearity we analyzed the mean variance inflation 
factor (VIF), results are in Figure 34.  To test for model specificity and omitted variables, 
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    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF 
  
-------------+---------------------- 
      unity2 |      1.83    0.547797 
       legit |      1.70    0.589228 
     culneed |      1.50    0.666385 
     culture |      1.50    0.667182 
     perresp |      1.46    0.685720 
        race |      1.16    0.863499 
       embed |      1.15    0.865932 
    security |      1.13    0.885088 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.43 
Figure 30.  Variance Inflation Factor for Regression Model 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of 
q28 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 71) =      3.94 
                  Prob > F =      0.0116 
Figure 31.  Ramsey Test for Regression Model 
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replace race = 0 if race>1 
(36 real changes made) 
 
. tab race 
 




          0 |         81       26.21 
26.21 




      Total |        309      100.00 
Figure 32.  Recoded racial responses for Q37 
C. FREQUENCY ANALYSIS 
Table 59 and 60 show frequency of responses for questions 34 and 35. 
Q34:  How many police officers are you acquainted with? 






93901 77 24.8 68 21.9 0 0.0 3 1.0 148 47.7 
93902 10 3.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 10 3.2 
93903  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
93905 16 5.2 92 29.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 108 34.8 
93906 3 1.0 33 10.6 1 0.3 0 0.0 37 11.9 
93907 2 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.3 3 1.0 
93908 2 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.6 4 1.3 
TOTAL 110 35.5 193 62.3 1 0.3 6 1.9 310 100.0
Table 48.  Police Embeddedness by Race and Zip Code 
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Q35:  How many city officials are you acquainted with? 
Zip code White % Hispanic % Native American % Other % 
Total by  
Zip Code % 
93901 80 25.2 32 10.1 0 0.0 3 0.9 116 36.6 
93902 10 3.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 10 3.2 
93903  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
93905 6 1.9 70 22.1 1 0.3 0 0.0 77 24.3 
93906 9 2.8 23 7.3 2 0.6 1 0.3 35 11.0 
93907 12 3.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 12 3.8 
93908 2 0.6 0 0.0 1 0.3 0 0.0 3 0.9 
TOTAL 119 37.5 193 60.9 4 1.3  0.0 317 100.0 
Table 49.  City Council Embeddedness by Race  and Zip Code 
Table 61 contains the frequency of responses by race, mean, and standard 
















is	very	serious.	 3.6%  1.0%  3.0%  6.9%  85.5%  4.7	 0.9	
            White 4.9% --- 2.4% 2.4% 90.2% 4.7 0.9 
            Hispanic 1.8% 1.3% 3.1% 7.5% 86.3% 4.7 1.0 
            African American --- --- --- 50.0% 50.0% 4.5 0.7 
           Asian 50.0% --- --- --- 50.0% 4.6 1.0 
           Native American 12.5% --- --- 12.5% 75.0% 4.4 1.4 
           Other 10.0% --- --- 10.0% 80.0% 4.5 1.3 
          No Race Provided 8.3% --- 8.3% --- 83.3% 4.5 1..2 
Q2:	Compared	to	last	year,	gang	violence	in	
Salinas	has	increased.	 7.0%	 5.9%	 12.2%	 16.6%	 58.3%	 4.1	 1.2	
												White	 11.1%  8.3%  11.1%  22.2%  47.2%  3.1	 2.0	
												Hispanic	 4.4%  5.3%  13.6%  17.0%  59.7%  4.3	 1.1	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐	 50.0%  3.5	 2.1	
											Asian	 50.0%  25.0%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐	 25.0%  4.0	 1.3	
											Native	American	 16.7%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  16.7%  66.7%  4.2	 1.6	
											Other	 14.3%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 85.7%  4.4	 1.5	
										No	Race	Provided	 20.0%  ‐‐‐  10.0%  10.0%  60.0%  3.9	 1.7	
Q3:						The	Salinas	Police	care	what	happens	
to	you.	 18.4%	 6.8%	 30.0%	 15.2%	 29.6%	 3.3	 1.4	
												White	 11.9%  2.4%  19.0%  31.0%  35.7%  3.5	 1.6	
												Hispanic	 19.7%  8.4%  29.8%  12.9%  29.2%  3.3	 1.2	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%  ‐‐‐  50.0%  4.0	 N/A	
											Asian	 ‐‐‐  25.0%  75.0%  ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 3.6	 1.3	
											Native	American	 14.3%  ‐‐‐  28.6%  14.3%  42.9%  3.7	 1.5	
											Other	 28.6%  ‐‐‐  57.1%  ‐‐‐  14.3%  2.7	 1.4	


















Representative	cares	what	happens	to	you.	 16.9%	 12.0%	 28.0%	 12.0%	 31.1%	 3.3	 1.4	
												White	 9.1%  15.2%  18.2%  27.3%  30.3%  3.5	 1.3	
												Hispanic	 17.7%  12.2%  28.7%  9.8%  31.7%  3.2	 1.3	
												African	American	 100.0%  ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 1.0	 NA	
											Asian	 ‐‐‐	 25.0%  25.0%  ‐‐‐  50.0%  3.6	 1.3	
											Native	American	 14.3%  ‐‐‐  42.9%  ‐‐‐  42.9%  3.6	 1.5	
											Other	 25.0%  12.5%  25.0%  12.5%  25.0%  3.0	 1.6	




her	to	pay	a	lot	of	attention	to	what	I	say.	 21.3%	 15.6%	 26.2%	 12.7%	 24.2%	 3.0	 1.5	
												White	 17.1%  14.3%  28.6%  14.3%  25.7%  2.5	 1.8	
												Hispanic	 21.0%  16.6%  26.0%  12.7%  23.8%  3.1	 1.1	
												African	American	 50.0%  ‐‐‐  50.0%  ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 2.0	 1.4	
											Asian	 100.0%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 3.2	 1.5	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  40.0%  ‐‐‐  60.0%  4.2	 1.1	
											Other	 28.6%  ‐‐‐  28.6%  28.6%  14.3%  3.0	 1.5	





what	I	say.	 17.1%	 16.7%	 28.2%	 12.2%	 25.7%	 3.1	 1.4	
												White	 13.5%  21.6%  32.4%  8.1%  24.3%  2.6	 1.7	
												Hispanic	 16.9%  16.9%  26.4%  14.0%  25.8%  3.5	 1.1	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 100.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 3.0	 0.0	
											Asian	 100.0%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  3.4	 1.4	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  28.6%  ‐‐‐  71.4%  4.4	 1.0	
											Other	 25.0%  12.5%  25.0%  12.5%  25.0%  3.0	 1.6	



















legal	system.	 13.9%	 10.5%	 30.0%	 19.9%	 25.8%	 3.3	 1.3	
												White	 12.5%  10.0%  32.5%  25.0%  20.0%  2.9	 1.6	
												Hispanic	 13.1%  11.1%  28.3%  19.2%  28.3%  3.5	 0.9	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 3.0	 1.4	
											Asian	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐	 66.7%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 3.6	 1.3	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  40.0%  20.0%  40.0%  4.0	 1.0	
											Other	 33.3%  11.1%  22.2%  11.1%  22.2%  2.8	 1.6	
										No	Race	Provided	 20.0%  ‐‐‐  50.0%  20.0%  10.0%  3.0	 1.2	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Q8:I	am	satisfied	with	the	quality	of	
education	in	Salinas.				 20.6%	 15.7%	 26.9%	 14.7%	 22.0%	 3.0	 1.4	
												White	 23.8%  28.6%  26.2%  9.5%  11.9%  2.4	 1.4	
												Hispanic	 19.8%  12.3%  28.8%  16.0%  23.1%  3.0	 1.3	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 3.0	 1.4	
											Asian	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐	 66.7%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 3.0	 1.4	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐  16.7%  16.7%  16.7%  50.0%  4.0	 1.3	
											Other	 40.0%  20.0%  10.0%  10.0%  20.0%  2.5	 1.6	




council,	mayor).	 13.3%	 16.7%	 26.2%	 19.0%	 24.7%	 3.3	 1.3	
												White	 11.6%  23.3%  32.6%  25.6%  7.0%  2.9	 1.2	
												Hispanic	 13.2%  15.3%  23.3%  19.0%  29.1%  3.2	 1.1	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 2.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 33.3%  ‐‐‐  33.3%  ‐‐‐  33.3%  3.4	 1.2	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  66.7%  ‐‐‐	 33.3%  3.7	 1.0	
											Other	 22.2%  11.1%  22.2%  22.2%  22.2%  3.1	 1.5	



















billboards,	community	meetings).	 21.6%  11.1%  19.9%  15.7%  31.7%  3.2	 1.5	
												White	 25.0%  20.5%  15.9%  25.0%  13.6%  2.8	 1.5	
												Hispanic	 21.3%  9.5%  17.1%  15.2%  37.0%  3.0	 1.3	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 2.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 3.3	 1.5	
											Native	American	 16.7%  16.7%  16.7%  16.7%  33.3%  3.3	 1.6	
											Other	 12.5%  12.5%  37.5%    37.5%  3.4	 1.5	
										No	Race	Provided	 16.7%  ‐‐‐  58.3%  8.3%  16.7%  3.1	 1.2	
Q11:	I	receive	most	of	my	information	about	
gang	activity	through	word	of	mouth	or	
rumors.	 13.9%	 8.5%	 21.0%	 14.2%	 42.4%	 3.6	 1.4	
												White	 26.7%  20.0%  26.7%  11.1%  15.6%  2.7	 1.4	
												Hispanic	 12.4%  6.0%  17.4%  15.1%  49.1%  2.9	 1.3	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 3.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 33.3%  ‐‐‐  33.3%  ‐‐‐  33.3%  3.3	 1.5	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐  16.7%  ‐‐‐  33.3%  50.0%  4.2	 1.2	
											Other	 11.1%  ‐‐‐  55.6%  ‐‐‐  33.3%  3.4	 1.3	
										No	Race	Provided	 ‐‐‐  16.7%  41.7%  ‐‐‐  41.7%  3.7	 1.2	
Q12:		I	receive	most	of	my	information	about	
gang	activity	through	media	outlets	(TV,	
newspaper,	radio).	 6.4%	 7.8%	 15.5%	 21.6%	 48.6%	 4.0	 1.2	
												White	 4.4%  8.9%  13.3%  26.7%  46.7%  4.0	 1.2	
												Hispanic	 6.9%  8.3%  15.1%  20.2%  49.5%  4.3	 0.9	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 4.0	 1.4	
											Asian	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 25.0%	 75.0%	 3.5	 1.5	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐	 66.7%	 4.3	 1.0	
											Other	 22.2%  ‐‐‐  33.3%  11.1%  33.3%  3.3	 1.6	

















place	to	walk	alone	at	night.	 8.7%	 4.5%	 8.3%	 10.1%	 68.4%	 4.3	 1.3	
												White	 12.2%  2.4%  12.2%  14.6%  58.5%  3.8	 1.7	
												Hispanic	 7.9%  4.6%  6.9%  9.3%  71.3%  4.5	 1.0	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 50.0%	 4.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 25.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 75.0%	 4.3	 1.3	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 14.3%  14.3%  71.4%  4.6	 0.8	
											Other	 ‐‐‐  25.0%  25.0%  12.5%  37.5%  3.6	 1.3	
										No	Race	Provided	 20.0%  ‐‐‐  10.0%  ‐‐‐  70.0%  4.0	 1.7	
Q14:					I	feel	safe	and	secure	in	my	home.	 15.4%	 8.8%	 17.5%	 19.6%	 38.6%	 3.6	 1.5	
												White	 4.5%  11.4%  22.7%  25.0%  36.4%  3.8	 1.2	
												Hispanic	 20.2%  8.2%  15.9%  19.2%  36.5%  3.8	 1.1	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 50.0%	 4.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 ‐‐‐	 25.0%  25.0%  25.0%  25.0%  3.6	 1.3	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 28.6%	 ‐‐‐  71.4%	 4.4	 1.0	
											Other	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 10.0%  20.0%  70.0%  4.6	 0.7	
										No	Race	Provided	 ‐‐‐	 20.0%  30.0%  10.0%  40.0%  3.7	 1.3	
Q15:		I,	or	a	member	of	my	family	have	been	
threatened	by	a	gang	member	in	Salinas.	 55.3%	 7.0%	 10.5%	 7.0%	 20.2%	 2.3	 1.6	
												White	 61.9%  7.1%  9.5%  4.8%  16.7%  2.0	 1.6	
												Hispanic	 53.8%  7.0%  9.7%  8.1%  21.5%  3.1	 1.8	
												African	American	 50.0%	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 1.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 100.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 2.1	 1.5	
											Native	American	 66.7%  16.7%  16.7%  ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 1.5	 0.8	
											Other	 37.5%  ‐‐‐  12.5%  ‐‐‐  50.0%  3.3	 2.0	
										No	Race	Provided	 50.0%  ‐‐‐  30.0%  10.0%  10.0%  2.3	 1.5	
Q16:		As	compared	to	a	year	ago,	the	Salinas	
police	department	has	made	the	city	a	more	
secure	and	safe	place	to	live.	 35.4%	 15.0%	 27.2%	 8.7%	 13.8%	 2.5	 1.4	
												White	 20.6%  17.6%  23.5%  23.5%  14.7%  2.3	 1.7	
												Hispanic	 39.2%  14.4%  27.8%  6.2%  12.4%  3.1	 1.4	
												African	American	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 2.5	 2.1	
											Asian	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 75.0%	 ‐‐‐	 25.0%	 2.5	 1.4	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐  60.0%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  40.0%	 3.2	 1.6	
											Other	 28.6%  ‐‐‐  28.6%  14.3%  28.6%  3.1	 1.7	

















language,	will	unite	all	of	Salinas’s	citizens.		 58.3%	 8.3%	 12.2%	 7.5%	 13.8%	 2.1	 1.5	
												White	 42.5%  5.0%  20.0%  17.5%  15.0%  2.5	 1.6	
												Hispanic	 64.5%  8.6%  8.6%  6.5%  11.8%  2.0	 1.4	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 3.5	 2.1	
											Asian	 33.3%  ‐‐‐  33.3%  ‐‐‐  33.3%  2.3	 1.6	
											Native	American	 50.0%  ‐‐‐  50.0%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  2.0	 1.1	
											Other	 37.5%  25.0%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐	 37.5%  2.8	 1.9	
										No	Race	Provided	 44.4%  ‐‐‐  33.3%  ‐‐‐  22.2%  2.6	 1.7	
Q18:		Salinas’s	citizens	are	best	represented	
by	leaders	from	their	own	racial	or	ethnic	
background.	 30.4%	 7.9%	 29.6%	 9.2%	 22.9%	 2.9	 1.5	
												White	 37.5%  2.5%  37.5%  5.0%  17.5%  2.4	 1.6	
												Hispanic	 27.2%  8.7%  28.9%  9.8%  25.4%  2.7	 1.3	
												African	American	 50.0%	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 1.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 2.8	 1.5	
											Native	American	 40.0%  ‐‐‐  20.0%  20.0%  20.0%  2.8	 1.8	
											Other	 22.2%  11.1%  33.3%  11.1%  22.2%  3.0	 1.5	
										No	Race	Provided	 55.6%	 11.1%	 11.1%	 11.1%	 11.1%	 2.1	 1.5	
Q19:			People	should	help	others	who	are	
less	fortunate.	 3.8%	 2.8%	 9.1%	 11.2%	 73.1%	 4.5	 1.0	
												White	 4.7%	 2.3%	 4.7%	 11.6%	 76.7%	 4.5	 1.0	
												Hispanic	 2.8%	 3.3%	 10.4%	 10.4%	 73.1%	 4.6	 0.7	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 50.0%	 4.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 25.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 75.0%	 4.5	 1.0	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 16.7%	 ‐‐‐	 83.3%	 4.7	 0.8	
											Other	 22.2%	 ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  11.1%	 66.7%	 4.0	 1.7	
											No	Race	Provided	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 10.0%	 30.0%	 60.0%	 4.5	 0.7	
Q20:			Hispanic	Americans	face	
discrimination	in	getting	a	decent	job.	 19.6%	 6.3%	 23.1%	 16.1%	 34.9%	 3.4	 1.5	
												White	 36.8%	 2.6%	 23.7%	 21.1%	 15.8%	 2.5	 1.7	
												Hispanic	 15.5%	 7.2%	 23.2%	 13.4%	 40.7%	 3.5	 1.3	
												African	American	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 2.5	 2.1	
											Asian	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 3.4	 1.5	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 33.3%	 66.7%	 ‐‐‐	 3.7	 0.6	
											Other	 37.5%	 12.5%	 12.5%	 25.0%	 12.5%	 2.6	 1.6	

















to	my	sense	of	who	I	am.	 6.7%	 3.2%	 15.8%	 14.8%	 59.5%	 4.1	 1.2	
												White	 4.7%	 4.7%	 27.9%	 14.0%	 48.8%	 3.9	 1.3	
												Hispanic	 5.7%	 3.3%	 15.2%	 14.7%	 61.1%	 4.2	 1.1	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 50.0%	 4.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 25.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 75.0%	 4.2	 1.3	
											Native	American	 16.7%	 ‐‐‐  16.7%	 16.7%	 50.0%	 3.8	 1.6	
											Other	 22.2%	 ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  11.1%	 66.7%	 4.0	 1.7	




system).	 22.7%	 9.5%	 34.1%	 13.3%	 20.4%	 2.9	 1.4	
												White	 23.7%	 7.9%	 36.8%	 26.3%	 5.3%	 2.5	 1.5	
												Hispanic	 21.5%	 10.7%	 32.2%	 10.7%	 24.8%	 3.2	 1.2	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 2.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 3.0	 1.3	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 40.0%	 20.0%	 40.0%	 4.0	 1.0	
											Other	 37.5%	 37.5%	 12.5%	 12.5%	 ‐‐‐	 2.6	 1.5	
										No	Race	Provided	 42.9%	 ‐‐‐  42.9%	 ‐‐‐  14.3%	 2.4	 1.5	
Q23:		In	Salinas,	elections	are	a	good	way	of	
making	government	pay	attention	to	what	
the	people	think.	 17.4%	 8.1%	 21.7%	 17.1%	 35.7%	 3.5	 1.5	
												White	 15.0%  12.5%  12.5%  25.0%  35.0%  3.2	 1.7	
												Hispanic	 17.0%  6.9%  23.4%  16.5%  36.2%  3.8	 1.0	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 3.5	 2.1	
											Asian	 33.3%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  33.3%  33.3%  3.5	 1.5	
											Native	American	 16.7%  33.3%  50.0%  ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 3.7	 1.6	
											Other	 50.0%  ‐‐‐  20.0%  ‐‐‐  30.0%  2.6	 1.8	
										No	Race	Provided	 ‐‐‐	 22.2%  22.2%  22.2%  33.3%  3.7	 1.2	
Q24:		It	is	important	for	people	to	vote	on	
local	community	issues.	(Salinas	elections,	
school	boards	elections)	 3.8%	 1.0%	 7.6%	 10.7%	 76.8%	 4.6	 1.0	
												White	 9.3%  ‐‐‐  7.0%  ‐‐‐  83.7%  4.4	 1.4	
												Hispanic	 1.9%  1.4%  7.5%  12.1%  77.1%  4.7	 0.6	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 50.0%	 4.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 25.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 75.0%	 4.5	 1.0	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 16.7%	 ‐‐‐	 83.3%	 4.7	 0.8	
											Other	 22.2%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  11.1%  66.7%  4.0	 1.7	


















community	problems	in	Salinas.			 5.0%	 1.8%	 10.8%	 14.0%	 68.5%	 4.4	 1.1	
												White	 7.0%	 2.3%	 7.0%	 20.9%	 62.8%	 4.2	 1.3	
												Hispanic	 3.4%	 2.0%	 10.7%	 11.7%	 72.2%	 4.8	 0.6	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 50.0%	 4.5	 0.7	
											Asian	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 66.7%	 4.3	 1.2	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐	 66.7%	 4.3	 1.0	
											Other	 22.2%	 ‐‐‐  11.1%	 22.2%	 44.4%	 3.7	 1.7	
										No	Race	Provided	 9.1%	 ‐‐‐  18.2%	 27.3%	 45.5%	 4.0	 1.3	
Q26:		The	City	of	Salinas	is	taking	a	unified	
approach	to	confronting	gang	violence.	 18.3%	 10.4%	 25.0%	 17.5%	 28.8%	 3.3	 1.4	
												White	 21.2%	 12.1%	 15.2%	 24.2%	 27.3%	 2.4	 1.9	
												Hispanic	 16.8%	 8.9%	 27.4%	 17.3%	 29.6%	 3.3	 1.4	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 3.5	 2.1	
											Asian	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐  33.3%	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐	 3.5	 1.3	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 16.7%	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐  50.0%	 3.8	 1.3	
											Other	 25.0%	 37.5%	 12.5%	 ‐‐‐  25.0%	 2.6	 1.6	
										No	Race	Provided	 44.4%	 ‐‐‐  22.2%	 22.2%	 11.1%	 2.6	 1.6	
Q27:		The	police	work	with	local	community	
leaders	to	fight	gang	violence.	 14.2%	 11.6%	 22.2%	 19.6%	 32.4%	 3.4	 1.4	
												White	 9.4%	 6.3%	 21.9%	 31.3%	 31.3%	 2.7	 2.0	
												Hispanic	 15.4%	 12.4%	 21.3%	 18.3%	 32.5%	 3.4	 1.2	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 3.5	 2.1	
											Asian	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  33.3%	 33.3%	 3.6	 1.3	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 40.0%	 ‐‐‐	 60.0%	 4.2	 1.1	
											Other	 16.7%	 16.7%	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐  16.7%	 2.8	 1.3	


















department.	 8.2%	 3.9%	 5.0%	 11.4%	 71.5%	 4.3	 1.2	
												White	 11.4%	 2.3%	 9.1%	 13.6%	 63.6%	 4.1	 1.5	
												Hispanic	 6.3%	 4.3%	 4.3%	 11.1%	 74.0%	 4.9	 0.3	
												African	American	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 3.0	 2.8	
											Asian	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 33.3%	 33.3%	 4.5	 1.1	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 100.0%	 5.0	 0.0	
											Other	 42.9%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 57.7%	 3.3	 2.1	





educational	system)	to	resolve.	 5.0%	 1.4%	 6.4%	 11.8%	 75.4%	 4.5	 1.0	
												White	 9.3%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  14.0%  76.7%  4.3	 1.5	
												Hispanic	 2.9%  1.4%  7.7%  11.5%  76.4%  4.5	 0.9	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 3.5	 2.1	
											Asian	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 66.7%	 4.5	 1.1	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 16.7%	 ‐‐‐  83.3%	 4.7	 0.8	
											Other	 22.2%	 ‐‐‐  11.1%	 ‐‐‐  66.7%	 3.9	 1.8	
										No	Race	Provided	 11.1%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 33.3%	 55.6%	 4.2	 1.3	
Q30:		The	City	of	Salinas	has	been	effective	
in	soliciting	local	citizens'	help	in	fighting	
the	gang	violence	problem.	 17.1%	 12.7%	 22.9%	 14.7%	 32.7%	 3.3	 1.5	
												White	 11.1%	 30.6%	 27.8%	 16.7%	 13.9%	 2.3	 1.6	
												Hispanic	 17.5%	 8.7%	 19.1%	 15.8%	 38.8%	 2.8	 1.4	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 4.0	 1.4	
											Asian	 33.3%	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐  33.3%	 ‐‐‐	 3.5	 1.4	
											Native	American	 16.7%	 ‐‐‐  66.7%	 ‐‐‐  16.7%	 3.0	 1.3	
											Other	 33.3%	 33.3%	 33.3%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 2.0	 0.9	


















violence.	 19.0%	 14.7%	 27.7%	 15.8%	 22.8%	 3.1	 1.4	
												White	 14.3%	 25.0%	 28.6%	 14.3%	 17.9%	 1.9	 1.8	
												Hispanic	 18.2%	 11.7%	 28.5%	 18.2%	 23.4%	 2.9	 1.1	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 3.5	 2.1	
											Asian	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 3.2	 1.5	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 4.0	 1.2	
											Other	 80.0%	 20.0%	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 1.2	 0.4	
										No	Race	Provided	 16.7%	 33.3%	 16.7%	 ‐‐‐  33.3%	 3.0	 1.7	
Q33:		Would	you	support	a	local	tax	increase	
to	fund	your	suggestions?			 26.7%	 2.6%	 18.5%	 15.5%	 36.6%	 3.3	 1.6	
												White	 17.1%  2.4%  17.1%  12.2%  51.2%  3.5	 1.8	
												Hispanic	 27.7%  2.9%  20.2%  16.8%  32.4%  3.2	 1.6	
												African	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 100.0%	 5.0	 0.0	
											Asian	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 100.0%	 3.7	 1.5	
											Native	American	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐	 50.0%	 50.0%	 4.5	 0.7	
											Other	 57.1%  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  14.3%  28.6%  2.6	 2.0	
										No	Race	Provided	 42.9%  ‐‐‐  14.3%  ‐‐‐  42.9%  3.0	 2.0	
Table 50.  Frequency of Responses by Question 
D. SURVEY 
Below is a copy of the CASP survey. 
 
Your Zip code ____________  
 
We are conducting a survey among Salinas residents regarding issues in your 
community, especially gang violence and law enforcement, and we would like to include 
your views in our study. This survey will be used for research purposes, and we assure 
you we are only seeking opinions and there will be no attempt to sell you anything or 
solicit a donation. It should take about 10 minutes to complete this survey. Thank you for 
making a valuable contribution to your neighbors and friends in the City of Salinas. This 
information will help make Salinas a safer place to live. 
 
Rate the following on a scale from 1 to 5 (1—completely disagree, 3—neutral, 5—
completely agree.   Or, Don’t Know.) Please circle the appropriate answer. 
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1. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious. 
1        2        3      4     5      Don’t Know 
2. Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased. 
1        2        3      4     5      Don’t Know 
3. The Salinas Police care what happens to you. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
4. Your Salinas City Council Representative cares what happens to you. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
5.  If I had some complaint about a police officer and took that complaint to a 
member of the police department, I can expect him or her to pay a lot of 
attention to what I say. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
6. If I had some complaint about a local government activity and took that 
complaint to a member of the Salinas City Council, I can expect him or her to 
pay a lot of attention to what I say. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
7. I am confident in Salinas’s courts and legal system. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
8. I am satisfied with the quality of education in Salinas.    
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
9. I am confident that Salinas’s city government can provide services that meet my 
needs. (Education system, police, city council, mayor). 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
10.  I receive most of my information about gang activity through official city 
communication channels (Press releases, billboards, community meetings). 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
11.  I receive most of my information about gang activity through word of mouth or 
rumors. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
12. I receive most of my information about gang activity through media outlets 
(TV, newspaper, radio). 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
	
13. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
14. I feel safe and secure in my home. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
15. I, or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
16. As compared to a year ago, the Salinas police department has made the city a 
more secure and safe place to live.  
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
17. Speaking English, as a common language, will unite all of Salinas’s citizens. 
Implies Spanish or other language is bad and divisive 
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      1        2        3      4     5      Don’t Know 
18. Salinas’s citizens are best represented by leaders from their own racial or ethnic 
background. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
19. People should help others who are less fortunate. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know		
20. Hispanic Americans face discrimination in getting a decent job. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
21. My cultural heritage is very important to my sense of who I am.  
       1        2        3      4     5      Don’t Know 
22. The needs of my ethnic group are met in the City of Salinas by institutions such 
as: (police, elected officials, educational system). 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
a.  If answer is a 4 or 5  in Question 22, who do you think is responsible? 
i. Police 
ii. City Council 
iii. Schools 
iv. Mayor 
v. Other _____________________ (Please specify) 
 
23. In Salinas, elections are a good way of making government pay attention to 
what the people think. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
24. It is important for people to vote on local community issues. (Salinas elections, 
school boards elections) 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
25. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve 
community problems in Salinas.   
       1        2        3      4     5      Don’t Know 
26. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
27. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence. 
1								2								3						4					5						Don’t	Know	
	
28. It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas police 
department.  
       1        2        3      4     5      Don’t Know 
29. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of 
the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, 
educational system) to resolve. 
  1        2        3      4     5      Don’t Know 
30. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in 
fighting the gang violence problem. 
     1        2        3      4     5      Don’t Know 
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31. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to 
gang violence.  
1        2        3      4     5      Don’t Know 
 
The following questions address different ways that the city may increase their 





a. Increasing police officers 
b. Increase in community programs and Services (Parks, after school 
programs, libraries, athletics, etc.) 
c. Increase in school budgets 
d. Employment programs 
e. None 
f. Other ______________________(Please Specify) 
 
33.  Would you support a local tax increase to fund your suggestions?   
       1        2        3      4     5      Don’t Know 
 
The following questions deal with people that you are acquainted with, meaning that 
you know their name and would stop and talk at least for a moment if you ran into 
the person on the street or in a shopping mall.   
 
34. How many police officers are you acquainted with?  __________ 




37. Finally, with what ethnic group do you most identify yourself with? Would you 




g.     Other 
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APPENDIX C. SALINAS POLICE DEPARTMENT ATTITUDES 
SURVEY 
A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
As discussed in Chapter VI, we analyzed the survey data to resolve the best 
questions to represent the dependent variable for our regression model.  Q30, "I have 
freedom to act on gang related intelligence in a timely manner," and Q33, "City agencies 
communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence," were 
ultimately chosen to represent the dependent variable for our model of information 
processing.  Regression analysis was completed with Stata Statistical Software: Release 
10, and is presented in Figure 37. 
 
Q34 |       Freq.      Percent         Cum. 
------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
0 |          53        60.23                60.23 
1 |          35        39.77                100.00 
------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
Total |          88       100.00 
 
Source |        SS         df        MS                Number of obs =      67 
-------------+------------------------------              F(  7,    59) =    8.27 
Model |    14.9094027     7        2.12991468            Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Residual |  15.1950749     59  .   257543642            R-squared     =  0.4953 
-------------+------------------------------              Adj R-squared =  0.4354 
Total |      30.1044776     66  .   456128449            Root MSE      =  .50749 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
infopro |       Coef.     Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
legitpol |   -.1970832    .0890185     -2.21    0.031      -.3752088   -.0189577 
legitcity |    .0355998    .0798414      0.45    0.657      -.1241625     .195362 
security |   -.0235114     .060514     -0.39    0.699      -.1445996    .0975768 
perresp |    -.269311    .0840546     -3.20    0.002      -.4375039   -.1011182 
community |    .8519703    .1337192      6.37    0.000       .5843987    1.119542 
unity |    -.0486216    .0875912     -0.56    0.581      -.2238912    .1266481 
q34 |     -.093801    .1324822     -0.71    0.482      -.3588973    .1712952 
cons |    .8387057    .6699404      1.25    0.216      -.5018421    2.179253 
Figure 33.  Regression Results 
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B. REGRESSION TESTS 
We utilized mean variance inflation factor (VIF) and Ramsey restest to verify the 
validity of our model.  We tested for collinearity using VIF, and for model specificity and 
omitted variables using the Ramsey retest.  The results are presented in Figure 38. 
Variable |        VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
unity |       1.45    0.688633 
community |      1.42    0.704397 
legitcity |       1.23    0.815449 
legitpol |       1.17    0.852431 
q34 |       1.12    0.892132 
security |       1.08    0.923940 
perresp |       1.06    0.940801 
-------------+---------------------- 
Mean VIF |       1.22 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of infopro 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 56) =      6.72 
                  Prob > F =      0.0006 
Figure 34.  Regression Tests 
C. SALINAS POLICE DEPARTMENT ATTITUDES SURVEY RESULTS 
The complete frequency of response data set for the Salinas Police Department 
attitudes survey is presented in Table 62. 
Salinas Police Department Attitudes Survey 













1. Compared to last year, gang 
violence in Salinas has 
increased. 85 96.6% 9.4% 31.8% 43.5% 12.9% 2.4% 2.7 0.9 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 33 38.8% 2.4% 15.3% 16.5% 3.5% 1.2% 2.6 0.9 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 52 61.2% 7.1% 16.5% 27.1% 9.4% 1.2% 2.7 0.9 
2. The gang violence problem 
in Salinas is very serious. 88 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 96.6% 5.0 0.2 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 39.8% 5.0 0.0 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 56.8% 4.9 0.2 
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25. The gang violence 
problem will resolve itself 
with time regardless of how 
the City responds to the 
situation. 83 94.3% 84.3% 10.8% 3.6% 0.0% 1.2% 1.2 0.6 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 34 41.0% 33.7% 6.0% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2 0.5 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 49 59.0% 50.6% 4.8% 2.4% 0.0% 1.2% 1.2 0.7 
3. The Salinas Police care 
about Salinas citizens. 88 100.0% 1.1% 3.4% 21.6% 33.0% 40.9% 4.1 0.9 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 0.0% 1.1% 8.0% 14.8% 15.9% 4.1 0.8 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 1.1% 2.3% 13.6% 18.2% 25.0% 4.1 1.0 
4. The Salinas City Council 
cares about Salinas citizens. 88 100.0% 5.7% 22.7% 39.8% 23.9% 8.0% 3.1 1.0 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 0.0% 13.6% 12.5% 11.4% 2.3% 3.1 0.9 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 5.7% 9.1% 27.3% 12.5% 5.7% 3.1 1.1 
5. The Salinas Police are very 
responsive to citizen 
complaints. 88 100.0% 0.0% 5.7% 18.2% 43.2% 33.0% 4.0 0.9 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 0.0% 2.3% 5.7% 18.2% 13.6% 4.1 0.9 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 0.0% 3.4% 12.5% 25.0% 19.3% 4.0 0.9 
6. The Salinas City Council 
are very responsive to citizen 
complaints. 74 84.1% 5.4% 20.3% 37.8% 24.3% 12.2% 3.2 1.1 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 30 40.5% 0.0% 10.8% 17.6% 10.8% 1.4% 3.1 0.8 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 44 59.5% 5.4% 9.5% 20.3% 13.5% 10.8% 3.3 1.2 
7. I am confident in Salinas’s 
courts and legal system. 88 100.0% 9.1% 34.1% 33.0% 20.5% 3.4% 2.8 1.0 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 2.3% 14.8% 14.8% 4.5% 3.4% 2.8 1.0 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 6.8% 19.3% 18.2% 15.9% 0.0% 2.7 1.0 
8. I am satisfied with the 
quality of education in Salinas 88 100.0% 44.3% 36.4% 17.0% 2.3% 0.0% 1.8 0.8 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 14.8% 19.3% 5.7% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8 0.7 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 29.5% 17.0% 11.4% 2.3% 0.0% 1.8 0.9 
9. I receive most of my 
information about gang 
activity through official city 
communication channels 
(Press releases, billboards, 
community meetings) 88 100.0% 46.6% 27.3% 10.2% 10.2% 5.7% 2.0 1.2 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 21.6% 6.8% 3.4% 4.5% 3.4% 2.0 1.4 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 25.0% 20.5% 6.8% 5.7% 2.3% 2.0 1.1 
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10. I receive most of my 
information about gang 
activity through word of 
mouth or rumors. 88 100.0% 15.9% 22.7% 30.7% 20.5% 10.2% 2.9 1.2 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 9.1% 9.1% 11.4% 8.0% 2.3% 2.6 1.2 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 6.8% 13.6% 19.3% 12.5% 8.0% 3.0 1.2 
11. I receive most of my 
information about gang 
activity through media outlets 
(TV, newspaper, radio). 88 100.0% 42.0% 31.8% 17.0% 8.0% 1.1% 1.9 1.0 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 18.2% 13.6% 6.8% 1.1% 0.0% 1.8 0.8 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 23.9% 18.2% 10.2% 6.8% 1.1% 2.1 1.1 
12. The city of Salinas is a 
dangerous place to walk alone 
at night. 88 100.0% 1.1% 4.5% 11.4% 26.1% 56.8% 4.3 0.9 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 0.0% 3.4% 9.1% 8.0% 19.3% 4.1 1.0 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 1.1% 1.1% 2.3% 18.2% 37.5% 4.5 0.8 
13. I feel safe and secure in 
my home. 84 95.5% 3.6% 9.5% 16.7% 29.8% 40.5% 3.9 1.1 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 41.7% 1.2% 6.0% 8.3% 16.7% 9.5% 3.7 1.1 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 49 58.3% 2.4% 3.6% 8.3% 13.1% 31.0% 4.1 1.1 
14. I or a member of my 
family have been threatened 
by a gang member in Salinas. 86 97.7% 46.5% 2.3% 7.0% 12.8% 31.4% 2.8 1.8 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 33 38.4% 16.3% 1.2% 2.3% 5.8% 12.8% 2.9 1.8 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 61.6% 30.2% 1.2% 4.7% 7.0% 18.6% 2.7 1.8 
15. As compared to a year 
ago, the Salinas police 
department has made the city 
a more secure and safe place 
to live. 86 97.7% 17.4% 20.9% 36.0% 20.9% 4.7% 2.7 1.1 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 40.7% 3.5% 10.5% 14.0% 9.3% 3.5% 3.0 1.1 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 51 59.3% 14.0% 10.5% 22.1% 11.6% 1.2% 2.6 1.1 
16. Speaking English, as a 
common language, will unite 
all of Salinas’s citizens. 85 96.6% 17.6% 12.9% 18.8% 15.3% 35.3% 3.4 1.5 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 41.2% 8.2% 5.9% 11.8% 7.1% 8.2% 3.0 1.4 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 50 58.8% 9.4% 7.1% 7.1% 8.2% 27.1% 3.6 1.6 
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17. Salinas’s citizens are best 
represented by leaders from 
their own racial or ethnic 
background. 83 94.3% 42.0% 31.8% 17.0% 8.0% 1.1% 2.4 1.3 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 18.2% 13.6% 6.8% 1.1% 0.0% 2.0 1.2 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 48 60.2% 23.9% 18.2% 10.2% 6.8% 1.1% 2.6 1.3 
18. People should help others 
who are less fortunate. 86 97.7% 5.8% 5.8% 30.2% 26.7% 31.4% 3.7 1.1 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 40.7% 2.3% 3.5% 12.8% 11.6% 10.5% 3.6 1.1 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 51 59.3% 3.5% 2.3% 17.4% 15.1% 20.9% 3.8 1.1 
19. Hispanic Americans face 
discrimination in getting a 
decent job. 84 95.5% 48.8% 28.6% 13.1% 3.6% 6.0% 1.9 1.1 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 34 40.5% 20.2% 13.1% 4.8% 2.4% 0.0% 1.7 0.9 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 50 59.5% 28.6% 15.5% 8.3% 1.2% 6.0% 2.0 1.3 
20. My ethnic group 
membership is very important 
to my sense of who I am. 83 94.3% 26.5% 10.8% 20.5% 18.1% 24.1% 3.0 1.5 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 34 41.0% 13.3% 2.4% 4.8% 7.2% 13.3% 3.1 1.7 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 49 59.0% 13.3% 8.4% 15.7% 10.8% 10.8% 3.0 1.4 
21. The needs of my ethnic 
group are met by the City of 
Salinas (police, city council, 
educational system, mayor). 79 89.8% 22.8% 20.3% 31.6% 16.5% 8.9% 2.7 1.2 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 33 41.8% 11.4% 5.1% 11.4% 10.1% 3.8% 2.8 1.3 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 46 58.2% 11.4% 15.2% 20.3% 6.3% 5.1% 2.6 1.2 
22. People should form or 
participate in community 
organizations to solve 
community problems in 
Salinas. 85 96.6% 1.2% 2.4% 17.6% 29.4% 49.4% 4.2 0.9 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 41.2% 0.0% 0.0% 3.5% 14.1% 23.5% 4.5 0.7 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 50 58.8% 1.2% 2.4% 14.1% 15.3% 25.9% 4.1 1.0 
23. The City of Salinas is 
taking a unified approach to 
confronting gang violence. 84 95.5% 20.2% 39.3% 14.3% 17.9% 8.3% 2.5 1.2 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 41.7% 6.0% 17.9% 6.0% 7.1% 4.8% 2.7 1.3 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 49 58.3% 14.3% 21.4% 8.3% 10.7% 3.6% 2.4 1.2 
24. The police work with local 
community leaders to fight 
gang violence. 82 93.2% 2.4% 17.1% 30.5% 37.8% 12.2% 3.4 1.0 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 42.7% 0.0% 7.3% 12.2% 14.6% 8.5% 3.6 1.0 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 47 57.3% 2.4% 9.8% 18.3% 23.2% 3.7% 3.3 1.0 
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26. I have a role in 
implementing the city's 
counter-gang strategy.  84 95.5% 13.1% 14.3% 23.8% 15.5% 33.3% 3.4 1.4 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 41.7% 4.8% 8.3% 9.5% 7.1% 11.9% 3.3 1.4 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 49 58.3% 8.3% 6.0% 14.3% 8.3% 21.4% 3.5 1.4 
27. Information related to 
gang activities should only be 
shared with other individuals 
or departments on a need to 
know basis. 84 95.5% 31.0% 20.2% 19.0% 16.7% 13.1% 2.6 1.4 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 33 39.3% 13.1% 10.7% 7.1% 4.8% 3.6% 2.4 1.3 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 51 60.7% 17.9% 9.5% 11.9% 11.9% 9.5% 2.8 1.5 
28.The city of Salinas and the 
Salinas PD have a unified 
counter-gang strategy. 81 92.0% 27.2% 35.8% 19.8% 14.8% 2.5% 2.3 1.1 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 33 40.7% 7.4% 18.5% 7.4% 6.2% 1.2% 2.4 1.1 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 48 59.3% 19.8% 17.3% 12.3% 8.6% 1.2% 2.2 1.1 
29. Existing Police 
Department policies suppress 
individual initiative and or 
hinder my ability to reduce 
gang activities.    86 97.7% 19.8% 14.0% 27.9% 20.9% 17.4% 3.0 1.4 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 34 39.5% 8.1% 7.0% 10.5% 10.5% 3.5% 2.9 1.3 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 52 60.5% 11.6% 7.0% 17.4% 10.5% 14.0% 3.1 1.4 
30. I have freedom to act on 
gang related intelligence in a 
timely manner. 87 98.9% 10.3% 21.8% 31.0% 25.3% 11.5% 3.1 1.2 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 34 39.1% 3.4% 10.3% 10.3% 8.0% 6.9% 3.1 1.2 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.9% 6.9% 11.5% 20.7% 17.2% 4.6% 3.0 1.1 
31. The gang violence 
problem is something that 
requires the combined efforts 
of the population of Salinas 
and the city government 
(police, city council, mayor, 
educational system) to 
resolve. 88 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 10.2% 85.2% 4.8 0.5 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 3.4% 35.2% 4.9 0.4 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 6.8% 50.0% 4.8 0.5 
32. The City of Salinas has 
been effective in soliciting 
local citizens' help in fighting 
the gang violence problem. 88 100.0% 21.6% 39.8% 28.4% 6.8% 3.4% 2.3 1.0 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 35 39.8% 9.1% 12.5% 10.2% 5.7% 2.3% 2.5 1.2 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 53 60.2% 12.5% 27.3% 18.2% 1.1% 1.1% 2.2 0.9 
 195
Salinas Police Department Attitudes Survey 













33. City agencies 
communicate effectively 
among each other on issues 
related to gang violence. 79 89.8% 34.2% 29.1% 29.1% 6.3% 1.3% 2.1 1.0 
     R Resides Inside Salinas 
City Limits 32 40.5% 10.1% 12.7% 15.2% 2.5% 0.0% 2.3 0.9 
     R Resides Outside Salinas 
City Limits 47 59.5% 24.1% 16.5% 13.9% 3.8% 1.3% 2.0 1.1 
Table 51.  Salinas Police Department Attitudes Survey Results 
D. ADDITIONAL MULTIPLE REGRESSION VARIABLES 
The following variables were included in the final information processing model, 
but were deemed statistically insignificant contributors to the dependent variable. 
Questions about Security (security) Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night. 4.3 0.9 
Q14. I or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in 
Salinas. 
2.8 1.8 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
3.6 1.1 86 0.083 
Table 52.  IV3 Security Component Questions 
Questions about City Government Legitimacy (legitcity) Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q4. The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens. 3.0 1.0 
Q6. The Salinas City Council are very responsive to citizen complaints. 3.2 1.1 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
3.1 0.8 74 -0.016 
Table 53.  IV2 City Government Legitimacy Component Questions 
Questions about Government Agency Unity of Effort (unity) Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang 
violence. 
2.5 1.2 
Q26. I have a role in implementing the city's counter-gang strategy.  3.4 1.4 
Q28. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD have a unified counter-gang 
strategy. 
2.3 1.1 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
3.3 0.7 77 1.153 
Table 54.  IV6 Government Agency Unity of Effort Component Questions 
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E. ADDITIONAL REGRESSION MODELS 
The following model best represented the variables of our initial theory, but 
ultimately proved insufficient to explain information processing (Adj R2 = 0.11, OV Test 











. reg q27 system unieff autonomy 
 
Source	|								 SS								 	 df								 MS															 	 Number	of	obs	=						71 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐												 	 F(		3,				67)	=				3.93 
Model	|			 20.9173768						 3			 6.97245893												 Prob	>	F						=		0.0120 
Residual	|			 118.829102					 67			 1.77356869												 R‐squared					=		0.1497 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐												 	 Adj	R‐squared	=		0.1116 
Total	|			 	 139.746479					 70			 1.99637827												 Root	MSE						=		1.3318 
 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
q27	|								 Coef.				 	 Std.	Err.							 t					 P>|t|						 [95%	Conf.	Interval] 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
system	|				 .6279292			 	.2090433						 3.00				 0.004				 .2106771				1.045181 
unieff	|				 ‐.0011321					 .264664					 ‐0.00				 0.997					‐.5294036				.5271394 
autonomy	|				 .3965108					 .286335						 1.38				 0.171			 ‐.1750162				.9680378 
_cons	|			 	 ‐.1800224				 1.192456					 ‐0.15				 0.880					‐2.560174					2.20013 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
 
Variable	|								 VIF								 1/VIF		 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
unieff	|							 1.15					 0.868118 
system	|							 1.13					 0.883114 












|				 	 system				 unieff		 	 autonomy 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
system	|				 1.0000 
unieff	|				 0.3301				 1.0000 
autonomy	|			 ‐0.0427				 0.1370				 1.0000	
Figure 35.  Additional Regression Model Results 
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F. SURVEY 
The survey, in its entirety is presented in Table 66. 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consent to Participate in Research 
 
Introduction.  You are invited to participate in a research study entitled Small Town Insurgency: 
The Struggle for Information Dominance to Reduce Gang Violence.  This research will foster a 
greater understanding of the causes of gang-related violence.  
 
Procedures.  You will be participating in a brief survey consisting of 34 questions.  The survey is 
expected to take no more than 15 minutes.  
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study.  Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary.  If you 
choose to participate you can change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study. You will 
not be penalized in any way or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled if you 
choose not to participate in this study or to withdraw.  
 
Potential Risks and Discomforts.  There are no identified potential risks associated with your 
participation in this survey.  
 
Anticipated Benefits.  Anticipated benefits from this study are: a better understanding of factors 
that contribute to gang-related violence and a potential for reduced gang violence within Salinas.  
You will not directly benefit from your participation in this research.  
 
Compensation for Participation.  No tangible compensation will be given.  A copy of the 
research results will be available at the conclusion of the experiment through the Naval 
Postgraduate School, and will be available for review, online, at the Dudley K. Knox Library:  
http://www.nps.edu/library. 
 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act.  Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept 
confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep 
your personal information in your research record confidential but total confidentiality cannot be 
guaranteed.  All records associated with your participation will be maintained and analyzed only 
by those directly involved with this research project, to include those conducting the survey.  
However, it is possible that the researcher may be required to divulge information obtained in the 
course of this research to the subject’s chain of command or other legal body.  No names will be 
used to identify participants in this research. 
 
Points of Contact.  If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience 
an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while taking part in this 
study please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Michael Freeman, (831) 656–3731,  
mefreema@nps.edu.  Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may 
be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831–656–2473, 
lgshattu@nps.edu. 
 
Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given the 
opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have 
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been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to participate in this study. I 
understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and signing this form, I do not waive 
any of my legal rights. 
 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 
Participant’s Signature     Date 
 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 
Researcher’s Signature     Date 
 
1. Compared to last year, gang violence in 
Salinas has increased. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
2. The gang violence problem in Salinas is 
very serious. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas 
citizens. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
4. The Salinas City Council cares about 
Salinas citizens. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
5. The Salinas Police are very responsive 
to citizen complaints. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
6. The Salinas City Council are very 
responsive to citizen complaints. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
7. I am confident in Salinas’s courts and 
legal system. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
8. I am satisfied with the quality of 
education in Salinas. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
9. I receive most of my information about 
gang activity through official city 
communication channels (Press 
releases, billboards, community 
meetings). 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
10. I receive most of my information about 
gang activity through word of mouth or 
rumors. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
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11. I receive most of my information about 
gang activity through media outlets 
(TV, newspaper, radio). 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place 
to walk alone at night. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
13. I feel safe and secure in my home. Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
14. I or a member of my family have been 
threatened by a gang member in Salinas. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know  
15. As compared to a year ago, the Salinas 
police department has made the city a 
more secure and safe place to live. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
16. Speaking English, as a common 
language, will unite all of Salinas’s 
citizens. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
17. Salinas’s citizens are best represented 
by leaders from their own racial or 
ethnic background. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
18. People should help others who are less 
fortunate. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
19. Hispanic Americans face discrimination 
in getting a decent job. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
20. My ethnic group membership is very 
important to my sense of who I am. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
21. The needs of my ethnic group are met 
by the City of Salinas (police, city 
council, educational system, mayor). 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
22. People should form or participate in 
community organizations to solve 
community problems in Salinas. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified 
approach to confronting gang violence. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
24. The police work with local community 
leaders to fight gang violence. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
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25. The gang violence problem will resolve 
itself with time regardless of how the 
City responds to the situation  
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
26.  I have a role in implementing the city’s 
counter-gang strategy. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
27.  Information related to gang activities 
should only be shared with other 
individuals or departments on a need to 
know basis. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
28. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD 
have a unified counter-gang strategy. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
29. Existing police department policies 
suppress individual initiative and or 
hinder my ability to reduce gang 
activities. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
30. I have freedom to act on gang related 
intelligence in a timely manner. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
31. The gang violence problem is 
something that requires the combined 
efforts of the population of Salinas and 
the city government (police, city 
council, mayor, educational system) to 
resolve. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
32. The City of Salinas has been effective in 
soliciting local citizens' help in fighting 
the gang violence problem. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
33. City agencies communicate effectively 
among each other on issues related to 
gang violence. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
34. I live within the city limits of Salinas No                           Yes 
Table 55.  Salinas Police Department Survey 
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APPENDIX D. SALINAS CITY EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES 
SURVEY 
A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
As discussed in Chapter VII, we analyzed the survey data to resolve the best 
questions to represent the dependent variable for our regression model.  Q25, "It is 
important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas Police Department," and 
Q32, "City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang 
violence," were ultimately chosen to represent the dependent variable for our model of 
information processing.  Regression analysis was completed with Stata Statistical 
Software: Release 10, and is presented in Figure 40. 
Source |        SS         df        MS               Number of obs  = 35 
--------------------------------------------------------------------   F(7, 27)   = 3.63 
Model |   4.86878947      7   .695541353      Prob > F       = 0.0069 
Residual |   5.17406767     27   .191632136       R-squared      = 0.4848 
--------------------------------------------------------------------         Adj R-squared  = 0.3512 
Total |   10.0428571     34   .295378151        Root MSE       = .43776 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
infopro |       Coef.     Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
gangprob |    .0753529    .0748298      1.01    0.323      -.0781851     .228891 
legit |     .1174803    .1118389      1.05    0.303      -.1119941     .3469547 
security |    -.199643    .0941257     -2.12    0.043      -.3927731     -.006513 
perresp |    .0313628     .136262      0.23    0.820      -.2482237     .3109494 
community |    .2580694    .1800793      1.43    0.163      -.1114229     .6275617 
unity |    .1004382    .1296514      0.77    0.445      -.1655846     .366461 
q33 |     .0028773    .1863037      0.02    0.988      -.3793863     .385141 
_cons |    2.169782    .7970861      2.72    0.011       .5342966      3.805268 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 36.  Regression Results 
B. REGRESSION TESTS 
We utilized mean variance inflation factor (VIF) and Ramsey retest to verify the 
validity of our model.  We tested for collinearity using VIF, and for model specificity and 
omitted variables using the Ramsey retest.  The results are presented in Figure 41. 
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Variable |        VIF        1/VIF   
-------------------------------------------- 
community |      2.04     0.491147 
unity |       1.96     0.508939 
legit |       1.81     0.553885 
gangprob |       1.39     0.718007 
security |       1.33     0.754401 
q33 |       1.29     0.772954 
perresp |       1.13     0.884290 
------------------------------------------- 
Mean VIF |       1.56 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of 
infopro 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 24) =       0.65 
                  Prob > F =      0.5881 
Figure 37.  Regression Tests 
C. SALINAS CITY EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES SURVEY RESULTS 
The complete frequency of response data set for the Salinas City Employee 
attitudes survey is presented in Table 67. 
Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey 












1. Compared to last 
year, gang violence 
in Salinas has 
increased. 61 93.8% 3.3% 18.0% 32.8% 16.4% 29.5% 3.5 1.2 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 40 65.6% 0.0% 11.5% 18.0% 11.5% 24.6% 3.8 1.1 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 19 31.1% 3.3% 6.6% 13.1% 4.9% 3.3% 2.9 1.1 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 4.0 1.4 
2. The gang violence 
problem in Salinas 
is very serious. 65 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 15.4% 83.1% 4.8 0.4 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 42 64.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.8% 53.8% 4.8 0.4 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 32.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.6% 27.7% 4.9 0.4 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 4.0 1.4 
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3. The Salinas 
Police care about 
Salinas citizens. 62 95.4% 9.7% 16.1% 29.0% 22.6% 22.6% 3.3 1.3 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 41 66.1% 8.1% 12.9% 14.5% 14.5% 16.1% 3.3 1.4 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 20 32.3% 1.6% 3.2% 12.9% 8.1% 6.5% 3.5 1.1 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 1 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0 -- 
4. The Salinas City 
Council cares about 
Salinas citizens. 64 98.5% 4.7% 14.1% 34.4% 18.8% 28.1% 3.5 1.2 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 42 65.6% 4.7% 10.9% 18.8% 12.5% 18.8% 3.5 1.3 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 20 31.3% 0.0% 1.6% 14.1% 6.3% 9.4% 3.8 1.0 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5 0.7 
5. The Salinas 
Police are very 
responsive to citizen 
complaints. 60 92.3% 15.0% 25.0% 35.0% 23.3% 1.7% 2.7 1.0 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 40 66.7% 11.7% 15.0% 21.7% 16.7% 1.7% 2.7 1.1 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 18 30.0% 3.3% 8.3% 13.3% 5.0% 0.0% 2.7 0.9 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.3% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 3.0 1.4 
6. The Salinas City 
Council are very 
responsive to citizen 
complaints. 62 95.4% 4.8% 12.9% 46.8% 24.2% 11.3% 3.2 1.0 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 41 66.1% 4.8% 8.1% 33.9% 11.3% 8.1% 3.1 1.0 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 19 30.6% 0.0% 3.2% 12.9% 11.3% 3.2% 3.5 0.8 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.2% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 3.0 1.4 
7. I am confident in 
Salinas’s courts and 
legal system. 61 93.8% 11.5% 24.6% 18.0% 29.5% 16.4% 3.1 1.3 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 40 65.6% 8.2% 13.1% 13.1% 18.0% 13.1% 3.2 1.3 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 19 31.1% 3.3% 9.8% 4.9% 9.8% 3.3% 3.0 1.2 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.3% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 3.0 1.4 
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8. I am satisfied 
with the quality of 
education in Salinas 63 96.9% 25.4% 39.7% 17.5% 12.7% 4.8% 2.3 1.1 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 42 66.7% 14.3% 27.0% 12.7% 7.9% 4.8% 2.4 1.2 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 19 30.2% 11.1% 11.1% 4.8% 3.2% 0.0% 2.0 1.0 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.2% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 3.0 1.4 
9. I receive most of 
my information 
about gang activity 





meetings) 63 96.9% 12.7% 23.8% 28.6% 23.8% 11.1% 3.0 1.2 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 41 65.1% 7.9% 12.7% 20.6% 15.9% 7.9% 3.0 1.2 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 20 31.7% 4.8% 9.5% 7.9% 7.9% 1.6% 2.8 1.2 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.2% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 3.5 2.1 
10. I receive most of 
my information 
about gang activity 
through word of 
mouth or rumors. 65 100.0% 12.3% 32.3% 33.8% 16.9% 4.6% 2.7 1.0 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 42 64.6% 7.7% 18.5% 24.6% 10.8% 3.1% 2.7 1.0 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 32.3% 3.1% 13.8% 9.2% 4.6% 1.5% 2.6 1.0 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 2.5 2.1 
11. I receive most of 
my information 
about gang activity 
through media 
outlets (TV, 
newspaper, radio). 65 100.0% 4.6% 7.7% 15.4% 38.5% 33.8% 3.9 1.1 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 42 64.6% 1.5% 4.6% 13.8% 24.6% 20.0% 3.9 1.0 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 32.3% 3.1% 1.5% 1.5% 13.8% 12.3% 4.0 1.2 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 3.5 2.1 
 
 207
Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey 












12. The city of 
Salinas is a 
dangerous place to 
walk alone at night. 65 100.0% 6.2% 7.7% 26.2% 24.6% 35.4% 3.8 1.2 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 42 64.6% 6.2% 3.1% 20.0% 12.3% 23.1% 3.7 1.3 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 32.3% 0.0% 3.1% 4.6% 12.3% 12.3% 4.0 1.0 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 0.0% 1.5% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5 0.7 
13. I feel safe and 
secure in my home. 61 93.8% 11.5% 6.6% 19.7% 37.7% 24.6% 3.6 1.3 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 40 65.6% 4.9% 3.3% 13.1% 24.6% 19.7% 3.8 1.2 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 19 31.1% 6.6% 3.3% 6.6% 11.5% 3.3% 3.1 1.4 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 4.5 0.7 
14. I or a member of 
my family have 
been threatened by a 
gang member in 
Salinas. 63 96.9% 52.4% 17.5% 9.5% 14.3% 6.3% 2.0 1.3 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 41 65.1% 34.9% 11.1% 6.3% 9.5% 3.2% 2.0 1.3 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 20 31.7% 15.9% 4.8% 3.2% 4.8% 3.2% 2.2 1.5 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.2% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5 0.7 
15. As compared to 
a year ago, the 
Salinas police 
department has 
made the city a more 
secure and safe 
place to live. 63 96.9% 25.4% 25.4% 30.2% 15.9% 3.2% 2.5 1.1 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 40 63.5% 19.0% 15.9% 17.5% 7.9% 3.2% 2.4 1.2 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 33.3% 6.3% 9.5% 11.1% 6.3% 0.0% 2.5 1.0 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 3.5 0.7 
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English, as a 
common language, 
will unite all of 
Salinas’s citizens. 64 98.5% 21.9% 17.2% 21.9% 17.2% 21.9% 3.0 1.5 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 42 65.6% 12.5% 12.5% 20.3% 7.8% 12.5% 2.9 1.4 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 20 31.3% 9.4% 4.7% 1.6% 6.3% 9.4% 3.1 1.7 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 4.0 0.0 
17. Salinas’s 
citizens are best 
represented by 
leaders from their 
own racial or ethnic 
background. 63 96.9% 12.7% 22.2% 38.1% 23.8% 3.2% 2.8 1.0 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 40 63.5% 7.9% 14.3% 23.8% 15.9% 1.6% 2.8 1.0 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 33.3% 3.2% 7.9% 14.3% 6.3% 1.6% 2.9 1.0 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.2% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 2.5 2.1 
18. People should 
help others who are 
less fortunate. 64 98.5% 0.0% 0.0% 15.6% 32.8% 51.6% 4.4 0.7 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 41 64.1% 0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 20.3% 31.3% 4.3 0.8 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 32.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 12.5% 17.2% 4.4 0.7 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 




getting a decent job. 64 98.5% 20.3% 28.1% 25.0% 17.2% 9.4% 2.7 1.2 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 41 64.1% 14.1% 15.6% 18.8% 10.9% 4.7% 2.6 1.2 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 32.8% 4.7% 12.5% 6.3% 4.7% 4.7% 2.8 1.3 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 2.5 2.1 
20. My ethnic group 
membership is very 
important to my 
sense of who I am. 65 100.0% 15.4% 12.3% 27.7% 29.2% 15.4% 3.2 1.3 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 42 64.6% 12.3% 4.6% 16.9% 20.0% 10.8% 3.2 1.3 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 32.3% 3.1% 7.7% 10.8% 9.2% 1.5% 3.0 1.1 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 5.0 0.0 
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21. The needs of my 
ethnic group are met 
by the City of 
Salinas (police, city 
council, educational 
system, mayor). 59 90.8% 8.5% 20.3% 37.3% 22.0% 11.9% 3.1 1.1 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 40 67.8% 5.1% 11.9% 27.1% 13.6% 10.2% 3.2 1.1 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 17 28.8% 3.4% 6.8% 10.2% 6.8% 1.7% 2.9 1.1 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.4% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 3.0 1.4 
22. People should 




problems in Salinas. 64 98.5% 0.0% 3.1% 12.5% 29.7% 54.7% 4.4 0.8 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 41 64.1% 0.0% 3.1% 7.8% 12.5% 40.6% 4.4 0.9 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 32.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 17.2% 12.5% 4.3 0.6 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 4.0 1.4 
23. The City of 
Salinas is taking a 
unified approach to 
confronting gang 
violence. 57 87.7% 7.0% 10.5% 38.6% 29.8% 14.0% 3.3 1.1 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 36 63.2% 7.0% 8.8% 21.1% 17.5% 8.8% 3.2 1.2 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 20 35.1% 0.0% 1.8% 15.8% 12.3% 5.3% 3.6 0.8 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 1 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0 -- 
24. The police work 
with local 
community leaders 
to fight gang 
violence. 58 89.2% 6.9% 13.8% 29.3% 39.7% 10.3% 3.3 1.1 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 40 69.0% 6.9% 8.6% 19.0% 25.9% 8.6% 3.3 1.2 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 16 27.6% 0.0% 3.4% 10.3% 12.1% 1.7% 3.4 0.8 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.4% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 3.0 1.4 
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25. It is important 
and effective to pass 
crime information to 
the Salinas Police 
Department. 64 98.5% 0.0% 3.1% 4.7% 20.3% 71.9% 4.6 0.7 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 41 64.1% 0.0% 3.1% 3.1% 10.9% 46.9% 4.6 0.8 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 32.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 7.8% 23.4% 4.7 0.6 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 4.5 0.7 
26. The gang 
violence problem 
will resolve itself 
with time regardless 
of how the City 
responds to the 
situation  64 98.5% 78.1% 10.9% 3.1% 6.3% 1.6% 1.4 0.9 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 41 64.1% 50.0% 7.8% 3.1% 3.1% 0.0% 1.4 0.8 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 32.8% 26.6% 3.1% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 1.4 0.9 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 3.0 2.8 
27. I have a role in 
implementing the 
city’s counter-gang 
strategy. 59 90.8% 25.4% 5.1% 25.4% 28.8% 15.3% 3.0 1.4 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 39 66.1% 22.0% 1.7% 16.9% 16.9% 8.5% 2.8 1.5 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 18 30.5% 3.4% 1.7% 8.5% 10.2% 6.8% 3.5 1.2 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.4% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 3.0 1.4 
28. Information 
related to gang 
activities should 
only be shared with 
other individuals or 
departments on a 
need to know basis. 62 95.4% 43.5% 21.0% 16.1% 8.1% 11.3% 2.2 1.4 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 41 66.1% 32.3% 12.9% 8.1% 6.5% 6.5% 2.1 1.4 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 19 30.6% 11.3% 8.1% 8.1% 1.6% 1.6% 2.2 1.2 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.2% 5.0 0.0 
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29. The city of 
Salinas and the 
Salinas PD have a 
unified counter-gang 
strategy.    51 78.5% 15.7% 27.5% 27.5% 23.5% 5.9% 2.8 1.2 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 34 66.7% 13.7% 17.6% 15.7% 15.7% 3.9% 2.7 1.2 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 15 29.4% 2.0% 9.8% 9.8% 5.9% 2.0% 2.9 1.1 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% 0.0% 3.5 0.7 
30. The gang 
violence problem is 
something that 
requires the 
combined efforts of 
the population of 
Salinas and the city 
government (police, 
city council, mayor, 
educational system) 
to resolve. 65 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.2% 7.7% 86.2% 4.8 0.5 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 42 64.6% 0.0% 0.0% 6.2% 3.1% 55.4% 4.8 0.6 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 21 32.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.6% 27.7% 4.9 0.4 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 5.0 0.0 
31. The City of 
Salinas has been 
effective in 
soliciting local 
citizens' help in 
fighting the gang 
violence problem. 59 90.8% 8.5% 33.9% 35.6% 15.3% 6.8% 2.8 1.0 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 37 62.7% 6.8% 20.3% 18.6% 13.6% 3.4% 2.8 1.1 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 20 33.9% 0.0% 13.6% 16.9% 1.7% 1.7% 2.8 0.8 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.4% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 3.0 2.8 
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32. City agencies 
communicate 
effectively among 
each other on issues 
related to gang 
violence. 51 78.5% 17.6% 31.4% 35.3% 13.7% 2.0% 2.5 1.0 
     R Resides Inside 
Salinas City Limits 33 64.7% 11.8% 23.5% 17.6% 11.8% 0.0% 2.5 1.0 
     R Resides 
Outside Salinas City 
Limits 16 31.4% 3.9% 7.8% 15.7% 2.0% 2.0% 2.7 1.0 
     R Did Not 
Indicate Where 
They Reside 2 3.9% 2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0 1.4 
Table 56.  Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey Results 
D. ADDITIONAL MULTIPLE REGRESSION VARIABLES 
The following variables were included in the final information processing model, 
but were deemed statistically insignificant contributors to the dependent variable. 
Questions about Perception of Gang Problem (gangprob) Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q1. Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased. 3.5 1.2 
Q2. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious 4.8 0.4 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
4.2 0.7 61 0.08 
Table 57.  IV1 Perception of Gang Problem Component Questions 
Questions about Legitimacy (legit) Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens. 3.3 1.3 
Q4. The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens. 0.0 1.2 
Q5. The Salinas Police are very responsive to citizen complaints. 2.7 1.0 
Q6. The Salinas City Council are very responsive to citizen complaints. 3.2 1.0 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
3.1 0.9 58 0.12 
Table 58.  IV2 Legitimacy Component Questions 
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Questions about Personal Responsibility (perresp) Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q18. People should help others who are less fortunate. 4.4 0.7 
Q22. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve 
community problems in Salinas. 
4.4 0.8 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
4.4 0.6 63 0.03 
Table 59.  IV4 Personal Responsibility Component Questions 
 
Questions about Government Agency Unity of Effort (unity) Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang 
violence. 
3.3 1.1 
Q29. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD have a unified counter-gang 
strategy. 
2.8 1.2 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
3.0 0.9 47 0.10 
Table 60.  IV6 Government Agency Unity of Effort Component Questions 
E. ADDITIONAL REGRESSION MODELS 
The following model in Figure 42 best represented the variables of our initial 






. gen unieff=(q23+q29+q30+q31)/4 
(20	missing	values	generated) 
 
. gen autonomy=(q6+q27)/2 
(9	missing	values	generated) 
 
. reg q25 system unieff autonomy 
 
Source	|								 SS								 	 df								 MS															 	 Number	of	obs		 =	40 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐												 F(		3,				36)		 =	1.49 
Model	|			 2.87155974						 3			 .957186581								 	 Prob	>	F							 =	0.2333 
Residual	|			 23.1034403					 36			 .641762229							 	 R‐squared						 =	0.1106 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐												 Adj	R‐squared		 =	0.0364 
Total	|							 25.975					 39			 .666025641								 	 Root	MSE							 =	.8011 
 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
q25	|							 	 Coef.				 	 Std.	Err.							 t					 P>|t|						 [95%	Conf.	Interval] 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
system	|					 ‐.18468				 .1636548					 ‐1.13				 0.267					‐.5165872				.1472273 
unieff	|				 .3707268				 .2322883						 1.60				 0.119					‐.1003757				.8418294 
autonomy	|				 .1738479				 .1558826						 1.12			 0.272					‐.1422966				.4899924 





Variable	|								 VIF								 1/VIF		 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
unieff	|							 1.18					 0.849650 
system	|							 1.16					 0.858841 














|				 	 system				 unieff		 	 autonomy 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
system	|				 1.0000 
unieff	|				 0.3996				 1.0000 
autonomy	|				 0.0206				 0.0930				 1.0000	
Figure 38.  Additional Regression Model Results 
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F. SURVEY 
The survey, in its entirety is presented in Figure 43. 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consent to Participate in Research 
 
Introduction.  You are invited to participate in a research study entitled Small Town Insurgency: 
The Struggle for Information Dominance to Reduce Gang Violence.  This research will foster a 
greater understanding of the causes of gang–related violence.  
 
Procedures.  You will be participating in a brief survey consisting of 33 questions.  The survey is 
expected to take no more than 15 minutes.  
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study.  Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary.  If you 
choose to participate you can change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study. You will 
not be penalized in any way or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled if you 
choose not to participate in this study or to withdraw.  
 
Potential Risks and Discomforts.  There are no identified potential risks associated with your 
participation in this survey.  
 
Anticipated Benefits.  Anticipated benefits from this study are: a better understanding of factors 
that contribute to gang–related violence and a potential for reduced gang violence within Salinas.  
You will not directly benefit from your participation in this research.  
 
Compensation for Participation.  No tangible compensation will be given.  A copy of the 
research results will be available at the conclusion of the experiment through the Naval 
Postgraduate School, and will be available for review, online, at the Dudley K. Knox Library:  
http://www.nps.edu/library. 
 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act.  Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept 
confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep 
your personal information in your research record confidential but total confidentiality cannot be 
guaranteed.  All records associated with your participation will be maintained and analyzed only 
by those directly involved with this research project, to include those conducting the survey.  
However, it is possible that the researcher may be required to divulge information obtained in the 
course of this research to the subject’s chain of command or other legal body.  No names will be 
used to identify participants in this research. 
 
Points of Contact.  If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience 
an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while taking part in this 
study please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Michael Freeman, (831) 656–3731,  
mefreema@nps.edu.  Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may 
be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831–656–2473, 
lgshattu@nps.edu. 
 
Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given the 
opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have 
 216
been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to participate in this study. I 
understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and signing this form, I do not waive 
any of my legal rights. 
 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 
Participant’s Signature     Date 
 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 
Researcher’s Signature     Date 
 
 
1. Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas 
has increased. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
2. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very 
serious. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens. Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
4. The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas 
citizens. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
5. The Salinas Police are very responsive to 
citizen complaints. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
6. The Salinas City Council are very responsive to 
citizen complaints. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
7. I am confident in Salinas’s courts and legal 
system. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
8. I am satisfied with the quality of education in 
Salinas 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 




9. I receive most of my information about gang 
activity through official city communication 
channels (Press releases, billboards, community 
meetings). 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
10. I receive most of my information about gang 
activity through word of mouth or rumors. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
11. I receive most of my information about gang 
activity through media outlets (TV, newspaper, 
radio). 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk 
alone at night. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
13. I feel safe and secure in my home. Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
14. I or a member of my family have been 
threatened by a gang member in Salinas. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
15. As compared to a year ago, the Salinas police 
department has made the city a more secure and 
safe place to live. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
16. Speaking English, as a common language, will 
unite all of Salinas’s citizens. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
17. Salinas’s citizens are best represented by 
leaders from their own racial or ethnic 
background. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
18. People should help others who are less 
fortunate. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
19. Hispanic Americans face discrimination in 
getting a decent job. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
20. My ethnic group membership is very important 
to my sense of who I am. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
21. The needs of my ethnic group are met by the 
City of Salinas (police, city council, 
educational system, mayor). 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
22. People should form or participate in community 
organizations to solve community problems in 
Salinas. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
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23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach 
to confronting gang violence. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
24. The police work with local community leaders 
to fight gang violence. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
25. It is important and effective to pass crime 
information to the Salinas Police Department. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
26. The gang violence problem will resolve itself 
with time regardless of how the City responds 
to the situation  
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know
27.  I have a role in implementing the city’s 
counter-gang strategy. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know
28.  Information related to gang activities should 
only be shared with other individuals or 
departments on a need to know basis. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know
29. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD have a 
unified counter-gang strategy. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know
30. The gang violence problem is something that 
requires the combined efforts of the population 
of Salinas and the city government (police, city 
council, mayor, educational system) to resolve. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know 
31. The City of Salinas has been effective in 
soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the 
gang violence problem. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know
32. City agencies communicate effectively among 
each other on issues related to gang violence. 
Completely                           Completely  
Disagree                                Agree 
1          2           3          4         5        Don’t Know
33. I live within the city limits of Salinas No                           Yes
Figure 39.  Salinas City Employee Survey 
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APPENDIX E. NETWORK SURVEY AND EMPIRICAL 
INFORMATION  
A. DESCRIPTION 
Participants received an electronic excel spreadsheet survey through the SPD 
email system.  These potential participants were asked four comprehensive questions, in 
order to analyze the operations of the informal network.  This survey took approximately 
30 minutes to complete.  The survey questions were designed to measure, understand, 
and visualize the contact network, the advice network, the intelligence network, and the 
assistance or trust network that exist in the SPD.  Specifically, each officer rated his or 
her survey responses using a scale of 0 (Rarely or never), 1 (Every few months), 2 (Every 
few weeks), 3 (Every week), and 4 (Everyday) in relation to other officers and outside 
organizations and agencies that work with SPD on gang related issues.  The survey was 
returned to the research team electronically.  Survey results were compiled and analyzed 
using UCINET and NETDRAW social networking analysis programs.188 In accordance 
with IRB guidelines, all names were removed from survey responses during the analysis 
of the results. 
B. METHOD OF RECRUITMENT 
On recommendations for the Salinas City Manager and the SPD Chief of Police, 
the entire SPD was recruited to conduct the survey, provided they had an option to opt-
out if they so desired.  The survey was sent to the Assistant Chief of Police via email, 
who electronically distributed the surveys to potential recruits through official SPD email 
distribution lists.  The SPD leadership encouraged participation in the survey, but did not 
make participation mandatory.  All information gathered during this survey is 
unclassified. 
                                                 
188 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis and 
Brogatti, Netdraw Network Visualization. 
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C. SURVEY 
1. Social Network Survey 
Figure 44 is an example of the Network Survey distributed to the Salinas Police 
Department from 15 September 2010 thru 27 September 2010, which was used in 
conjunction with the social network analysis portion of this thesis.189 
 
Figure 40.  Social Network Analysis Survey Example used to analyze the Salinas 
Police Department 
                                                 
189 The survey used for this research was developed using the David Krackhardt informal network 
model, and was adapted by Bruce Hoppe, Ph.D. from Boston University.  Used with permission, from 
Hoppe, Organizational Network Survey Spreadsheet Utility. 
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2. Social Network Participation Results 
The following table shows participation numbers, demonstrating the limitations of the social analysis conducted with 
the SPD.  Total numbers were derived from historical SPD data, dated 19 August 2010.  It is entirely possible that current 
numbers have changed slightly; however, at the time of the survey’s execution, these are the numbers that the research team 
used. 
 
Table 61.  Salinas Police Department Network Analysis Survey Participation Results
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3. Contact Network Working Data and Analysis 
a. Weekly Contact Network Density, Average Degree, 
Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE190 
                                       Density No. of Ties 
                             --------------  -------------- 
Salinas NetworkGE3         0.2200 753.0000 
Table 62.  Weekly Contact Network Density Results  
FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES191 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
                            1             2             3             4 
                     OutDegree      InDegree     NrmOutDeg   NrmInDeg 
                  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------ 
    1  Mean         12.763         12.763        22.005        22.005 
    2  Std Dev         11.522         4.014        19.866         6.921 
    3  Sum        753.000       753.000      1298.276      1298.276 
    4  Variance        132.757        16.113       394.641        47.899 
    5  SSQ       17443.000     10561.000     51851.961     31394.174 
    6  MCSSQ      7832.678       950.678     23283.822      2826.034 
    7  Euc Norm        132.072       102.767       227.710       177.184 
    8  Minimum          0.000         2.000         0.000         3.448 
    9  Maximum         54.000        24.000        93.103        41.379 
   10 N of Obs         59.000        59.000        59.000        59.000 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 72.325% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 19.709% 
 
Table 63.  Weekly Contact Network Average Degree Centrality and Centralization 
Results  
                                                 
190 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 




Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.444 
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.353 
 
Table 64.  Weekly Contact Network Clustering Coefficient  
GEODESIC DISTANCE193 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Average distance (among reachable pairs)    = 1.943 
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness")     = 0.532 
  (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness) 
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.468 
 
Table 65.  Weekly Contact Network Average Path Length and Cohesion 
b. Daily Contact Network Density, Average Degree, Centralization, 
Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE194 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------                        
     Density  No. of Observations 
    ----------- ---------------------------- 
Salinas NetworkEQ4  0.050   171.000 
 
Table 66.  Daily Contact Network Density Results  
                                                 
192 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
193 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
194 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
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FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES195 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
                            1             2             3             4 
                     OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
                  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------ 
    1  Mean          2.898        2.898        4.997         4.997 
    2  Std Dev          3.074        2.023        5.299        3.487 
    3  Sum         171.000       171.000       294.828      294.828 
    4  Variance         9.447        4.091        28.083        12.162 
    5  SSQ  1053.000       737.000     3130.202      2190.844 
    6  MCSSQ       557.390      241.390      1656.926      717.568 
    7  Euc Norm        32.450        27.148        55.948       46.806 
    8  Minimum         0.000        0.000         0.000        0.000 
    9  Maximum         17.000         7.000        29.310       12.069 
   10 N of Obs         59.000       59.000        59.000        59.000 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 24.732% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 7.194% 
 




Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.379 
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.283 
 
Table 68.  Daily Contact Network Clustering Coefficient  
GEODESIC DISTANCE197 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Average distance (among reachable pairs)    = 4.382 
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness")     = 0.176 
  (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness) 
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.824 
 
Table 69.  Daily Contact Network Average Path Length and Cohesion 
                                                 
195 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
196 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
197 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
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c. Weekly Contact-Agency Network Density 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE198 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                        Density     No. of Ties 
                                  --------------  -------------- 
    Salinas Agency NetworkGE3          0.0405         43.0000 
 
Table 70.  Weekly Contact-Agency Network Density Results  
d. Daily Contact-Agency Network Density 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE199 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                    Density     No. of Ties 
                                  --------------  -------------- 
Salinas Agency NetworkEQ4          0.0122         13.0000 
 
Table 71.  Daily Contact-Agency Network Density Results  
4. Advice Network Working Data 
a. Weekly Advice Network Density, Average Degree, Centralization, 
Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE200 
                                Density     No. of Ties 
                         --------------  -------------- 
    Advice NetworkGE3          0.0710        243.0000 
Table 72.  Weekly Advice Network Density Results  
                                                 
198 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
199 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
200 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
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FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES201 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
                            1             2             3             4 
                     OutDegree     InDegree    NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
                  ------------  ------------ ------------  ------------ 
    1  Mean          4.119         4.119         7.101         7.101 
    2  Std Dev          5.308         2.585         9.151         4.456 
    3  Sum         243.000       243.000       418.966       418.966 
    4  Variance         28.172         6.681        83.747        19.860 
    5  SSQ        2663.000      1395.000      7916.171      4146.849 
    6  MCSSQ       1662.169       394.169      4941.051      1171.729 
    7  Euc Norm         51.604        37.350        88.973        64.396 
    8  Minimum          0.000         1.000         0.000         1.724 
    9  Maximum         22.000        13.000        37.931        22.414 
   10 N of Obs         59.000        59.000        59.000        59.000 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 31.361% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 15.577% 
 




Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.244 
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0. 
 
Table 74.  Weekly Advise Network Clustering Coefficient  
GEODESIC DISTANCE203 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Average distance (among reachable pairs)    = 3.383 
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness")     = 0.281 
  (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness) 
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.719 
 
Table 75.  Weekly Advice Network Average Path Length and Cohesion 
                                                 
201 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
202 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
203 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
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b. Daily Advice Network Density, Average Degree, Centralization, 
Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE204 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
            Density     No. of Ties 
      --------------  -------------- 
Advice NetworkEQ4           0.0231         79.0000 
 
Table 76.  Daily Advice Network Density Results  




                            1             2             3             4 
                     OutDegree      InDegree     NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
                 ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------ 
    1  Mean          1.339         1.339         2.309         2.309 
    2  Std Dev          2.535         1.323         4.371         2.280 
    3  Sum         79.000        79.000       136.207       136.207 
    4  Variance          6.427         1.749        19.107         5.201 
    5   SSQ        485.000       209.000      1441.736       621.284 
    6   MCSSQ        379.220       103.220      1127.290       306.838 
    7  Euc Norm         22.023        14.457        37.970        24.926 
    8  Minimum          0.000         0.000         0.000         0.000 
    9  Maximum         15.000         5.000        25.862         8.621 
   10 N of Obs         59.000        59.000        59.000        59.000 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 23.960% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 6.421% 
 
Table 77.  Daily Advice Network Average Degree Centrality and Centralization 
Results  
                                                 
204 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 




Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.425 
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0. 
 
Table 78.  Daily Advise Network Clustering Coefficient  
GEODESIC DISTANCE207 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Average distance (among reachable pairs)    = 2.931 
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness")     = 0.048 
  (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness) 
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.952 
 
Table 79.  Daily Advice Network Average Path Length and Cohesion 
c. Weekly Advice-Agency Network Density 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE208 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                       Density     No. of Ties 
                                 --------------  -------------- 
Advice Agency NetworkGE3             0.0160         16.0000 
 
Table 80.  Weekly Advice-Agency Network Density Results  
d. Daily Advice-Agency Network Density 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE209 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                       Density     No. of Ties 
                                 --------------  -------------- 
Advice Agency NetworkEQ4            0.0070          7.0000 
 
Table 81.  Daily Advice-Agency Network Density Results  
                                                 
206 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
207 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
208 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
209 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
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5. Intelligence Network Working Data 
a. Weekly Intelligence Network Density, Average Degree, 
Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE210 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                           Density      No. of Ties 
                         --------------  -------------- 
Intel NetworkGE3           0.0731        250.0000 
 
Table 82.  Weekly Intelligence Network Density Results  




                            1             2            3             4 
                     OutDegree        InDegree         NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
                  ------------  ------------        ------------         --------------- 
    1  Mean                      4.237         4.237         7.306         7.306 
    2  Std Dev          5.700         2.242         9.827         3.866 
    3  Sum         250.000       250.000       431.034       431.034 
    4  Variance         32.486         5.028        96.570        14.948 
    5  SSQ        2976.000      1356.000      8846.611      4030.916 
    6  MCSSQ       1916.678       296.678      5697.616       881.920 
    7  Euc Norm         54.553        36.824        94.056        63.489 
    8  Minimum          0.000         1.000         0.000         1.724 
    9  Maximum         22.000        10.000        37.931        17.241 
   10 N of Obs         59.000        59.000        59.000        59.000 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 31.153% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 10.107% 
 
Table 83.  Weekly Intelligence Network Average Degree Centrality and Centralization 
Results  
                                                 
210 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 




Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.324 
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.193 
 
Table 84.  Weekly Intelligence Network Clustering Coefficient  
GEODESIC DISTANCE213 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Average distance (among reachable pairs)    = 3.090 
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness")     = 0.235 
  (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness) 
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.765 
 
Table 85.  Weekly Intelligence Network Average Path Length and Cohesion 
b. Daily Intelligence Network Density, Average Degree, 
Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE214 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                Density            No. of Ties 
                        --------------  -------------- 
 Intel NetworkEQ4     0.0234         80.0000 
 
Table 86.  Daily Intelligence Network Density Results  
                                                 
212 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
213 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
214 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
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                            1             2             3             4 
                     OutDegree     InDegree     NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
                  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------ 
    1  Mean          1.356         1.356         2.338         2.338 
    2  Std Dev          2.184         1.423         3.766         2.454 
    3  Sum          80.000        80.000       137.931       137.931 
    4  Variance          4.772         2.026        14.184         6.022 
    5  SSQ         390.000       228.000      1159.334       677.765 
    6  MCSSQ        281.525       119.525       836.877       355.307 
    7 Euc Norm         19.748        15.100        34.049        26.034 
    8  Minimum          0.000         0.000         0.000         0.000 
    9  Maximum          9.000         5.000        15.517         8.621 
   10 N of Obs         59.000        59.000        59.000        59.000 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 13.407% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 6.391% 




Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.475 
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.298 
 
Table 88.  Daily Intelligence Network Clustering Coefficient  
GEODESIC DISTANCE217 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Average distance (among reachable pairs)    = 2.753 
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness")     = 0.049 
  (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness) 
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.951 
 
Table 89.  Daily Intelligence Network Average Path Length and Cohesion 
                                                 
215 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
216 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
217 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
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c. Weekly Intelligence-Agency Network Density 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE218 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      Density     No. of Ties 
                               --------------  -------------- 
Intel Agency NetworkGE3           0.0160         16.0000 
 
Table 90.  Weekly Intelligence-Agency Network Density Results  
d. Daily Intelligence-Agency Network Density 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE219 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      Density     No. of Ties 
                               --------------  -------------- 
Intel Agency NetworkEQ4           0.0060          6.0000 
 
Table 91.  Daily Intelligence-Agency Network Density Results  
6. Assistance Network Working Data 
a. Weekly Assistance Network Density, Average Degree, 
Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE220 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                    Density     No. of Ties 
                              --------------  -------------- 
Assistance NetworkGE3           0.0751        257.0000 
Table 92.  Weekly Assistance Network Density Results 
                                                 
218 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
219 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 








                            1             2             3             4 
                     OutDegree     InDegree     NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
                  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------ 
    1  Mean          4.356         4.356         7.510         7.510 
    2  Std Dev          6.011         2.334        10.363         4.025 
    3  Sum         257.000       257.000       443.103       443.103 
    4  Variance         36.128         5.450       107.395        16.200 
    5  SSQ        3251.000      1441.000      9664.090      4283.591 
    6  MCSSQ       2131.525       321.525      6336.282       955.783 
    7  Euc Norm         57.018        37.961        98.306        65.449 
    8  Minimum          0.000         0.000         0.000         0.000 
    9  Maximum         27.000        11.000        46.552        18.966 
   10 N of Obs         59.000        59.000        59.000        59.000 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 39.715% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 11.653% 
 




Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.376 
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.204 
 
Table 94.  Weekly Assistance Network Clustering Coefficient  
                                                 
221 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 




Average distance (among reachable pairs)    = 2.959 
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness")     = 0.250 
 (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness) 
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.750 
 
Table 95.   Weekly Assistance Network Average Path Length and Cohesion 
b. Daily Assistance Network Density, Average Degree, 
Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE224 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     Density  No. of 
Ties 
     --------------  -----------
-- 
Assistance NetworkEQ4           0.0248         85.0000 
 
Table 96.  Daily Assistance Network Density Results  
                                                 
223 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
224 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
 235
FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES225 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
                            1             2             3             4 
                     OutDegree     InDegree     NrmOutDeg     NrmInDeg 
                  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------ 
    1  Mean          1.441         1.441         2.484         2.484 
    2  Std Dev          2.520         1.292         4.344         2.228 
    3  Sum          85.000        85.000       146.552       146.552 
    4  Variance          6.348         1.670        18.871         4.965 
    5  SSQ         497.000       221.000      1477.408       656.956 
    6  MCSSQ        374.542        98.542      1113.384       292.932 
    7  Euc Norm         22.293        14.866        38.437        25.631 
    8  Minimum          0.000         0.000         0.000         0.000 
    9  Maximum         13.000         5.000        22.414         8.621 
   10 N of Obs         59.000        59.000        59.000        59.000 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 20.273% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 6.243% 
 





Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.471 
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.236 
 
Table 98.  Daily Assistance Network Clustering Coefficient  
                                                 
225 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 




Average distance (among reachable pairs)    = 3.081 
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness")     = 0.055 
  (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness) 
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.945 
 
Table 99.  Daily Assistance Network Average Path Length and Cohesion 
c. Weekly Assistance-Agency Network Density 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE228 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                            Density     No. of Ties 
                                      --------------  -------------- 
Assistance Agency NetworkGE3           0.0199         20.0000 
 
Table 100.  Weekly Assistance-Agency Network Density Results  
d. Daily Assistance-Agency Network Density 
DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE229 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                            Density     No. of Ties 
                                     --------------  -------------- 
Assistance Agency NetworkEQ4           0.0080          8.0000 
 
Table 101.   Daily Assistance-Agency Network Density Results  
                                                 
227 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
228 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
229 Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. 
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APPENDIX F. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
A. DESCRIPTION 
The interviews conducted in conjunction with this study used questions developed 
from our condition variables.  The questions ranged from baseline assessments of the 
gang situation, to perceptions of city government.  Topics identified for discussion 
included: legitimacy, city security, population’s trust in government, levels of 
intelligence sharing, and media engagement.  Not all questions developed for this 
research were applicable to every person interviewed.  Thus, we developed tailored 
interview questions for each interviewee based on their role in countering the gang 
problem in Salinas, whether they were involved in suppression, intervention, or 
prevention; or some combination of all of these. All interview questions were developed 
in advance, and were approved by the Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review 
Board.   
To elicit thoughtful and candid responses from the interviewees, we attempted to 
be as transparent as possible by providing the questions identified for discussion prior to 
the interview.  All interviews were conducted in person with at least two researchers 
present during the interview.  At all times, interviewees were made aware that we were 
taking notes of the interview, and all respondents agreed to be quoted; however, some of 
the respondents did not want to be referred to by name in the final publication of this 
paper.   Interviews ranged between 45 to 90 minutes in length.  The feedback during the 
interviews reflected an array of substantive responses, from additional discussion topics 




B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The following list of questions, organized by each of our significant variables, 
represents the questions used to conduct the interviews necessary to support our research: 
 
1. General Questions 
1. Do you think gangs are a problem within the city of Salinas? 
2. Do you think the gang problem in Salinas is more of a problem now than it was 
1–10 yrs ago? 
2. Unity of Effort 
1. In your opinion, is the city of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting 
gang violence? 
a. Could you give some examples? 
b. Does this unified approach include non-governmental entities? 
c. How has this changed over the last 10 yrs? 
2. Does the city encourage initiatives that include citizen involvement to counter 
gang violence?  
a. Could you give some examples? 
3. In your opinion is intelligence on gang activity freely shared among all 
departments within the city government? 
4. Who makes strategic decisions regarding the city’s counter gang strategy?   
5. Does the chief of police and or Mayor publish guidance on counter-gang activity? 
a. If so, how is this guidance distributed and to what level within the 
organization is this guidance disseminated? 
6. Are there published critical intelligence requirements established for gang-
activity? 
a. Are these intelligence requirements known by all officers within the police 
department? 
7. What are the agencies that most collaborate with your organization to counter 
gang violence? 
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8. What civil protection programs does the city of Salinas employ, such as 
neighborhood watch etc.? 
a. Are any of these programs effective at harnessing population involvement 
in countering gang violence?  
i. If not, what would make them more effective?  
b. Do these programs enable the population to participate in its own security? 
3. Integration 
1. What are some existing barriers that hinder cooperation between government and 
nongovernment entities in countering gang violence? 
2. Is the communication within the city government effective with respect to gang 
violence? 
a. Within the police department? 
b. With other law enforcement agencies? 
c. With the city officials? 
d. With the public? 
3. What is the primary means of communication the police department uses to 
communicate with the local population on gang related issues? 
4. What mechanisms does the city employ to gather feedback on the population’s 
attitudes and perceptions in regards to gang violence? 
5. How much would you say the work of the police department’s gang activity is 
characterized by deliberate (planned) operations versus reactionary? 
6. How is information / intelligence disseminated within your organization? Outside 
your organization? 
a. Is intelligence on gang activity handled in a unique fashion? 
b. To what extent are information / intelligence compartmentalized and or 
controlled strictly by the originator of the information?  
i. What kind of information is compartmentalized within the police 
department? 
c. To what extent does the police department share intelligence across 
interagency boundaries? 
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7. What are some collaborative tools the city uses to integrate its efforts to counter 
gang activity?  Examples: Share point web site. 
4. Autonomy 
1. Would you consider the decision making process for counter-gang initiatives to 
be fast and efficient or slow and delaying? 
a. What about decisions for tactical operations? 
5. Legitimacy 
1. In your opinion how important is legitimacy for a governing body? 
2. What do you feel are some components of city government legitimacy? 
3. What strengthens legitimacy; weakens legitimacy in city governments? 
4. In your opinion is Salinas’ government seen as legitimate? 
5. In your opinion what are some of the indicators of legitimacy? 
6. What are some steps the city government is taking to improve its legitimacy 
within the population? 
7. In your opinion how has the legitimacy of the Salinas city government changed 
over the last 10 yrs. (Increased / Decreased) 
6. Security 
1. In your opinion how important is security for a city? 
2. In your opinion is Salinas a secure city? How has this changed over the last 10 
yrs? 
3. What strengthens security; weakens security of a city? 
4. In your opinion what are some indicators of a secure city? 
5. What are some steps the city government is taking to improve the security of 
Salinas? 
7. Trust 
1. In your opinion do the citizens of Salinas trust the city government? Why or why 
not? 
2. Does this trust or lack of trust follow racial, ethnic, cultural, or some other lines? 
3. In your opinion what does the rejection of measure “k” indicate, if anything? 
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4. In your opinion does the population tell everything it knows about the gangs to 
local law enforcement? 
a. Why or why not?  What are some barriers preventing this? 
5. In your opinion how has the population’s trust in the city government changed 
over the last 10 years? 
8. Embeddedness 
1. In your opinion what percent of the police force lives within the city of Salinas? 
2. Does your organization encourage community involvement outside of work 
related matters? How is this done? 
3. Does your organization put an emphasis on cultural awareness? (Language 
training) 
9. Information Operations 
1. Does your organization issue press releases regarding gang activity? 
2. What is the criterion your organization uses when issuing press releases related to 
gang activity? (per incident, periodically, pro-actively)  
3. Does the Salinas city government have a coordinated message to influence target 
audiences within the population in regards to gang violence?  
4. What is the central theme of the city’s counter gang message? 
a. What are the different target audiences the city focuses on? 
b. What would you say is the most effective tool the gangs use to convey 
their messages to the population?  
i. Do you believe the gangs have an IO theme? 
ii. Would you consider the gangs IO campaign effective? 
iii. Does the city have a similar tool you use to counter this?  
5. Do you have a PIO to handle media engagements? 
6. What mediums does the city use to put out its message to the population regarding 
gang violence? 
7. How often does the city put out information messages to the population 
concerning its counter-gang strategy? 
8. How has the city’s media engagement changed over the last few years? 
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